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This dissertation is comprised of three essays which examine the ramifications of
executive compensation incentive structures on corporate outcomes. In the first essay,
I present evidence which suggests that executive compensation convexity, measured
as the sensitivity of managerial equity compensation portfolios to stock volatility, pre-
dicts firm-specific crashes. I find that a bottom-to-top decile change in compensation
convexity results in a 21% increase in a firm’s unconditional ex-post idiosyncratic
crash risk. In contrast, I do not find robust evidence of a symmetric relation be-
tween compensation convexity and a firm’s idiosyncratic positive jump risk. Finally,
I exploit exogenous variation in compensation convexity, arising from a change in
the expensing treatment of executive stock options, in buttressing my interpretations
within a natural experiment setting. My results suggest that managerial equity com-
pensation portfolios do not augment a firm’s future idiosyncratic crash risk because
they link managerial wealth to equity prices, but rather because they tie managerial
wealth to the volatility of a firm’s equity.
In the second essay, I exploit an exogenous negative shock to CEO compensation
convexity in examining the differential ramifications of option pay and risk-taking in-
centives on the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility of the firm. I find new evidence
that is largely consistent with the notion that compensation convexity, stemming from
option convexity, predominantly incentivizes under-diversified risk-averse CEOs to in-
crease the value of their option portfolios by increasing the systematic volatility of
the firms they manage. I hypothesize that this effect manifests as systematic volatil-
ity is readily more hedgeable than idiosyncratic volatility from the perspective of
risk-averse executives who are overexposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms.
If managers use options as a conduit through which they can gamble with share-
holder wealth by overexposing them to suboptimal systematic volatility, options are
not serving their intended contracting function. Instead of decreasing agency costs of
risk, by encouraging CEOs to adopt innovative positive NPV projects that may be
primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk, option pay may have contributed to the
same frictions it was intended to reduce.
In the third essay, I present evidence that is consistent with the notion that certain
managerial debt-like remuneration structures decrease the likelihood of firm-specific
positive stock-price jumps. Namely, I find that a bottom-to-top decile increase in
the present value of CEO pension pay leads to a roughly 25% decrease in a firm’s
unconditional ex-post jump probability. However, I do not find that CEO deferred
compensation decreases firm jump risk. Finally, I find that information in option-
implied volatility smirks does not appear to reflect these dynamics. Together, these
results suggest that not all debt-like compensation mechanisms decrease managerial
risk-taking equally.
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CHAPTER 1
Executive Compensation Convexity and Firm Crash Risk
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1.1. Introduction
A growing body of evidence shows that equity components of executive compen-
sation, originally designed to mitigate agency costs within a firm, may, instead, exac-
erbate the frictions they are intended to remedy. For instance, Armstrong, Larcker,
Ormazabal, and Taylor (2013) find that compensation convexity within executive re-
muneration portfolios incentivizes executives to misreport the earnings of the firms
they manage. Benmelech, Kandel, and Veronesi (2010) demonstrate theoretically
that the concealing of negative firm-specific information induced by stock-based com-
pensation should precipitate substantial market overvaluations as well as subsequent
crashes in the firm’s stock price. In this paper, I examine empirically whether execu-
tive compensation convexity, measured as the average sensitivity of the top executives’
equity compensation portfolios to stock volatility, predicts idiosyncratic firm crashes.
Using four measures of idiosyncratic firm crash risk, one ex-ante and three ex-post,
I provide new evidence demonstrating an economically significant positive predictive
link between compensation convexity (risk-taking incentives) and idiosyncratic firm
crashes.
My first measure of a firm’s idiosyncratic crash risk is the steepness of its option
implied volatility smirk. Within the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing framework,
all options written on the same underlying asset and time to expiration should yield
identical estimates of implied volatility. Empirically, the implied volatilities of out-of-
the-money put options typically exceed those of at-the-money put options. The option
pricing literature suggests that the smirk reflects the option market’s expectation of
future crash and negative jump risk in stock prices (Bates, 1991; Dumas, Fleming, and
Whaley, 1998; Bates, 2000; Pan, 2002). I find that executive compensation convexity
is positively related to the slope of a firm’s put smirk. This result suggests that the
option market’s ex-ante expectation of a firm’s future idiosyncratic crash and negative
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jump risk increases with executive compensation convexity.
Next, I consider the ramifications of compensation convexity on a firm’s ex-post
idiosyncratic crash risk. Following Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009), I define
an ex-post idiosyncratic firm crash as a decline in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns
falling 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly
return for a given firm fiscal year.1 My first measure of ex-post idiosyncratic firm
crash risk is a binary indicator specifying the occurrence of an idiosyncratic firm crash
within a firm fiscal year. Using logistic, conditional logistic, and linear probability
models, I identify a positive predictive relationship between executive compensation
convexity and the occurrence of idiosyncratic firm crashes. All else equal, I find
that moving from the bottom decile to the top decile of compensation convexity
results in a 5.14 percentage point increase in a firm’s idiosyncratic crash risk. This
increase is economically significant as, on average, it represents roughly 21% of a
firm’s unconditional ex-post idiosyncratic crash risk.
My second measure of ex-post idiosyncratic firm crash risk is the number of id-
iosyncratic firm stock-price crashes within a given firm fiscal year. By means of
Poisson, conditional Poisson, and linear model analysis, I find that executive com-
pensation convexity is positively related to the number of idiosyncratic firm crashes
within a given firm fiscal year. My third measure of ex-post idiosyncratic firm crash
risk is the largest standard deviation decline in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns below
their firm fiscal year mean. Using this measure, I show that executive compensation
convexity is positively related to the magnitude of idiosyncratic firm crashes.
Across my empirical specifications, I find that executive compensation convexity
is positively related to the realized (ex-post) occurrence, frequency, and magnitude
of idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes. This relation persists even after controlling
for the idiosyncratic firm put smirk and other established predictive measures of
13.09 standard deviations is selected as the crash threshold as it yields a 0.1% probability of
crashes under the normal distribution.
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idiosyncratic crashes. This evidence suggests that option prices may not fully reflect
the impact of compensation convexity on future firm crash risk. I also demonstrate
that the positive relation between compensation convexity and the idiosyncratic firm
crash measures is robust to alternate definitions of compensation convexity as well as
to the inclusion of firm, year, executive, and executive spell fixed effects (CEO×Firm
fixed effects).
Compensation convexity provides executives with incentives to conceal negative
earnings information pertaining to the firms which they manage. This occurs as
convexity within remuneration mechanisms decreases managerial aversion to the in-
creased equity risk stemming from misreporting. The resulting discontinuous release
of adverse firm-specific news, in clusters, mediates the observed empirical relation
between convexity and crashes. Accordingly, the link between convexity and idiosyn-
cratic crash risk should be more pronounced in firms in which it is more feasible for
executives to withhold information from the market. Pontiff (2006) finds that id-
iosyncratic risk is the single largest impediment to market efficiency. As arbitrageurs
are unable to fully hedge the idiosyncratic risk stemming from arbitrage positions,
they must assess the costs of idiosyncratic risk exposure on expected arbitrage prof-
its. All else equal, managers should be able to conceal more information in higher
idiosyncratic volatility firms as the costs to arbitraging mispricing in the stock prices
of these firms are more stringent. In accordance with the hypothesized amplification
effects of informational inefficiency on the convexity-idiosyncratic crash risk relation,
I find that the positive association between compensation convexity and ex-post crash
risk is stronger in higher idiosyncratic volatility firms.
I assess the robustness of my inferences within a natural experiment setting by
exploiting the exogenous variation in compensation convexity surrounding a change
in the expensing treatment of executive stock options. Prior to FAS 123R, firms were
given a choice to expense executive options at either their intrinsic or fair values. Most
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firms elected the intrinsic valuation methodology and issued options at-the-money so
as to set their option related expenses to zero when reporting earnings. FAS 123R
mandated the expensing of options at their fair value through the use of either a
closed form option pricing model, such as the Black and Scholes (1973) model as
modified to account for dividend payouts, or a binomial option pricing model. Using
a comprehensive sample of firms, Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012) demonstrate that
firms attenuate their utilization of options as a component of executive remuneration
portfolios following the implementation of FAS 123R in December of 2005. As option
value is a convex function of a firm’s stock price, Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012)
find that this reduction in options issuance to executives precipitated an exogenous
decline in compensation convexity.
To mitigate endogeneity concerns, I use the cross-sectional difference-in-means
identification strategy of Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012) in exploiting the exoge-
nous variation in convexity surrounding FAS 123R. Specifically, I transform all of the
independent and dependent variables by first determining the averages of the respec-
tive variables, for each firm, pre- and post-FAS 123R. I then calculate a post- minus
pre-period difference for each variable and regress changes in the crash outcome vari-
ables on changes in the set of independent variables. I define the pre-FAS 123R period
as spanning fiscal years 2002-2004 while setting the post-FAS 123R period to fiscal
years 2005-2007. On average, I find that firms experiencing greater pre- to post-FAS
123R declines in compensation convexity experience greater reductions in the occur-
rence, frequency, and magnitude of realized (ex-post) idiosyncratic firm stock-price
crashes. In contrast, I find no evidence indicating that the exogenous negative shock
to compensation convexity had any significant effect on firms’ idiosyncratic positive
jump risk within this setting.
Finally, I employ a difference-in-differences identification strategy featuring a con-
tinuous magnitude of convexity treatment variable. As an ex-ante proxy for the
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magnitude of convexity treatment under FAS 123R, I use the level of Executive Vega
in fiscal year 2002 as it is prior to when most firms began adjusting compensation con-
tracts in anticipation of FAS 123R. All else equal, managers with higher vega in 2002
are expected to be more affected by FAS 123R from a risk-taking incentives stand-
point than their lower vega counterparts. In interacting the magnitude of convexity
treatment variable (Executive Vega 2002) with the post-FAS 123R period dummy, I
find that firms that were, ex-ante, more likely to be affected by FAS 123R decrease
their idiosyncratic crash risk by a greater amount than the firms that were less likely
to be affected by FAS 123R. These results are largely consistent with my previous
inferences.2
This paper contributes to the compensation literature by demonstrating that ex-
ecutive compensation convexity, measured as the average sensitivity of the top exec-
utives’ equity compensation portfolios to stock volatility, predicts idiosyncratic firm
crashes. Specifically, the evidence in this paper suggests that the incentives stem-
ming from managerial equity portfolios do not appear to augment a firm’s future
idiosyncratic crash risk because they link managerial wealth to equity prices (delta),
but rather because they tie managerial wealth to the volatility of the firm’s equity
(vega). All else equal, I find that this effect is economically significant as a bottom-
to-top decile change in compensation convexity results in a 21% increase in a firm’s
unconditional ex-post idiosyncratic crash risk.
If the relation between compensation convexity and idiosyncratic crash risk is en-
tirely mediated by the risky investments of a firm’s executives, I would expect to
also observe a positive relation between convexity and positive stock-price jump risk
as these risky bets should, in certain states, also yield highly positive idiosyncratic
returns. Empirically, I do not find robust evidence of a symmetric link between com-
2Unlike the cross-sectional difference-in-means research design of Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu
(2012), this specification does not capture the magnitude of the ex-post realized decline in con-
vexity after FAS 123R.
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pensation convexity and a firm’s idiosyncratic positive jump risk. This asymmetry
manifests as executives’ incentives to conceal negative firm-specific information ex-
ceed their incentives to withhold positive firm news. As a result, the release of positive
firm-specific information is more continuous in nature and, thus, does not lead to pos-
itive idiosyncratic stock price jumps. This evidence clarifies the potentially negative
implications of compensation convexity on extreme corporate outcomes. Moreover,
the asymmetric nature of my results suggests that executives’ concealing of negative
firm specific performance information plays a crucial role in propagating the observed
empirical relation between compensation convexity and idiosyncratic firm crash risk.
This paper also adds to a second strand of literature which examines the factors
underlying a firm’s option implied volatility smirk. Namely, I provide new evidence re-
vealing that compensation convexity is positively related to the steepness of a firm’s
idiosyncratic firm put smirk. Intuitively, the slope of the put smirk is more pro-
nounced when option investors’ perceptions of the likelihood of the future occurrence
of idiosyncratic firm stock price crashes exceed the crash probabilities implied by a
lognormal distribution.3 My results indicate that the option market’s ex-ante percep-
tion of a firm’s idiosyncratic crash risk increases with compensation convexity. This
paper also contributes to the option pricing literature by showing that compensation
convexity is positively related to the realized (ex-post) occurrence, frequency, and
magnitude of idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes even after controlling for the put
smirk and other established predictive measures of idiosyncratic crashes. This evi-
dence suggests that option prices may not fully reflect the impact of compensation
convexity on future idiosyncratic firm crash risk.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the related
literature and institutional background. Section 1.3 develops my hypotheses and
3Investors can also bid up the prices and, consequently, the implied volatilities of out-of-the-
money put options, relative to at-the-money put options, as they demand more crash and negative
jump risk insurance on firms whose top executives are compensated with highly convex remuneration
contracts.
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specifies the identification strategy. Section 1.4 describes the data as well as the
measurement of important variables. Section 1.5 presents the empirical analysis and
Section 1.6 concludes the paper.
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1.2. Related Literature and Institutional Background
1.2.1. Executive Compensation and Crash Risk
Benmelech, Kandel, and Veronesi (2010) develop a dynamic rational expectations
model with asymmetric information in modeling the effects of stock based compensa-
tion on managerial effort and the concealing of firm specific information. Specifically,
they demonstrate theoretically that managerial stock based compensation may induce
managers to exert costly effort while also incentivizing managers to conceal negative
information regarding the future growth options of the firm. Moreover, their model
indicates that managers may engage in suboptimal investment policies in supporting
the concealing of bad information. Benmelech, Kandel, and Veronesi (2010) predict
that the concealing of bad news pertaining to the firm’s performance precipitates
severe market overvaluations as well as subsequent crashes in the firm’s stock price.
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) examine the link between the compensation in-
centives of bank CEOs in the years preceding the recent credit crisis and the per-
formance of banks during the crisis. Using a sample consisting of depository and
investment banks, they find little evidence indicating that CEOs whose incentives
were less aligned with those of shareholders actually fared worse during the crisis. In
fact, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) demonstrate that bank CEOs with higher equity
portfolio deltas, ex-post, performed worse than their lower delta incentives cohorts.
Furthermore, neither cash bonuses nor stock options are found to have caused de-
clines in bank performance during the crisis. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) argue that
CEOs with better aligned delta incentives appear to have taken risks that, ex-ante,
were deemed potentially profitable for shareholders. However, the ex-post outcomes
of these risks resulted in unexpected poor performance. In support of this reasoning,
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that CEOs did not attempt to decrease their share
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holdings prior to the credit crisis.
Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) find that CFOs’ price increasing incentives stemming
from option pay (option portfolio deltas) are positively related to a firm’s future crash
risk. In contrast, they show that delta incentives stemming from stock holdings do
not appear to be significantly associated with crash risk. As managerial losses from
option holdings are bounded by the strike price, the positive delta incentive effects
of option portfolios on crash risk should exceed those provided by the symmetric
payoff structures of stock portfolios. Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) find no evidence of a
significant positive link between vega and a firm’s future crash risk. They state that
it “may be desirable for future analytical research to consider the different features of
options and stocks, as well as the different characteristics of CFOs and CEOs, when
modeling the relation between managerial equity incentives and stock price crash
risk.”
1.2.2. Compensation Convexity and Misreporting
Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2013) survey the literature that ex-
amines the relation between managerial equity incentives and financial misreport-
ing and find that the empirical evidence yields mixed inferences. For instance,
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) use a regression research design in showing that
the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings is more prominent at firms
where the CEO’s equity pay is more sensitive to the firm’s stock price (higher equity
portfolio delta). Similarly, Burns and Kedia (2006) demonstrate that the sensitiv-
ity of the CEO’s option portfolio to stock price (option delta) is positively related
to a firm’s likelihood to misreport. In contrast, Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker
(2010) use a propensity-score matching approach and find little evidence of a positive
association between a CEO’s equity portfolio delta and misreporting after matching
CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments. Armstrong,
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Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2013) reconcile these findings by showing that the
relation between equity portfolio delta and misreporting is contingent on the choice
of research design. Namely, they find a positive link between delta and misreporting
using a regression design, but no evidence of a link between delta and misreporting
when exploiting a matched-pair design.
In contrast to the research design contingent relation between delta and misre-
porting, Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2013) find strong evidence of a
robust positive relation between equity portfolio vega (compensation convexity) and
misreporting. More importantly, they demonstrate that the misreporting incentives
provided by equity portfolio vega subsume those of equity portfolio delta when the full
incentives of the manager’s equity portfolio are simultaneously considered. Further-
more, Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2013) demonstrate the robustness
of the positive link between compensation convexity and managerial misreporting for,
both, the top management team (top five executives) as well as for CEOs. This result
is consistent with the intuition in Jiang, Petroni, and Wang (2010) and Feng, Ge, Luo,
and Shevlin (2011) as executives other than the CEO appear to have a prominent
role in a firm’s misreporting decision.
1.3. Hypothesis Development and Research De-
sign
1.3.1. Hypothesis Development
Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2013) postulate that as misreport-
ing augments both equity risk and equity values, it is crucial to simultaneously con-
sider both equity portfolio delta (sensitivity of the manager’s total equity portfolio to
changes in stock price) and equity portfolio vega (sensitivity of the manager’s total
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equity portfolio to changes in stock volatility) in analyzing managerial misreporting
decisions. Theoretically, equity portfolio delta provides two countervailing incentive
effects on the manager’s decision to misreport. On the one hand, equity portfolio
delta will encourage managerial misreporting as delta is a measure of the increase
in the value of a manager’s equity portfolio from a given increase in the firm’s stock
price. Namely, if a manager misreports in order to bolster the firm’s stock price,
managers with higher equity portfolio delta will benefit more from a fixed increase in
their firm’s stock price. Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2013) refer to
this as the reward effect of equity portfolio delta. In contrast, equity portfolio delta
also discourages managerial misreporting as it amplifies the ramifications of equity
risk on the total riskiness of a manager’s equity portfolio. Armstrong, Larcker, Or-
mazabal, and Taylor (2013) refer to this as the risk effect of equity portfolio delta.
Accordingly, the net effect of equity portfolio delta on the misreporting decision is
theoretically ambiguous.
In contrast to delta, equity portfolio vega provides unambiguous incentives to mis-
report. All else equal, risk-averse managers who are compensated with more highly
convex remuneration contracts will have more incentives to misreport. This occurs
as convexity within the compensation mechanism decreases managerial aversion to
the increased equity risk stemming from misreporting. Armstrong, Larcker, Ormaz-
abal, and Taylor (2013) interpret their evidence as suggesting that “equity holdings
provide managers with incentives to misreport not because they tie their wealth to
equity values, but because they tie their wealth to equity risk.” In accordance with
the theoretical framework of Benmelech, Kandel, and Veronesi (2010), the concealing
of negative firm-specific information should precipitate substantial market overval-
uations as well as subsequent crashes in the firm’s stock price. Accordingly, there
should exist a positive relation between compensation convexity and measures of
idiosyncratic firm crash risk.
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My first measure of a firm’s idiosyncratic crash risk is the steepness of its option
implied volatility smirk. If the option market discerns the augmented crash risk stem-
ming from compensation convexity, the steepness of a firm’s idiosyncratic put smirk
should increase with the convexity of managerial equity portfolios. This intuition
leads to my first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a. All else equal, the option market’s ex-ante expectation of a firm’s fu-
ture idiosyncratic crash and negative jump risk increases with executive compensation
convexity.
Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2013) find that compensation con-
vexity within executive remuneration portfolios incentivizes executives to misreport
earnings information pertaining to the firms they manage. Once the market discovers
and updates its information set to incorporate the concealed negative information,
the firm’s stock price should experience an ex-post decline or, in extreme cases, an
idiosyncratic crash. Accordingly, I expect the following:
Hypothesis 1b. All else equal, the ex-post probability of the occurrence of idiosyn-
cratic firm crashes increases with executive compensation convexity.
Jin and Myers (2006) predict a higher frequency of large, negative idiosyncratic
return declines in countries where firms are more opaque. As compensation convexity
augments managerial inclinations to misreport, it should consequently increase the
frequency of idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes. This leads to my next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1c. All else equal, the ex-post number of idiosyncratic firm crashes in-
creases with executive compensation convexity.
Managers who are compensated with more highly convex remuneration contracts
are likely to be more incentivized to continue concealing negative firm-specific infor-
mation. Once the negative information is finally revealed, it is likely to precipitate a
greater decline in a firm’s stock price. Thus, I expect that:
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Hypothesis 1d. All else equal, the ex-post magnitude of idiosyncratic firm crashes
increases with executive compensation convexity.
As the effects of compensation convexity on idiosyncratic crash risk are partially
mediated by convexity’s provision of executive incentives to conceal negative earn-
ing information, the link between convexity and idiosyncratic crash risk should be
more pronounced in firms in which it is more feasible for executives to withhold in-
formation from the market. Pontiff (2006) finds that idiosyncratic risk is the single
largest impediment to market efficiency. As arbitrageurs are unable to fully hedge
the idiosyncratic risk stemming from arbitrage positions, they must assess the costs
of idiosyncratic risk exposure on expected arbitrage profits. All else equal, managers
should be able to conceal more information in higher idiosyncratic volatility firms
as the costs to arbitraging mispricing in the stock prices of these firms are more
stringent. This leads to my final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. All else equal, the relation between executive compensation convexity
and idiosyncratic crash risk is more pronounced in higher idiosyncratic volatility firms.
1.3.2. Research Design
Within my primary analysis, I employ equations of the following form in analyzing
the implications of compensation convexity on firms’ ex-ante and ex-post idiosyncratic
crash risk:
IFP Smirki,t = λ0 + λ1Convexityi,t + m∑
j=1βjControlj,i,t + i,t (1.1)
Crashi,t = ψ0 + ψ1Convexityi,t−1 + m+1∑
j=1 µjControlj,i,t−1 + ηi,t (1.2)
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Crash Frequencyi,t = γ0 + γ1Convexityi,t−1 + m+1∑
j=1 ωjControlj,i,t−1 + θi,t (1.3)
Sigmai,t = φ0 + φ1Convexityi,t−1 + m+1∑
j=1 δjControlj,i,t−1 + τi,t (1.4)
where i is the firm subscript, t is the fiscal year subscript, and j is the control subscript.
If Hypothesis 1a holds, I should find that executive compensation convexity is
positively related to the slope of the idiosyncratic firm put smirk (IFP Smirk). Ac-
cordingly, Hypothesis 1a implies that λ1 > 0 within Equation 1.1. In accordance with
Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009), I define an ex-post idiosyncratic firm crash as
a decline in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns falling 3.09 or more standard deviations
below the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return for a given firm fiscal year. My first
measure of ex-post idiosyncratic firm crash risk, Crash, is a binary indicator speci-
fying the occurrence of an idiosyncratic firm crash within a given firm fiscal year. If
Hypothesis 1b holds, I expect to find that executive compensation convexity is posi-
tively related to this ex-post binary crash variable. Namely, Hypothesis 1b mandates
that ψ1 > 0 within Equation 1.2.
My second measure of ex-post idiosyncratic firm crash risk, Crash Frequency, is
the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes within a given firm fiscal year.
If Hypothesis 1c holds, I should find that executive compensation convexity is pos-
itively related to the number of idiosyncratic firm crashes within a given firm fiscal
year. Therefore, Hypothesis 1c predicts that γ1 > 0 within Equation 1.3. My third
measure of ex-post idiosyncratic firm crash risk, Sigma, is the largest standard devi-
ation decline in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns below their firm fiscal year mean.
If Hypothesis 1d holds, I expect to find that executive compensation convexity is
positively related to the magnitude of idiosyncratic firm crashes. As a result, Hy-
pothesis 1d necessitates that φ1 > 0 within Equation 1.4. Finally, I expect to find
15
that the positive link between compensation convexity and crash risk is amplified
in higher idiosyncratic volatility firms if Hypothesis 2 holds. Hence, the coefficient
of the interaction term between executive compensation convexity and idiosyncratic
volatility should be significantly positive across my measures of idiosyncratic firm
crash risk.
1.4. Data Selection and Variable Measurement
I begin by obtaining the necessary data from Compustat in order to construct the
control variables Opaque, ROE, Size, M/B, and Leverage. As in Hutton, Marcus,
and Tehranian (2009), I define Opaque as the three year moving sum of the absolute
value of discretionary accruals:
Opaquet = t−1∑
i=t−3 ∣DiscAcci∣ (1.5)
Discretionary accruals are calculated by estimating the modified Jones model in De-
chow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995). For all firms within each of the 49 Fama-French
industries in a given fiscal year, I estimate the following cross-sectional regression:
TAi,t
Assetsi,t−1 = α0 [ 1Assetsi,t−1 ] + β1 [ ∆Salesi,tAssetsi,t−1 ] + β2 [ PPEi,tAssetsi,t−1 ] + εi,t (1.6)
Discretionary accruals, for each firm’s fiscal year, are then defined as follows:
DiscAcci,t = TAi,tAssetsi,t−1 − α̂0 [ 1Assetsi,t−1 ] − β̂1 [∆Salesi,t −∆Receivablesi,tAssetsi,t−1 ]
− β̂2 [ PPEi,tAssetsi,t−1 ] (1.7)
16
where TAi,t is the total accruals, Assetsi,t is the total assets, ∆Salesi,t is the change
in sales, ∆Receivablesi,t is the change in receivables, and PPEi,t is the property,
plant, and equipment of firm i in fiscal year t, respectively. Next, I remove utility firms
(Fama-French industry #31) as well as financial services firms (Fama-French industry
#48) from my sample. I define ROE, Size, M/B, and Leverage within Appendix B.
After constructing the necessary Compustat related variables, I use daily stock
return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) in constructing
weekly stock returns. I remove low-priced stocks (stocks whose annual average price
is less than $2.50) as well as stock fiscal years with less than 26 weeks of return data.
Next, I follow Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009) in estimating the below model
for each stock fiscal year and I define idiosyncratic firm weekly returns as ln(1 + ε):
ri,t = αi +β1,irm,t−1 +β2,irj,t−1 +β3,irm,t +β4,irj,t +β5,irm,t+1 +β6,irj,t+1 + εit (1.8)
where ri,t is the weekly return for stock i in week t, rm,t is the weekly return for the
CRSP value-weighted market index in week t, and rj,t is the weekly return for stock
i’s value-weighted Fama-French industry index j during week t.4 I include leads and
lags of the market and industry index returns to account for non-synchronous trading
(Dimson, 1979). I take the natural logarithm of the residuals from Equation 1.8 in
order to render their distribution more symmetric.
I proxy for the option market’s perception of a firm’s future expected (ex-ante)
idiosyncratic crash risk as the slope of the Idiosyncratic Firm Put Smirk. I ob-
tain data pertaining to firm and S&P 500 put options from OptionMetrics’ Ivy DB
volatility surface database. My sample period begins in fiscal year 1997 as this is
the first fiscal year with fully available volatility surface data. I measure the slope
of the Idiosyncratic Firm Put Smirk (IFP Smirk) as the ratio of the idiosyncratic
4If the return data is unavailable during week t − 1 or t + 1, I obtain the return data from the
nearest available respective weeks.
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implied volatility (variance) of out-of-the-money put options to the idiosyncratic im-
plied volatility (variance) of at-the-money put options for a given firm fiscal year.
Specifically, I define IFP Smirk for a given firm i in fiscal year t as follows:
IFP Smirki,t = σˆ2i,t−1,OTM − [βˆ2i,t-1,Vasicek × σˆ2S&P500,t−1,OTM]
σˆ2i,t−1,ATM − [βˆ2i,t-1,Vasicek × σˆ2S&P500,t−1,ATM] (1.9)
where the deltas of out-of-the-money (OTM) put options and at-the-money (ATM)
put options are -.2 and -.5, respectively. σˆ2i,t−1,OTM is the average implied volatility
(variance) of out-of-the-money 91-day horizon firm put options as measured over the
10 trading days prior to the start of fiscal year t. σˆ2S&P500,t−1,OTM is the average
implied volatility (variance) of out-of-the-money 91-day horizon S&P 500 put options
as measured over the 10 trading days prior to the start of fiscal year t. σˆ2i,t−1,ATM is the
average implied volatility (variance) of at-the-money 91-day horizon firm put options
as measured over the 10 trading days prior to the start of fiscal year t. Finally,
σˆ2S&P500,t−1,ATM is the average implied volatility (variance) of at-the-money 91-day
horizon S&P 500 put options as measured over the 10 trading days prior to the start
of fiscal year t.
In accordance with Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), I use the Vasicek (1973) Bayesian
shrinkage estimator of a firm’s time-series beta on the market portfolio to attenuate
the influence of outliers within the time-series estimation framework. Specifically,
βˆi,t-1,Vasicek is the Vasicek shrinkage estimator of firm i’s beta on the market portfolio
during fiscal year t−1 as estimated using weekly returns. I construct this measure as
follows:
βˆi,t-1,Vasicek =wi,t−1βˆTSi,t−1 + [(1 −wi,t−1) × 1] (1.10)
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wi,t−1 = XSVar(βˆTSi,t−1)
XSVar(βˆTSi,t−1) + SE2(βˆTSi,t−1) (1.11)
ri,t−1 = αi +βTSi,t−1rm,t−1 + εi,t−1 (1.12)
where βˆ
TS
i,t−1 is the time-series estimate of firm i’s fiscal year beta on the market during
fiscal year t − 1 using weekly returns. wi,t−1 is the Vasicek shrinkage weight on the
time-series estimate of firm i’s fiscal year beta on the market during fiscal year t − 1.
XSVar(βˆTSi,t−1) is the cross-sectional variance of the time-series estimates of firm betas
on the market during fiscal year t − 1. SE2(βˆTSi,t−1) is the square of the standard error
on the time-series estimate of firm i’s beta on the market portfolio during fiscal year
t−1 using using weekly returns. ri,t−1 denotes firm i’s weekly returns during fiscal year
t − 1 and rm,t−1 represents the weekly returns for the CRSP value-weighted market
index during fiscal year t−1. Intuitively, the Vasicek (1973) Bayesian shrinkage factor,
wi,t−1, places greater emphasis on the time-series estimate of beta when the estimate
has a lower standard error or when the cross-sectional variance of betas is large. Thus,
the Vasicek (1973) Bayesian shrinkage approach shrinks the time series estimate of
beta, βTSi,t−1, towards the cross-sectional mean beta.
I use 91-day maturity options in order to address two primary factors. According
to Bates (2000), jump risk is more pertinent for shorter-expiration options whereas the
effects of stochastic volatility are more pronounced over longer horizons. In contrast,
my control and compensation incentive variables are measured annually. Therefore, I
use 91-day horizon options in attempting to accommodate both of the aforementioned
maturity considerations. I use a 10-day average of implied volatilities as it decreases
the reliance on data from only one day of observations. As a robustness check, I use
182-day horizon put options in constructing the longer horizon put smirk measure
IFP Smirk 182.
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The variable JIFP Smirk is the positive jump risk idiosyncratic firm put smirk.
JIFP Smirk is the ratio of the idiosyncratic implied volatility (variance) of in-the-
money put options to the idiosyncratic implied volatility (variance) of at-the-money
put options for a given firm fiscal year. Specifically, I define JIFP Smirk for a given
firm i in fiscal year t as follows:
JIFP Smirki,t = σˆ2i,t−1,ITM − [βˆ2i,t-1,Vasicek × σˆ2S&P500,t−1,ITM]
σˆ2i,t−1,ATM − [βˆ2i,t-1,Vasicek × σˆ2S&P500,t−1,ATM] (1.13)
where the deltas of the in-the-money (ITM) put options and at-the-money (ATM)
put options are -.8 and -.5, respectively.
I also construct ex-post positive jump risk measures in order to examine the
ramifications of compensation convexity on a firm’s idiosyncratic positive jump risk.
Namely, Jump is set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences one or more
idiosyncratic weekly returns rising 3.09 or more standard deviations above the mean
idiosyncratic firm weekly return. Jump Frequency is the number of idiosyncratic
firm stock-price jumps within a given firm fiscal year and Jump Sigma is the largest
standard deviation jump in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns above their firm fiscal
year mean.
After constructing all of the Compustat, CRSP, and OptionMetrics related vari-
ables, I use Execucomp data to formulate measures of executive compensation incen-
tives. In order to attenuate the potential influence of unobservable executive-specific
characteristics, I follow Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2013) in using
the incentives of the top management team. As the majority of firms within the
Execucomp database report compensation data for their top five executives within
a specific fiscal year, I use all available information pertaining to any of the firm’s
top five executives in constructing my incentive measures. I refer to the top five
executives within a firm as the executive team.
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I define the variable Executive CashComp as the executive team’s average total
cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. Next, Executive Delta is the average
dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios
(in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Finally, Executive
Vega is the average dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total equity
compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in
the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. In ascertaining the robustness of
my results to alternate incentive measures used in the literature, I also consider scaled
compensation incentive variables. Namely, Scaled Delta is the ratio of Executive Delta
to Executive CashComp and Scaled Vega is the ratio of Executive Vega to Executive
CashComp. My final merged primary sample, featuring non-missing values of all of
the necessary Compustat, CRSP, OptionMetrics, and Execucomp variables, consists
of 14,153 firm fiscal year observations spanning fiscal years 1997 through 2011. All
remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
1.5. Empirical Analysis
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics pertaining to the variables used within
my analysis. I winsorize the variables Size, Opaque, ROE, M/B, Leverage, IFP
Smirk, IFP Smirk 182, JIFP Smirk, Executive CashComp, Executive Delta, and
Executive Vega at the first and 99th percentiles in order to minimize the impact of
outliers. As the compensation variables Executive CashComp, Executive Delta, and
Executive Vega are skewed, I take the natural logarithm of these respective variables
in rendering their distributions more symmetric. The average total cash remuneration
(salary+bonus) received by the members of the executive team during a fiscal year
is roughly $740,080. Furthermore, the average dollar change in the value of the
executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios associated with a 1% increase
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in the firm’s stock price is $314,930. In contrast, the average dollar change in the
value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios associated with a
one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s return is roughly
$68,780.
I extract the idiosyncratic component of firm returns by estimating Equation 1.8
for each stock fiscal year and defining idiosyncratic firm weekly returns as ln(1 + ε).
Next, I calculate standardized idiosyncratic firm weekly stock returns as follows:
ln(1 + ε) −Mean (ln(1 + ε))
Standard Deviation (ln(1 + ε)) (1.14)
Panel A of Figure 1.1 plots the distribution of standardized idiosyncratic firm weekly
stock returns expressed as the number of standard deviations from a firm’s fiscal year
mean. A week is classified as a crash week if a firm experiences an idiosyncratic
weekly stock return decline falling 3.09 or more standard deviations below its mean
idiosyncratic weekly return for a particular fiscal year. This figure also presents the
deviation of the empirical distribution of standardized idiosyncratic firm returns from
a theoretical normal distribution (depicted as a solid curve) with the same mean and
variance. Most notably, the empirical distribution of standardized idiosyncratic firm
returns is more “peaked” (leptokurtic) than a normal distribution and also features
fatter tails.
Table 1.2 reports summary statistics pertaining to firm, industry, and market
weekly returns during idiosyncratic firm stock-price crash weeks. The average firm
weekly stock return during a crash week is roughly -19.40%. This return is signif-
icantly less than the average firm weekly return during non-crash weeks at the 1%
level. In contrast, industry and market mean and median weekly returns during crash
weeks are significantly greater than their non-crash week counterparts. This demon-
strates empirically that the negative ramifications of idiosyncratic firm stock-price
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crashes are indeed, by construction, largely confined to the firm. Panel B of Fig-
ure 1.1 plots the distribution of standardized idiosyncratic firm returns during crash
weeks. The empirical likelihood of an idiosyncratic firm crash week occurring within
my weekly sample is the sum of the mass under this empirical distribution (roughly
0.5% (3,653/734,974)). Under a normal distribution, the probability of the occur-
rence of one idiosyncratic weekly stock return decline falling 3.09 or more standard
deviations below the mean idiosyncratic weekly return is roughly 0.1%.
Within Panel D of Table 1.2, I classify a firm fiscal year as a crash year if a
firm experiences one or more idiosyncratic weekly returns falling 3.09 or more stan-
dard deviations below the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return. The empirical
unconditional ex-post probability of the occurrence of a minimum of one idiosyn-
cratic weekly return stock price crash within a fiscal year is 24.95% (24.10%+0.85%).
As there are roughly 52 weeks within a fiscal year, this probability would be roughly
1 − (1 − 0.001)52 ≈ 5.07% under a normal distribution.5 Figure 1.2 presents the tem-
poral distribution of weekly idiosyncratic firm crashes during the calendar and fiscal
year, respectively.6 Panels A and B suggest that the probability of the occurrence of
idiosyncratic crashes increases in the weeks following the end of calendar and fiscal
year quarter periods. This amplification of crash likelihood is likely concurrent with
the release of information pertaining to a firm’s idiosyncratic performance during the
previous quarter.
My first hypothesis is that the option market’s ex-ante expectation of a firm’s
future idiosyncratic crash and negative jump risk increases with executive compen-
sation convexity. If Hypothesis 1a holds, I should find that executive compensation
convexity is positively related to the slope of the idiosyncratic firm put smirk (IFP
5I do not expect the empirical distribution of standardized idiosyncratic firm weekly stock returns
to be normally distributed. The -3.09 standard deviation cutoff used to define idiosyncratic crashes
is simply a benchmark used in the literature to reference extreme events.
6Each quarter is approximated as spanning roughly 13 weeks with a total of roughly 52 weeks
comprising a year.
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Smirk). Accordingly, Hypothesis 1a implies that λ1 > 0 within Equation 1.1 below:
IFP Smirki,t = λ0 + λ1Convexityi,t + m∑
j=1βjControlj,i,t + i,t (1.1)
I test this hypothesis within Table 1.3. Specifically, I proxy for compensation con-
vexity with the variable Executive Vega. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, I find that
compensation convexity is positively related to the slope of the idiosyncratic firm put
smirk (IFP Smirk) across my empirical specifications within Table 1.3. I include firm
fixed effects in order to account for omitted time-invariant firm-specific variables that
are potentially correlated with convexity. I also use year fixed effects to control for
variation in the idiosyncratic firm put smirk that is common within the cross section
of firms for a particular year. In addition, I include CEO fixed effects to account
for omitted time-invariant CEO-specific variables that are potentially correlated with
convexity. Finally, I utilize CEO spell fixed effects in allowing for the possibility that
CEO fixed effects may vary across a CEO’s tenure at distinct firms.
My second hypothesis predicts that the ex-post probability of the occurrence of
idiosyncratic firm crashes increases with executive compensation convexity. Accord-
ingly, my first measure of ex-post idiosyncratic firm crash risk, Crash, is a binary
indicator specifying the occurrence of an idiosyncratic firm crash within a given firm
fiscal year. If Hypothesis 1b holds, I expect to find that executive compensation
convexity is positively related to this ex-post binary crash variable. Namely, Hypoth-
esis 1b implies that ψ1 > 0 within Equation 1.2:
Crashi,t = ψ0 + ψ1Convexityi,t−1 + m+1∑
j=1 µjControlj,i,t−1 + ηi,t (1.2)
I test this hypothesis within Table 1.4. By employing the logistic and conditional
logistic models in Table 1.4, I identify a positive predictive relationship between ex-
ecutive compensation convexity (Executive Vega) and the occurrence of idiosyncratic
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firm crashes. Next, I assess the robustness of the aforementioned relation within the
linear probability models of Table 1.5. Overall, the evidence in Table 1.5 is largely in
agreement with the inferences from Table 1.4. Together, the logistic, conditional lo-
gistic, and linear probability model analysis presents evidence that is consistent with
the empirical implications of Hypothesis 1b.
Hypothesis 1c proposes that, all else equal, the ex-post number of idiosyncratic
firm crashes should increase with executive compensation convexity. I test this hy-
pothesis by using specifications in the form of Equation 1.3 below:
Crash Frequencyi,t = γ0 + γ1Convexityi,t−1 + m+1∑
j=1 ωjControlj,i,t−1 + θi,t (1.3)
My second measure of ex-post idiosyncratic firm crash risk, Crash Frequency, is the
number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes within a given firm fiscal year. If Hy-
pothesis 1c holds, I should find that executive compensation convexity is positively
related to crash frequency. Therefore, Hypothesis 1c predicts that γ1 > 0 within
Equation 1.3. In testing Hypothesis 1c, I begin by modeling the number of idiosyn-
cratic firm stock-price crashes occurring within a firm’s fiscal year using a Poisson
counting process. Specifically, I employ Poisson and conditional Poisson regressions
in Table 1.6. In accordance with this hypothesis, I find that executive compensation
convexity is, indeed, positively related to the number of idiosyncratic firm crashes
within a given firm fiscal year. Next, I examine Hypothesis 1c using a basic linear
(OLS) model. The results from the linear specifications within Table 1.7 are largely
in agreement with the inferences from the Poisson and conditional Poisson analysis.
Together, this evidence further supports the empirical predictions of Hypothesis 1c.
All else equal, managers who are compensated with more highly convex remu-
neration contracts are likely to be more incentivized to continue concealing negative
firm-specific information. Once the negative information is finally revealed, it is likely
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to precipitate a greater decline in the firm’s stock price. Consequently, Hypothesis 1d
asserts that the ex-post magnitude of idiosyncratic firm crashes should increase with
executive compensation convexity. My third measure of ex-post idiosyncratic firm
crash risk, Sigma, is the largest standard deviation decline in idiosyncratic firm weekly
returns below their firm fiscal year mean. If Hypothesis 1d holds, I expect to find
that executive compensation convexity is positively related to Sigma. Equivalently,
Hypothesis 1d necessitates that φ1 > 0 within Equation 1.4:
Sigmai,t = φ0 + φ1Convexityi,t−1 + m+1∑
j=1 δjControlj,i,t−1 + τi,t (1.4)
Columns (1)-(5) of Table 1.8 present evidence that is in agreement with Hypothesis 1d.
The results in Tables 4-8 indicate that executive compensation convexity is positively
related to the realized (ex-post) occurrence, frequency, and magnitude of idiosyncratic
firm stock-price crashes even after controlling for the idiosyncratic firm put smirk and
other established predictive measures of idiosyncratic crashes. This evidence suggests
that option markets do not fully incorporate the impact of compensation convexity
on future firm crash risk.
Theoretically, equity portfolio delta provides two countervailing incentive effects
on the manager’s decision to misreport. On the one hand, equity portfolio delta will
encourage managerial misreporting as delta is a measure of the increase in the value of
a manager’s equity portfolio from a given increase in the firm’s stock price. Namely,
if a manager decides to misreport in order to bolster the firm’s stock price, managers
with higher equity portfolio delta will benefit more from a fixed increase in their
firm’s stock price. Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2013) refer to this
as the reward effect of equity portfolio delta. In contrast, equity portfolio delta also
discourages managerial misreporting as it amplifies the ramifications of equity risk on
the total riskiness of a manager’s equity portfolio. Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal,
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and Taylor (2013) refer to this as the risk effect of equity portfolio delta. Accordingly,
the net effect of equity portfolio delta on the misreporting decision is theoretically
ambiguous. In accordance with this reasoning, I do not find robust evidence in
Tables 4-8 indicating that the total delta (price-increasing) incentives stemming from
executives’ total equity compensation portfolios are significantly related to a firm’s
ex-post realized crash risk. While the delta incentives stemming from executives’
option portfolios appear to predict firm crashes due to the limited liability property
of options, the delta incentives stemming from executives’ stock portfolios appear to
largely negate these incentives as they expose executives to more symmetric downside
risk.
In ascertaining the economic magnitude of the ramifications of compensation con-
vexity on a firm’s idiosyncratic crash risk, I use scaled decile rank linear model anal-
ysis. Namely, I transform all of my independent variables by first calculating their
decile rank each fiscal year, subtracting one, and then dividing by nine. I then employ
linear models in re-examining my four hypotheses in Table 1.9. The coefficient on the
respective scaled decile rank variable is the change in the corresponding dependent
variable stemming from a bottom-to-top decile transition in the independent variable.
All else equal, I find that moving from the bottom decile to the top decile of compen-
sation convexity results in a 5.14 percentage point increase in a firm’s idiosyncratic
crash occurrence probability (column(2)). This increase is economically significant as,
on average, it represents roughly 21% (.0514/.2496) of a firm’s unconditional ex-post
idiosyncratic crash risk. Similarly, a bottom-to-top decile increase in compensation
convexity results in a .1091 increase in the steepness of the idiosyncratic firm put
smirk. This increase is economically significant as, on average, it represents roughly
11% (.1091/1.03) of the steepness of a firm’s idiosyncratic put smirk. Next, I con-
sider if the positive relation between compensation convexity and the idiosyncratic
firm crash measures is robust to alternate definitions of compensation incentives used
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in the literature. Specifically, I construct the variable Scaled Delta as the ratio of Ex-
ecutive Delta to Executive CashComp and Scaled Vega as the ratio of Executive Vega
to Executive CashComp. The results in Table 1.10 suggest that the scaled measure
of compensation convexity, Scaled Vega, is positively related to a firm’s idiosyncratic
crash risk across my empirical specifications.
As the effects of compensation convexity on idiosyncratic crash risk are partially
mediated by convexity’s provision of executive incentives to conceal negative earn-
ing information, the link between convexity and idiosyncratic crash risk should be
more pronounced in firms in which it is more feasible for executives to withhold in-
formation from the market. Pontiff (2006) finds that idiosyncratic risk is the single
largest impediment to market efficiency. As arbitrageurs are unable to fully hedge
the idiosyncratic risk stemming from arbitrage positions, they must assess the costs
of idiosyncratic risk exposure on expected arbitrage profits. All else equal, managers
should be able to conceal more information in higher idiosyncratic volatility firms as
the costs to arbitraging mispricing in the stock prices of these firms are more stringent.
Hypothesis 2 posits that, all else equal, the relation between executive compensa-
tion convexity and idiosyncratic crash risk is more pronounced in higher idiosyncratic
volatility firms. I test this hypothesis in Table 1.11 by interacting compensation
convexity with idiosyncratic volatility quartile stratification dummies calculated on a
fiscal year basis. The variable Q4(Idiosyncratic Volatility) is a binary indicator vari-
able indicating a firm fiscal year’s membership in the highest quartile of idiosyncratic
volatility strata. Table 1.11 presents evidence that is largely in agreement with Hy-
pothesis 2. For all of the ex-post measures of idiosyncratic crash risk in columns (2)-
(4) of Table 1.11, the association between compensation convexity and realized crash
risk is increasing in the idiosyncratic volatility quartile stratifications. However, the
idiosyncratic volatility smirk does not appear to capture these dynamics. Instead, the
information within option prices appears to indicate that the convexity-idiosyncratic
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crash risk relation is decreasing with idiosyncratic volatility. This evidence further
suggests that option prices may not fully reflect the dynamics underlying the relation
between compensation convexity and realized idiosyncratic firm stock-price crash risk.
1.5.1. Exogenous Variation in Executive Compensation Con-
vexity
Next, I assess the robustness of my inferences within a natural experiment setting
by exploiting the exogenous variation in compensation convexity surrounding a change
in the expensing treatment of executive stock options. Prior to FAS 123R, firms were
given a choice to expense executive options at either their intrinsic or fair values.
Most firms elected the intrinsic valuation methodology and issued options at-the-
money so as to set their option related expenses to zero when reporting earnings.
FAS 123R mandated the expensing of options at their fair value through the use
of either a closed form option pricing model, such as the Black and Scholes (1973)
model as modified to account for dividend payouts, or a binomial option pricing
model. Using a comprehensive sample of firms, Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012)
demonstrate that firms attenuate their use of options as a component of executive
remuneration portfolios following the implementation of FAS 123R in December of
2005.
As option value is a convex function of a firm’s stock price, Hayes, Lemmon, and
Qiu (2012) find that this reduction in options issuance to executives precipitated an
exogenous decline in compensation convexity. In contrast, Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu
(2012) show that firms largely offset the decline in price increasing incentives (delta)
stemming from a decrease in options by increasing their use of restricted stock grants.
Accordingly, Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012) argue that FAS 123R largely represents
an exogenous shock to compensation convexity (vega) and not to price increasing
incentives (delta). Consistent with Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012), I find that the
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average executive team’s compensation convexity decreases by $11,705 per percentage
point change in the standard deviation of a firm’s equity returns (significant at the 1%
level). This represents a 11.42% decline in average compensation convexity from the
pre- to post-FAS 123R period. In contrast, the change in the average price increasing
incentives (total equity portfolio delta) of the executive team surrounding FAS 123R
is not statistically significant at the 10% level.
In addressing potential endogeneity concerns, I utilize the cross-sectional difference-
in-means identification strategy of Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012) in buttressing my
previous interpretations. Specifically, I transform all of my independent and depen-
dent variables by first determining the averages of the respective variables, for each
firm, pre- and post-FAS 123R. I then calculate a post- minus pre-period difference for
each variable and regress changes in my crash outcome variables on changes in my
independent variables. I define the pre-FAS 123R period as spanning fiscal years 2002-
2004 while setting the post-FAS 123R period to fiscal years 2005-2007. Table 1.12
presents the results of these cross-sectional difference-in-means tests surrounding the
exogenous variation in compensation convexity stemming from FAS 123R. On aver-
age, I find that firms experiencing greater pre- to post-FAS 123R declines in com-
pensation convexity experience greater reductions in the occurrence, frequency, and
magnitude of realized (ex-post) idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes. In contrast,
I find no evidence indicating that the aforementioned exogenous negative shock to
compensation convexity had any significant effect on the option market’s perception
of firms’ ex-ante idiosyncratic crash risk. As a robustness test, I reconstruct the id-
iosyncratic firm put smirk using longer maturity 182-day options in Table 1.13 and
find that my inferences from Table 1.12 are unchanged.
Another point to consider is whether compensation convexity is also symmetri-
cally positively related to a firm’s idiosyncratic positive jump risk. If the observed
relation between compensation convexity and idiosyncratic crash risk is entirely me-
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diated by the risky investments of a firm’s executives, I would expect to also observe
a positive relation between convexity and positive stock-price jump risk as these risky
bets should, in certain states, also yield highly positive idiosyncratic returns. I exam-
ine this question by constructing the positive jump risk equivalents of the four crash
risk measures used in this paper. Specifically, JIFP Smirk is the positive jump risk
idiosyncratic firm put smirk and captures the option market’s perception of a firm’s
ex-ante positive stock price jump risk. Jump is set to one if, within its fiscal year, a
firm experiences one or more idiosyncratic weekly returns rising 3.09 or more stan-
dard deviations above the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return. Jump Frequency
is the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price jumps within a given firm fiscal year
and Jump Sigma is the largest standard deviation jump in idiosyncratic firm weekly
returns above their firm fiscal year mean. Table 1.14 presents no evidence of a sym-
metric positive relation between compensation convexity and a firm’s idiosyncratic
positive stock-price jump risk. These results suggest that executives’ concealing of
negative firm performance information plays a crucial role in catalyzing the observed
empirical relation between compensation convexity and idiosyncratic firm crash risk.
Finally, I employ a difference-in-differences identification strategy featuring a con-
tinuous magnitude of convexity treatment variable in further examining the robust-
ness of the convexity-idiosyncratic crash risk relation. As an ex-ante proxy for the
magnitude of convexity treatment under FAS 123R, I use the level of Executive Vega
in fiscal year 2002. I select this fiscal year as it is prior to when most firms began
adjusting compensation contracts in anticipation of FAS 123R. All else equal, firms
with higher vega in 2002 are expected to be more affected by FAS 123R from a risk-
taking incentives standpoint than their lower vega counterparts. In interacting the
magnitude of convexity treatment variable (Executive Vega 2002) with the post-FAS
123R period dummy in Table 1.15, I find that firms that were, ex-ante, more likely to
be affected by FAS 123R decrease their idiosyncratic crash risk by a greater amount
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than those firms who were less likely to be affected by FAS 123R. These results are
largely consistent with my previous inferences.
1.6. Summary and Conclusion
Within this paper, I examine whether executive compensation convexity, measured
as the average sensitivity of the top executives’ equity compensation portfolios to stock
volatility, predicts idiosyncratic firm crashes. Using four measures of idiosyncratic
firm crash risk, one ex-ante and three ex-post, I provide new evidence demonstrating
an economically significant positive predictive link between compensation convexity
(risk-taking incentives) and idiosyncratic firm crashes. First, I identify a positive
relation between compensation convexity and the slope of the idiosyncratic firm put
smirk, a measure of the option market’s perception of a firm’s future expected (ex-
ante) idiosyncratic crash risk. Next, I find that compensation convexity is positively
related to the realized (ex-post) occurrence, frequency, and magnitude of idiosyncratic
firm stock-price crashes even after controlling for the put smirk and other established
predictive measures of idiosyncratic crashes. This evidence suggests that option prices
may not fully reflect the impact of compensation convexity on future idiosyncratic
firm crash risk.
All else equal, I find that a bottom-to-top decile change in compensation convexity
results in a 21% increase in a firm’s unconditional ex-post idiosyncratic crash risk. I
also present evidence that is consistent with the notion that the effects of compensa-
tion convexity on idiosyncratic crash risk are more pronounced in firms in which the
limits to arbitrage are more stringent. In contrast, I do not find robust evidence of
a significant link between compensation convexity and a firm’s idiosyncratic positive
jump risk. This result suggests that executives’ concealing of negative firm perfor-
mance information plays a crucial role in propagating the observed empirical relation
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between compensation convexity and idiosyncratic firm crash risk. Finally, I exploit
exogenous variation in compensation convexity, stemming from a change in the ex-
pensing treatment of executive stock options, in buttressing my interpretations within
a natural experiment setting. As a whole, the evidence within this paper elucidates
the potentially negative implications of compensation convexity, within managerial
equity remuneration contracts, on extreme corporate outcomes.
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1.7. Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Distributions of Standardized Idiosyncratic Firm Returns During
Crash and Non-Crash Weeks
Panel A: Distribution of Standardized Idiosyncratic Firm Returns
(Normal Distribution is Depicted as a Solid Curve)
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Figure 1.2: Temporal Distribution of Idiosyncratic Firm Crashes
Panel A: Calendar Year Distribution of Idiosyncratic Firm Crashes
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for variables related to executive compensation incentives, idiosyncratic firm
crash risk, idiosyncratic positive jump risk, and firm properties. My primary sample consists of 14,115 firm fiscal year
observations spanning fiscal years 1997 through 2011. I winsorize the variables Size, Opaque, ROE, M/B, Leverage,
IFP Smirk, IFP Smirk 182, JIFP Smirk, Executive CashComp, Executive Delta, and Executive Vega at the first and
99th percentiles. Executive CashComp is the executive team’s average total cash remuneration within a given firm
fiscal year. Executive Delta is the average dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation
portfolios (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Executive Vega is the average dollar
change in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a one
percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. Scaled Delta is the ratio of Executive
Delta to Executive CashComp. Scaled Vega is the ratio of Executive Vega to Executive CashComp. IFP smirk is the
idiosyncratic firm put smirk constructed using 91-day maturity options. IFP smirk 182 is the idiosyncratic firm put
smirk constructed using 182-day maturity options. Crash is set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences
one or more idiosyncratic weekly returns falling 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean idiosyncratic firm
weekly return. Crash Frequency is the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes within a given firm fiscal
year. Sigma is the largest standard deviation decline in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns below their firm fiscal year
mean. JIFP Smirk is the jump risk related idiosyncratic firm put smirk. Jump is set to one if, within its fiscal year,
a firm experiences one or more idiosyncratic weekly returns rising 3.09 or more standard deviations above the mean
idiosyncratic firm weekly return. Jump Frequency is the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price jumps within a
given firm fiscal year. Jump Sigma is the largest standard deviation jump in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns above
their firm fiscal year mean. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns.
All remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
Full Sample of Firm Fiscal Years with Non-Missing Variables
Variable Mean Std 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Executive Incentives:
Executive CashComp (in $000s) 740.08 529.77 264.64 407.50 579.33 870.72 1815.18
Executive Delta (in $000s) 314.93 609.67 16.13 52.13 121.02 292.47 1220.30
Executive Vega (in $000s) 68.78 99.63 2.28 13.34 32.63 79.22 268.80
Scaled Delta 0.44 0.88 0.03 0.10 0.19 0.41 1.64
Scaled Vega 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.28
ln(1+Executive CashComp) 6.42 0.58 5.58 6.01 6.36 6.77 7.50
ln(1+Executive Delta) 4.86 1.29 2.84 3.97 4.80 5.68 7.11
ln(1+Executive Vega) 3.48 1.32 1.19 2.66 3.52 4.38 5.60
Idiosyncratic Firm Crash Risk:
IFP Smirk 1.03 0.47 0.39 0.91 1.05 1.19 1.55
IFP Smirk 182 0.95 0.57 0.17 0.85 1.01 1.15 1.45
Crash 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Crash Frequency 0.26 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Sigma 2.69 0.78 1.73 2.13 2.52 3.09 4.27
Idiosyncratic Firm Jump Risk:
JIFP Smirk 1.09 0.31 0.80 0.94 1.02 1.14 1.62
Jump 0.19 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Jump Frequency 0.20 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Jump Sigma 2.59 0.65 1.73 2.12 2.48 2.94 3.83
Firm Properties:
ROE 0.10 0.28 -0.28 0.05 0.12 0.19 0.38
Size 7.70 1.48 5.53 6.62 7.54 8.62 10.45
M/B 3.28 3.36 0.78 1.57 2.43 3.94 9.20
Leverage 0.52 0.22 0.15 0.36 0.53 0.67 0.90
Opaque 1.59 3.62 0.06 0.16 0.37 1.11 7.52
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.09
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Table 1.2: Weekly Returns During Idiosyncratic Firm Stock-Price Crash Weeks
This table presents summary statistics pertaining to firm, industry, and market weekly returns during idiosyncratic
firm stock-price crash weeks. A week is classified as a crash week if a firm experiences an idiosyncratic weekly stock
return decline falling 3.09 or more standard deviations below its mean idiosyncratic weekly return for a particular
fiscal year. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%,5%,and 1% levels, respectively. The
aforementioned significance levels pertain to difference-in-means paired t-tests and difference-in-medians Wilcoxon
rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests for mean and median returns during crash and non-crash weeks.
Panel A: Firm Weekly Returns During Crash vs. Non-Crash Weeks
Variable N(Weeks) Mean Median Variance
Crash Weeks 3,653 -0.1940*** -0.1683*** 0.0135
Non-Crash Weeks 731,321 0.0034 0.0018 0.0046
Total 734,974
Panel B: Industry Weekly Returns During Crash vs. Non-Crash Weeks
Variable N(Weeks) Mean Median Variance
Crash Weeks 3,653 0.0036*** 0.0041** 0.0014
Non-Crash Weeks 731,321 0.0015 0.0033 0.0013
Total 734,974
Panel C: Market Weekly Returns During Crash vs. Non-Crash Weeks
Variable N(Weeks) Mean Median Variance
Crash Weeks 3,653 0.0044*** 0.0054*** 0.0007
Non-Crash Weeks 731,321 0.0013 0.0030 0.0007
Total 734,974
Panel D: Crash Week Frequencies Within Firm Fiscal Year Sample
Number of Crashes N(Years) Percentage of Sample Cumulative Percentage
0 10,621 75.04 75.04
1 3,411 24.10 99.14
2 121 0.85 100
Total 14,153 100
37
Table 1.3: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on Idiosyncratic Firm Put
Smirks
The dependent variable, IFP Smirk, is the idiosyncratic firm put smirk. The idiosyncratic firm put smirk is a
measure of the option market’s perception of the firm’s future expected (ex-ante) idiosyncratic crash and negative
jump risk. Executive CashComp is the executive team’s average total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal
year. Executive Delta is the average dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation
portfolios (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Executive Vega is the average dollar
change in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a one
percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the
standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. A spell is defined as a binary dummy variable for the tenure
of a given CEO at a particular firm. All variables are measured at time t. Intercept term is included but not reported.
All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IFP Smirk IFP Smirk IFP Smirk IFP Smirk IFP Smirk
ln(1+Executive Vega) 0.0419∗∗∗ 0.0765∗∗∗ 0.0250∗∗∗ 0.0731∗∗∗ 0.0716∗∗∗
(8.10) (8.12) (5.15) (6.50) (6.23)
ln(1+Executive Delta) -0.0129∗∗∗ -0.0486∗∗∗ -0.0009 -0.0265∗ -0.0281∗
(-2.59) (-4.86) (-0.18) (-1.93) (-1.89)
ln(1+Executive CashComp) -0.0044 0.0349∗∗ -0.0183∗ 0.0530∗∗∗ 0.0533∗∗∗
(-0.44) (2.38) (-1.83) (3.23) (3.20)
ROE 0.0081 -0.0055 0.0096 -0.0034 0.0006
(0.58) (-0.30) (0.70) (-0.16) (0.03)
Size -0.0222∗∗∗ 0.0124 -0.0224∗∗∗ -0.0093 -0.0084
(-4.12) (1.00) (-4.23) (-0.61) (-0.51)
M/B -0.0011 -0.0030∗ 0.0024∗∗ -0.0026 -0.0032∗
(-0.88) (-1.71) (2.01) (-1.41) (-1.70)
Leverage 0.0452∗∗ 0.1576∗∗∗ 0.0745∗∗∗ 0.1172∗∗ 0.1259∗∗
(2.11) (3.26) (3.62) (2.16) (2.21)
Opaque 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0059∗∗∗
(9.15) (5.15) (3.57) (3.76) (3.67)
Idiosyncratic Volatility -0.7453∗∗∗ -0.6983∗∗∗ -0.6715∗∗∗ -0.5351∗ -0.5475∗
(-4.28) (-2.87) (-3.72) (-1.90) (-1.94)
Observations 14153 14153 14153 14153 14153
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.059 0.079 0.098 0.101
Firm-FE No Yes No No No
Year-FE No No Yes No No
CEO-FE No No No Yes No
Spell-FE No No No No Yes
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Table 1.4: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on the Occurrence of
Idiosyncratic Firm Crashes: Logistic and Conditional Logistic Analysis
The dependent variable, Crash, is a binary indicator specifying the occurrence of an idiosyncratic firm crash within
a given firm fiscal year. Specifically, crash is set to one if within its fiscal year a firm experiences one or more
idiosyncratic weekly returns falling 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly
return. Column (1) is a logistic regression whereas columns (2)-(5) are conditional logistic regressions. IFP smirk
is the idiosyncratic firm put smirk. Executive CashComp is the executive team’s average total cash remuneration
within a given firm fiscal year. Executive Delta is the average dollar change in the value of the executive team’s
total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Executive
Vega is the average dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s)
associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. Idiosyncratic
Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. A spell is defined as a unique CEO-firm
combination. The dependent variable is measured at time t while all independent variables are measured at time t−1.
Intercept term is included but not reported. All t-statistics in parentheses in column (1) are clustered at the firm level.
t-statistics in columns (2)-(5) are clustered within the respective conditioning variables of the conditional logistic
regressions. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Crash Crash Crash Crash Crash
ln(1+Executive Vega) 0.0632∗∗∗ 0.0965∗∗∗ 0.0557∗∗ 0.1396∗∗∗ 0.1421∗∗∗
(2.72) (2.78) (2.36) (3.13) (3.17)
ln(1+Executive Delta) 0.0026 -0.0464 0.0072 -0.0778 -0.1257∗∗
(0.11) (-1.12) (0.38) (-1.28) (-1.99)
ln(1+Executive CashComp) -0.0541 0.0317 -0.0388 -0.0126 -0.0311
(-1.04) (0.43) (-0.78) (-0.15) (-0.37)
IFP Smirk 0.1342∗∗∗ 0.0646 0.0787∗∗ 0.0706 0.0676
(3.11) (1.30) (2.31) (1.28) (1.21)
ROE 0.0940 0.0074 0.0932∗ 0.0508 0.0403
(1.23) (0.08) (1.96) (0.48) (0.38)
Size -0.0675∗∗∗ 0.4376∗∗∗ -0.0716∗∗ 0.4977∗∗∗ 0.5958∗∗∗
(-2.69) (7.79) (-2.42) (6.55) (7.66)
M/B 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.0109 0.0234∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗ 0.0193∗∗
(3.27) (1.40) (3.29) (1.98) (1.97)
Leverage -0.2878∗∗∗ 0.1323 -0.2550∗∗∗ -0.0590 0.0407
(-2.75) (0.61) (-2.84) (-0.21) (0.14)
Opaque 0.0188∗∗∗ -0.0012 0.0122∗∗ -0.0090 -0.0099
(3.42) (-0.17) (2.04) (-1.11) (-1.19)
Idiosyncratic Volatility 1.4797∗ -1.2251 2.9980∗∗∗ -2.9845∗∗ -2.8928∗∗
(1.66) (-0.97) (2.84) (-2.13) (-2.03)
Observations 14153 11986 14153 9963 9896
Firm-FE No Yes No No No
Year-FE No No Yes No No
CEO-FE No No No Yes No
Spell-FE No No No No Yes
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Table 1.5: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on the Occurrence of
Idiosyncratic Firm Crashes: Linear Probability Model Analysis
The dependent variable, Crash, is a binary indicator specifying the occurrence of an idiosyncratic firm crash within
a given firm fiscal year. Specifically, crash is set to one if within its fiscal year a firm experiences one or more
idiosyncratic weekly returns falling 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly
return. IFP smirk is the idiosyncratic firm put smirk. Executive CashComp is the executive team’s average total
cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. Executive Delta is the average dollar change in the value of the
executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock
price. Executive Vega is the average dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation
portfolios (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity
returns. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. A spell is defined as
a unique CEO-firm combination. The dependent variable is measured at time t while all independent variables are
measured at time t − 1. Intercept term is included but not reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at
the firm level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Crash Crash Crash Crash Crash
ln(1+Executive Vega) 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗ 0.0100∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0215∗∗∗
(2.77) (2.35) (2.40) (2.64) (2.63)
ln(1+Executive Delta) 0.0006 -0.0059 0.0013 -0.0103 -0.0182
(0.14) (-0.75) (0.30) (-0.93) (-1.51)
ln(1+Executive CashComp) -0.0101 0.0039 -0.0071 -0.0055 -0.0078
(-1.06) (0.29) (-0.70) (-0.33) (-0.46)
IFP Smirk 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0101 0.0135∗ 0.0100 0.0096
(3.16) (1.16) (1.70) (1.01) (0.96)
ROE 0.0165 0.0007 0.0164 0.0098 0.0077
(1.18) (0.04) (1.17) (0.49) (0.37)
Size -0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0716∗∗∗ -0.0128∗∗∗ 0.0808∗∗∗ 0.0963∗∗∗
(-2.66) (7.10) (-2.70) (5.99) (6.57)
M/B 0.0038∗∗∗ 0.0026 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗ 0.0042∗∗
(3.14) (1.63) (3.53) (2.18) (2.16)
Leverage -0.0524∗∗∗ 0.0262 -0.0462∗∗ -0.0016 0.0177
(-2.68) (0.61) (-2.34) (-0.03) (0.30)
Opaque 0.0038∗∗∗ -0.0000 0.0025∗∗ -0.0016 -0.0018
(3.24) (-0.02) (2.06) (-0.82) (-0.89)
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.2836∗ -0.2564 0.5702∗∗∗ -0.6026∗∗ -0.5911∗∗
(1.65) (-1.05) (2.98) (-2.11) (-2.02)
Observations 14153 14153 14153 14153 14153
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.050 0.010 0.059 0.058
Firm-FE No Yes No No No
Year-FE No No Yes No No
CEO-FE No No No Yes No
Spell-FE No No No No Yes
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Table 1.6: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on the Number of
Idiosyncratic Firm Crashes: Poisson and Conditional Poisson Analysis
The dependent variable, Crash Frequency, is the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes within a given firm
fiscal year. A firm experiences an idiosyncratic crash within a fiscal year if its idiosyncratic weekly returns drop by 3.09
or more standard deviations below their firm fiscal year mean. Column (1) is a Poisson regression whereas columns
(2)-(5) are conditional Poisson regressions. IFP smirk is the idiosyncratic firm put smirk. Executive CashComp is
the executive team’s average total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. Executive Delta is the average
dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with
a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Executive Vega is the average dollar change in the value of the executive
team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard
deviation of the firm’s equity returns. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly
returns. A spell is defined as a unique CEO-firm combination. The dependent variable is measured at time t while
all independent variables are measured at time t − 1. Intercept term is included but not reported. All t-statistics
in parentheses in column (1) are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics in columns (2)-(5) are clustered within the
respective conditioning variables of the conditional Poisson regressions. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Crash Freq Crash Freq Crash Freq Crash Freq Crash Freq
ln(1+Executive Vega) 0.0483∗∗∗ 0.0680∗∗∗ 0.0419∗∗ 0.0961∗∗∗ 0.0973∗∗∗
(2.69) (2.65) (2.17) (2.89) (2.93)
ln(1+Executive Delta) 0.0067 -0.0337 0.0116 -0.0540 -0.0912∗∗
(0.37) (-1.12) (0.91) (-1.20) (-1.99)
ln(1+Executive CashComp) -0.0384 0.0246 -0.0270 -0.0118 -0.0252
(-0.96) (0.46) (-0.78) (-0.19) (-0.41)
IFP Smirk 0.1106∗∗∗ 0.0646∗ 0.0672∗∗∗ 0.0682 0.0656
(3.39) (1.74) (2.73) (1.62) (1.55)
ROE 0.0774 -0.0082 0.0770∗∗ 0.0362 0.0275
(1.34) (-0.12) (2.47) (0.46) (0.35)
Size -0.0533∗∗∗ 0.3347∗∗∗ -0.0564∗∗∗ 0.3947∗∗∗ 0.4670∗∗∗
(-2.76) (8.08) (-2.60) (6.98) (8.24)
M/B 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0078 0.0182∗∗∗ 0.0125∗ 0.0126∗
(3.37) (1.44) (3.36) (1.88) (1.88)
Leverage -0.2243∗∗∗ 0.0856 -0.1984∗∗∗ -0.0505 0.0248
(-2.81) (0.55) (-2.85) (-0.25) (0.12)
Opaque 0.0128∗∗∗ -0.0015 0.0076∗ -0.0078 -0.0080
(3.38) (-0.31) (1.95) (-1.47) (-1.48)
Idiosyncratic Volatility 1.1586∗ -0.9423 2.3590∗∗∗ -2.0551∗∗ -1.9290∗
(1.76) (-1.05) (3.05) (-2.10) (-1.96)
Observations 14153 12056 14153 10111 10044
Firm-FE No Yes No No No
Year-FE No No Yes No No
CEO-FE No No No Yes No
Spell-FE No No No No Yes
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Table 1.7: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on the Number of
Idiosyncratic Firm Crashes: Linear Model Analysis
The dependent variable, Crash Freq, is the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes within a given firm
fiscal year. A firm experiences an idiosyncratic crash within a fiscal year if its idiosyncratic weekly returns drop
by 3.09 or more standard deviations below their firm fiscal year mean. IFP smirk is the idiosyncratic firm put
smirk. Executive CashComp is the executive team’s average total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year.
Executive Delta is the average dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios
(in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Executive Vega is the average dollar change in the
value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point
increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of
idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. A spell is defined as a unique CEO-firm combination. The dependent variable is
measured at time t while all independent variables are measured at time t − 1. Intercept term is included but not
reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Crash Freq Crash Freq Crash Freq Crash Freq Crash Freq
ln(1+Executive Vega) 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0142∗∗ 0.0103∗∗ 0.0198∗∗ 0.0200∗∗
(2.74) (2.17) (2.37) (2.29) (2.29)
ln(1+Executive Delta) 0.0019 -0.0053 0.0029 -0.0084 -0.0179
(0.41) (-0.63) (0.63) (-0.72) (-1.40)
ln(1+Executive CashComp) -0.0100 0.0045 -0.0068 -0.0084 -0.0108
(-0.99) (0.31) (-0.64) (-0.48) (-0.60)
IFP Smirk 0.0270∗∗∗ 0.0135 0.0156∗ 0.0136 0.0133
(3.43) (1.49) (1.91) (1.32) (1.27)
ROE 0.0184 -0.0009 0.0188 0.0132 0.0105
(1.27) (-0.05) (1.29) (0.64) (0.50)
Size -0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0773∗∗∗ -0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0877∗∗∗ 0.1057∗∗∗
(-2.71) (7.23) (-2.76) (6.12) (6.81)
M/B 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0030∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗ 0.0048∗∗
(3.16) (1.77) (3.57) (2.27) (2.26)
Leverage -0.0558∗∗∗ 0.0276 -0.0490∗∗ -0.0044 0.0203
(-2.70) (0.62) (-2.35) (-0.07) (0.32)
Opaque 0.0038∗∗∗ -0.0002 0.0023∗ -0.0021 -0.0022
(3.08) (-0.10) (1.82) (-1.01) (-1.06)
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.3130∗ -0.2795 0.6364∗∗∗ -0.6527∗∗ -0.6191∗∗
(1.72) (-1.11) (3.12) (-2.20) (-2.06)
Observations 14153 14153 14153 14153 14153
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.052 0.010 0.062 0.062
Firm-FE No Yes No No No
Year-FE No No Yes No No
CEO-FE No No No Yes No
Spell-FE No No No No Yes
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Table 1.8: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on the Magnitude of
Idiosyncratic Firm Crashes
The dependent variable, Sigma, is the largest standard deviation decline in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns below
their firm fiscal year mean. IFP smirk is the idiosyncratic firm put smirk. Executive CashComp is the executive
team’s average total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. Executive Delta is the average dollar change
in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in
the firm’s stock price. Executive Vega is the average dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total equity
compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the
firm’s equity returns. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. A spell
is defined as a unique CEO-firm combination. The dependent variable is measured at time t while all independent
variables are measured at time t − 1. Intercept term is included but not reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are
clustered at the firm level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sigma Sigma Sigma Sigma Sigma
ln(1+Executive Vega) 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0255∗∗ 0.0138∗ 0.0375∗∗ 0.0378∗∗
(2.71) (2.29) (1.92) (2.51) (2.50)
ln(1+Executive Delta) 0.0042 -0.0070 0.0038 -0.0151 -0.0250
(0.53) (-0.49) (0.47) (-0.72) (-1.10)
ln(1+Executive CashComp) -0.0244 0.0118 -0.0231 -0.0085 -0.0107
(-1.40) (0.49) (-1.25) (-0.29) (-0.36)
IFP Smirk 0.0407∗∗∗ 0.0094 0.0212 0.0092 0.0083
(3.06) (0.61) (1.54) (0.53) (0.47)
ROE 0.0287 -0.0115 0.0285 0.0014 -0.0016
(1.04) (-0.34) (1.03) (0.03) (-0.04)
Size -0.0210∗∗ 0.1585∗∗∗ -0.0201∗∗ 0.1823∗∗∗ 0.2080∗∗∗
(-2.55) (8.50) (-2.36) (7.19) (7.45)
M/B 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0040 0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0061 0.0064
(3.18) (1.19) (3.43) (1.56) (1.61)
Leverage -0.0893∗∗ 0.0684 -0.0757∗∗ 0.0984 0.1476
(-2.53) (0.89) (-2.11) (0.98) (1.38)
Opaque 0.0073∗∗∗ -0.0018 0.0052∗∗ -0.0060∗ -0.0067∗
(3.18) (-0.58) (2.23) (-1.70) (-1.84)
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.6373∗∗ -0.7873∗ 0.9436∗∗∗ -1.6372∗∗∗ -1.6510∗∗∗
(2.14) (-1.92) (2.83) (-3.35) (-3.33)
Observations 14153 14153 14153 14153 14153
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.059 0.011 0.067 0.068
Firm-FE No Yes No No No
Year-FE No No Yes No No
CEO-FE No No No Yes No
Spell-FE No No No No Yes
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Table 1.9: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on Idiosyncratic Firm
Crashes: Scaled Decile Rank Linear Model Analysis
The dependent variables are IFP Smirk, Crash, Crash Frequency, and Sigma, respectively. All independent variables
are transformed by first calculating their decile rank each fiscal year, subtracting one, and then dividing by nine.
The coefficient on the respective scaled decile rank variable is the change in the corresponding dependent variable
stemming from a bottom-to-top decile transition in the independent variable. IFP smirk is the idiosyncratic firm put
smirk. Crash is set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences one or more idiosyncratic weekly returns falling
3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return. Crash Frequency is the number
of idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes within a given firm fiscal year. Sigma is the largest standard deviation
decline in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns below their firm fiscal year mean. Executive CashComp is the executive
team’s average total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. Executive Delta is the average dollar change
in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase
in the firm’s stock price. Executive Vega is the average dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total
equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation
of the firm’s equity returns. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns.
A spell is defined as a unique CEO-firm combination. Intercept term is included but not reported. All t-statistics
in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IFP Smirk Crash Crash Frequency Crash Magnitude
Rank(Managerial Vega) 0.1091∗∗∗ 0.0514∗∗∗ 0.0506∗∗∗ 0.0698∗∗
(5.08) (2.97) (2.77) (2.25)
Rank(Managerial Delta) 0.0093 -0.0149 -0.0077 -0.0365
(0.46) (-0.82) (-0.41) (-1.11)
Rank(Managerial CashComp) -0.0338∗ 0.0029 0.0051 -0.0132
(-1.79) (0.16) (0.27) (-0.41)
Rank(IFP Smirk) 0.0185 0.0211∗ 0.0427∗∗
(1.62) (1.73) (2.04)
Rank(ROE) -0.0064 0.0016 0.0058 0.0123
(-0.41) (0.11) (0.38) (0.46)
Rank(Size) -0.1249∗∗∗ -0.0351 -0.0386 -0.0226
(-5.01) (-1.52) (-1.60) (-0.54)
Rank(M/B) 0.0210 0.0617∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.1189∗∗∗
(1.21) (3.86) (3.75) (4.01)
Rank(Leverage) 0.0425∗∗∗ -0.0368∗∗∗ -0.0402∗∗∗ -0.0614∗∗
(2.79) (-2.67) (-2.77) (-2.47)
Rank(Opaque) -0.0225 -0.0183 -0.0206 -0.0275
(-1.59) (-1.39) (-1.48) (-1.18)
Rank(Idiosyncratic Volatility) -0.0387∗∗ 0.0910∗∗∗ 0.0981∗∗∗ 0.1807∗∗∗
(-2.09) (5.70) (5.76) (6.39)
Observations 14153 14153 14153 14153
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.008
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Table 1.10: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on Idiosyncratic Firm
Crashes: Alternate Compensation Incentive Measures
The dependent variables are IFP Smirk, Crash, Crash Frequency, and Sigma, respectively. IFP smirk is the idiosyn-
cratic firm put smirk. Crash is set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences one or more idiosyncratic weekly
returns falling 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return. Crash Frequency
is the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes within a given firm fiscal year. Sigma is the largest standard
deviation decline in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns below their firm fiscal year mean. Scaled Delta is the ratio
of Executive Delta to Executive CashComp. Scaled Vega is the ratio of Executive Vega to Executive CashComp.
Executive CashComp is the executive team’s average total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. Exec-
utive Delta is the average dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in
$000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Executive Vega is the average dollar change in the
value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point
increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation
of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. A spell is defined as a unique CEO-firm combination. Columns (2) and (3)
are logistic and Poisson regressions, respectively. Intercept term is included but not reported. All t-statistics in
parentheses are clustered at the firm level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IFP Smirk Crash Crash Frequency Sigma
Scaled Vega 0.4426∗∗∗ 0.6441∗∗∗ 0.5199∗∗∗ 0.2566∗∗∗
(9.08) (2.97) (3.38) (3.22)
Scaled Delta -0.0124∗∗∗ -0.0506∗ -0.0362 -0.0120
(-2.74) (-1.78) (-1.63) (-1.36)
ln(1+Executive CashComp) 0.0285∗∗∗ -0.0103 -0.0003 -0.0053
(2.75) (-0.19) (-0.01) (-0.30)
IFP Smirk 0.1345∗∗∗ 0.1102∗∗∗ 0.0401∗∗∗
(3.14) (3.41) (3.02)
ROE 0.0051 0.0919 0.0767 0.0289
(0.37) (1.20) (1.34) (1.05)
Size -0.0268∗∗∗ -0.0545∗∗ -0.0434∗∗ -0.0191∗∗
(-5.19) (-2.23) (-2.35) (-2.29)
M/B -0.0011 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0180∗∗∗ 0.0081∗∗∗
(-0.90) (3.64) (3.80) (3.53)
Leverage 0.0495∗∗ -0.3170∗∗∗ -0.2496∗∗∗ -0.0985∗∗∗
(2.39) (-3.08) (-3.18) (-2.86)
Opaque 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0184∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗
(9.05) (3.35) (3.30) (3.11)
Idiosyncratic Volatility -0.8101∗∗∗ 1.5103∗ 1.1734∗ 0.6297∗∗
(-4.67) (1.70) (1.78) (2.11)
Observations 14153 14153 14153 14153
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.006
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Table 1.11: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on Idiosyncratic Firm
Crashes: Idiosyncratic Volatility Quartile Dummy Stratification
The dependent variables are IFP Smirk, Crash, Crash Frequency, and Sigma, respectively. IFP smirk is the idiosyn-
cratic firm put smirk. Crash is set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences one or more idiosyncratic weekly
returns falling 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return. Crash Frequency
is the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes within a given firm fiscal year. Sigma is the largest standard
deviation decline in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns below their firm fiscal year mean. Executive Delta is the average
dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with
a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Executive Vega is the average dollar change in the value of the executive
team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in the stan-
dard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm
weekly returns. Q4(Idio. Vol.) is the highest idiosyncratic volatility quartile stratification dummy. Intercept term
is included but not reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗
indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in
Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IFP Smirk Crash Crash Frequency Sigma
ln(1+Managerial Vega) 0.0656∗∗∗ -0.0036 -0.0036 -0.0050
(6.66) (-0.61) (-0.56) (-0.49)
ln(1+Managerial Vega)×Q2(Idio. Vol.) -0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0152∗ 0.0153∗ 0.0229∗
(-2.65) (1.94) (1.79) (1.65)
ln(1+Managerial Vega)×Q3(Idio. Vol.) -0.0412∗∗∗ 0.0243∗∗∗ 0.0255∗∗∗ 0.0438∗∗∗
(-3.70) (2.95) (2.89) (3.05)
ln(1+Managerial Vega)×Q4(Idio. Vol.) -0.0262∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0417∗∗∗
(-2.31) (3.04) (2.94) (2.68)
ln(1+Managerial Delta) -0.0112∗∗ -0.0022 -0.0011 -0.0013
(-2.23) (-0.50) (-0.25) (-0.16)
ln(1+Managerial CashComp) -0.0051 -0.0073 -0.0070 -0.0191
(-0.51) (-0.77) (-0.69) (-1.11)
IFP Smirk 0.0246∗∗∗ 0.0276∗∗∗ 0.0417∗∗∗
(3.24) (3.51) (3.15)
ROE 0.0201 0.0237∗ 0.0259∗ 0.0391
(1.45) (1.70) (1.79) (1.43)
Size -0.0175∗∗∗ -0.0036 -0.0040 -0.0048
(-3.25) (-0.79) (-0.84) (-0.58)
M/B -0.0020 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0065∗∗∗
(-1.59) (2.73) (2.77) (2.87)
Leverage 0.0504∗∗ -0.0417∗∗ -0.0441∗∗ -0.0669∗
(2.30) (-2.14) (-2.14) (-1.91)
Opaque 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0064∗∗∗
(9.29) (2.86) (2.69) (2.82)
Q2(Idio. Vol.) 0.1032∗∗ -0.0232 -0.0219 -0.0201
(2.20) (-0.73) (-0.64) (-0.36)
Q3(Idio. Vol.) 0.1494∗∗∗ -0.0411 -0.0399 -0.0409
(3.15) (-1.28) (-1.17) (-0.75)
Q4(Idio. Vol.) 0.1012∗∗ -0.0183 -0.0169 -0.0078
(2.17) (-0.56) (-0.49) (-0.14)
Observations 14153 14153 14153 14153
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.008 0.009 0.009
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Table 1.12: Exogenous Variation in Compensation Convexity:
Cross-Sectional Difference-in-Means Analysis
The dependent variables are ∆(IFP Smirk), ∆(Crash), ∆(Crash Frequency), and ∆(Sigma), respectively. All vari-
ables are transformed by first determining the average of the respective variable for each firm pre- and post-FAS123R,
and then calculating a post- minus pre-period difference. The pre-FAS 123R period spans fiscal years 2002-2004 while
the post-FAS 123R period spans fiscal years 2005-2007. IFP smirk is the idiosyncratic firm put smirk constructed
using 91-day maturity options. Crash is set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences one or more id-
iosyncratic weekly returns falling 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return.
Crash Frequency is the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes within a given firm fiscal year. Sigma is the
largest standard deviation decline in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns below their firm fiscal year mean. ∆(Executive
CashComp) is the change in mean executive cash compensation, by firm, surrounding the exogenous FAS 123R com-
pensation convexity shock. ∆(Executive Delta) is the change in mean executive delta, by firm, surrounding the
exogenous FAS 123R compensation convexity shock. ∆(Executive Vega) is the change in mean executive vega, by
firm, surrounding the exogenous FAS 123R compensation convexity shock. Executive CashComp is the executive
team’s average total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. Executive Delta is the average dollar change
in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in
the firm’s stock price. Executive Vega is the average dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total equity
compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the
firm’s equity returns. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. Inter-
cept term is included but not reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. The notation∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are
defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(IFP Smirk) ∆(Crash) ∆(Crash Frequency) ∆(Sigma)
∆(Managerial Vega) -0.0000 0.0003∗∗ 0.0004∗∗ 0.0007∗∗
(-0.14) (2.41) (2.42) (2.35)
∆(Managerial Delta) -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001∗
(-0.01) (-1.16) (-1.01) (-1.89)
∆(Managerial CashComp) -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
(-0.21) (-0.96) (-0.87) (0.37)
∆(IFP Smirk) 0.0814 0.1041∗ 0.0302
(1.49) (1.84) (0.29)
∆(ROE) 0.0136 0.1468∗∗ 0.1484∗∗ 0.2381∗∗
(0.31) (2.39) (2.20) (2.13)
∆(Size) -0.1229∗∗∗ 0.0719∗∗ 0.1008∗∗∗ 0.1594∗∗
(-5.65) (2.18) (2.83) (2.56)
∆(M/B) 0.0069∗ 0.0094∗ 0.0069 0.0241∗∗
(1.67) (1.67) (1.09) (2.41)
∆(Leverage) 0.0269 0.1636 0.1783 0.5215∗∗
(0.36) (1.24) (1.29) (2.27)
∆(Opaque) 0.0009 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0070
(0.42) (0.00) (-0.28) (1.12)
∆(Idiosyncratic Vol.) -2.2250∗∗∗ 0.5327 0.6413 -1.2262
(-3.23) (0.44) (0.50) (-0.59)
Observations 929 929 929 929
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.015 0.017 0.030
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Table 1.13: Exogenous Variation in Compensation Convexity:
Cross-Sectional Difference-in-Means Analysis
The dependent variables are ∆(IFP Smirk 182), ∆(Crash), ∆(Crash Frequency), and ∆(Sigma), respectively. All
variables are transformed by first determining the average of the respective variable for each firm pre- and post-
FAS123R, and then calculating a post- minus pre-period difference. The pre-FAS 123R period spans fiscal years
2002-2004 while the post-FAS 123R period spans fiscal years 2005-2007. IFP smirk 182 is the idiosyncratic firm put
smirk constructed using 182-day maturity options. Crash is set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences
one or more idiosyncratic weekly returns falling 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean idiosyncratic firm
weekly return. Crash Frequency is the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes within a given firm fiscal
year. Sigma is the largest standard deviation decline in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns below their firm fiscal
year mean. ∆(Executive CashComp) is the change in mean executive cash compensation, by firm, surrounding the
exogenous FAS 123R compensation convexity shock. ∆(Executive Delta) is the change in mean executive delta, by
firm, surrounding the exogenous FAS 123R compensation convexity shock. ∆(Executive Vega) is the change in mean
executive vega, by firm, surrounding the exogenous FAS 123R compensation convexity shock. Executive CashComp
is the executive team’s average total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. Executive Delta is the average
dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with
a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Executive Vega is the average dollar change in the value of the executive
team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard
deviation of the firm’s equity returns. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly
returns. Intercept term is included but not reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm level.
The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining
variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(IFP Smirk 182) ∆(Crash) ∆(Crash Frequency) ∆(Sigma)
∆(Managerial Vega) 0.0001 0.0003∗∗ 0.0004∗∗ 0.0007∗∗
(0.40) (2.38) (2.36) (2.34)
∆(Managerial Delta) -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001∗
(-0.21) (-1.18) (-1.02) (-1.90)
∆(Managerial CashComp) 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
(0.04) (-0.97) (-0.89) (0.37)
∆(IFP Smirk 182) 0.0409 0.0647 0.0108
(0.84) (1.25) (0.12)
∆(ROE) 0.0165 0.1472∗∗ 0.1488∗∗ 0.2383∗∗
(0.37) (2.39) (2.20) (2.13)
∆(Size) -0.1078∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗ 0.0950∗∗∗ 0.1569∗∗
(-4.61) (2.01) (2.67) (2.52)
∆(M/B) 0.0024 0.0099∗ 0.0075 0.0243∗∗
(0.60) (1.76) (1.18) (2.44)
∆(Leverage) 0.0606 0.1633 0.1772 0.5217∗∗
(0.79) (1.24) (1.28) (2.27)
∆(Opaque) -0.0014 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0070
(-0.60) (0.04) (-0.23) (1.13)
∆(Idiosyncratic Vol.) -0.5002 0.3719 0.4419 -1.2880
(-0.74) (0.31) (0.35) (-0.63)
Observations 929 929 929 929
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.013 0.015 0.030
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Table 1.14: Effect of Compensation Convexity on Idiosyncratic Positive Jump Risk:
Cross-Sectional Difference-in-Means Analysis
The dependent variables are ∆(JIFP Smirk), ∆(Jump), ∆(Jump Frequency), and ∆(Jump Sigma), respectively.
All variables are transformed by first determining the average of the respective variable for each firm pre- and
post-FAS123R, and then calculating a post- minus pre-period difference. The pre-FAS 123R period spans fiscal
years 2002-2004 while the post-FAS 123R period spans fiscal years 2005-2007. JIFP Smirk is the jump risk related
idiosyncratic firm put smirk. Jump is set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences one or more idiosyncratic
weekly returns rising 3.09 or more standard deviations above the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return. Jump
Frequency is the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price jumps within a given firm fiscal year. Jump Sigma is the
largest standard deviation jump in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns above their firm fiscal year mean. ∆(Executive
CashComp) is the change in mean executive cash compensation, by firm, surrounding the exogenous FAS 123R
compensation convexity shock. ∆(Executive Delta) is the change in mean executive delta, by firm, surrounding the
exogenous FAS 123R compensation convexity shock. ∆(Executive Vega) is the change in mean executive vega, by
firm, surrounding the exogenous FAS 123R compensation convexity shock. Executive CashComp is the executive
team’s average total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. Executive Delta is the average dollar change
in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase
in the firm’s stock price. Executive Vega is the average dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total
equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation
of the firm’s equity returns. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns.
Intercept term is included but not reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. The
notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining
variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(JIFP Smirk) ∆(Jump) ∆(Jump Frequency) ∆(Jump Sigma)
∆(Managerial Vega) -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(-0.84) (-1.07) (-0.99) (-0.78)
∆(Managerial Delta) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.30) (0.32) (0.32) (0.14)
∆(Managerial CashComp) -0.0000∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗
(-2.17) (2.01) (1.94) (1.91)
∆(JIFP Smirk) -0.0435 -0.0380 -0.0298
(-0.57) (-0.48) (-0.21)
∆(ROE) 0.0512∗ -0.1334∗∗ -0.1436∗∗ -0.3209∗∗∗
(1.92) (-2.02) (-2.11) (-2.98)
∆(Size) -0.0271∗ -0.0457 -0.0500 -0.1567∗∗∗
(-1.91) (-1.35) (-1.42) (-3.04)
∆(M/B) -0.0021 0.0077 0.0076 0.0156
(-0.81) (1.19) (1.10) (1.42)
∆(Leverage) -0.0222 -0.0159 -0.0388 -0.0126
(-0.43) (-0.14) (-0.33) (-0.07)
∆(Opaque) 0.0001 -0.0032 -0.0050 -0.0026
(0.04) (-0.97) (-1.43) (-0.51)
∆(Idiosyncratic Vol.) -0.2057 3.2716∗∗∗ 3.3366∗∗∗ 4.7873∗∗∗
(-0.52) (3.21) (3.22) (3.14)
Observations 929 929 929 929
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.024 0.025 0.043
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Table 1.15: Exogenous Variation in Compensation Convexity:
Difference-in-Differences Analysis
The dependent variables are IFP Smirk, Crash, Crash Frequency, and Sigma, respectively. IFP smirk is the idiosyn-
cratic firm put smirk. Crash is set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences one or more idiosyncratic weekly
returns falling 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return. Crash Frequency
is the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes within a given firm fiscal year. Sigma is the largest standard
deviation decline in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns below their firm fiscal year mean. Executive CashComp is
the executive team’s average total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. Executive Delta is the average
dollar change in the value of the executive team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with
a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Executive Vega is the average dollar change in the value of the executive
team’s total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in the stan-
dard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm
weekly returns. Post-123R is a dummy variable equal to zero for fiscal years 2002-2004 and equal to one for fiscal
years 2005-2007. Executive Vega 2002 is the continuous treatment variable. Post×ln(1+Executive Vega 2002) is the
difference-in-differences interaction term. All specifications feature industry and year fixed effects. Intercept term
is included but not reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗
indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in
Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IFP Smirk Crash Crash Frequency Sigma
Post×ln(1+Managerial Vega 2002) -0.0294∗∗∗ -0.0275∗∗∗ -0.0280∗∗∗ -0.0684∗∗∗
(-3.74) (-2.71) (-2.59) (-3.83)
Post-123R 0.2023∗∗∗ 0.1541∗∗∗ 0.1357∗∗ 0.3707∗∗∗
(5.17) (2.60) (2.05) (3.42)
ln(1+Managerial Vega 2002) 0.0260∗∗∗ 0.0013 0.0028 0.0004
(3.40) (0.13) (0.26) (0.02)
ln(1+Managerial Delta) -0.0052 0.0087 0.0099 0.0073
(-0.84) (1.02) (1.10) (0.48)
ln(1+Managerial CashComp) -0.0121 -0.0076 -0.0079 0.0153
(-0.92) (-0.41) (-0.39) (0.47)
IFP Smirk -0.0114 -0.0099 -0.0181
(-0.51) (-0.44) (-0.45)
ROE 0.0068 0.0770∗∗∗ 0.0818∗∗∗ 0.1233∗∗
(0.32) (2.71) (2.70) (2.11)
Size -0.0040 -0.0288∗∗∗ -0.0309∗∗∗ -0.0498∗∗∗
(-0.59) (-3.19) (-3.24) (-3.11)
M/B 0.0013 -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0068
(0.68) (-1.14) (-1.09) (-1.27)
Leverage 0.0827∗∗∗ 0.0529 0.0672 0.0093
(2.67) (1.29) (1.51) (0.11)
Opaque 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0030∗ 0.0028 0.0066∗∗
(3.73) (1.81) (1.63) (2.02)
SD(lnres) -0.2804 -0.4955 -0.4861 -0.2499
(-0.83) (-1.10) (-1.01) (-0.30)
Observations 4370 4370 4370 4370
Adjusted R2 0.090 0.023 0.022 0.024
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A. Estimation of Compensation Incentives
Delta is the dollar change in the value of the executive’s equity portfolio (in $000s)
associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Similarly, vega is the dollar
change in the value of the executive’s equity portfolio (in $000s) associated with a
one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns.
The closed form expressions for the delta and vega of a call option on an underlying
security with dividends are provided by the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing
model as modified to account for dividend payouts:
Option Value = Se−dTN (Z) −Xe−rTN (Z − σ√T) (15)
∆ = ∂ (Option Value)
∂S
(16)
= e−dTN (Z)
ν = ∂ (Option Value)
∂σ
(17)
= e−dTN ′ (Z)S√T
Z = ln ( SX ) + T [r − d + σ22 ]
σ
√
T
(18)
where N is the cumulative density function for the normal distribution, N ′ is the
probability density function for the normal distribution, d is the natural logarithm
of the expected dividend yield, T is the time to maturity of the option in years, S
is the price of the underlying stock, X is the exercise price of the option, r is the
natural logarithm of the risk-free interest rate, and σ is the expected stock return
volatility. Accordingly, the dollar change in the value of an option associated with a
1% increase in the firm’s stock price is .01×∆×S. The dollar change in the value of
an option associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation
of the firm’s equity returns is .01 × ν.
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The methodology in Core and Guay (2002) is used to aggregate the delta and
vega of individual option grants so as to arrive at the total delta and total vega
of the executive’s option portfolio. The total delta of the executive’s portfolio of
stocks is then added to the total option portfolio delta in calculating the total delta
of the executive’s equity portfolio. The total vega of the executive’s equity portfolio
is approximated as the total vega of the option portfolio as Guay (1999) finds that
stock options, but not common stock, substantially increase the sensitivity of the
executive’s wealth to firm equity risk.
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B. Variable Definitions
1. Cash Compensation: Total current compensation (Salary+Bonus) of the
executive—TOTAL CURR.
2. Crash: A binary indicator specifying the occurrence of an idiosyncratic firm
crash within a given firm fiscal year. Specifically, crash is set to one if within its
fiscal year a firm experiences one or more idiosyncratic firm weekly returns
falling 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean idiosyncratic firm
weekly return.
3. Crash Frequency: The number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price crashes within
a given firm fiscal year. A firm experiences an idiosyncratic crash within a fiscal
year if its idiosyncratic firm weekly returns drop by 3.09 or more standard
deviations below their firm fiscal year mean.
4. Delta: Dollar change in the value of the executive’s total equity compensation
portfolio (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price.
5. Discretionary Accruals: Discretionary accruals are calculated by estimating
the modified Jones model. For all firms within each Fama-French industry in a
given fiscal year, I estimate the following cross-sectional regression:
TAi,t
Assetsi,t−1 = α0 [ 1Assetsi,t−1 ] + β1 [ ∆Salesi,tAssetsi,t−1 ] + β2 [ PPEi,tAssetsi,t−1 ] + εi,t
Discretionary accruals, for each firm fiscal year, are then calculated as follows:
DiscAcci,t = TAi,tAssetsi,t−1 − α̂0 [ 1Assetsi,t−1 ] − β̂1 [∆Salesi,t −∆Receivablesi,tAssetsi,t−1 ]
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− β̂2 [ PPEi,tAssetsi,t−1 ]
where TAi,t is the total accruals, Assetsi,t is the total assets, ∆Salesi,t is the
change in sales, ∆Receivablesi,t is the change in receivables, and PPEi,t is the
property, plant, and equipment of firm i in fiscal year t, respectively.
6. Executive CashComp: The executive team’s average total cash remuneration
within a given firm fiscal year.
7. Executive Delta: Average dollar change in the value of the executive team’s
total equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase
in the firm’s stock price.
8. Executive Vega: Average dollar change in the value of the executive team’s to-
tal equity compensation portfolios (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-
point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns.
9. Idiosyncratic Firm Put Smirk: The ratio of the idiosyncratic implied volatil-
ity (variance) of out-of-the-money put options to the idiosyncratic implied
volatility (variance) of at-the-money put options for a given firm fiscal year.
Specifically, I define IFP Smirk for a given firm i in fiscal year t as follows:
IFP Smirki,t = σˆ2i,t−1,OTM − [βˆ2i,t-1,Vasicek × σˆ2S&P500,t−1,OTM]
σˆ2i,t−1,ATM − [βˆ2i,t-1,Vasicek × σˆ2S&P500,t−1,ATM]
βˆi,t-1,Vasicek =wi,t−1βˆTSi,t−1 + [(1 −wi,t−1) × 1]
wi,t−1 = XSVar(βˆTSi,t−1)
XSVar(βˆTSi,t−1) + SE2(βˆTSi,t−1)
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ri,t−1 = αi +βTSi,t−1rm,t−1 + εi,t−1
where the deltas of the out-of-the-money (OTM) put options and at-the-money
(ATM) put options are -.2 and -.5, respectively. σˆ2i,t−1,OTM is the average implied
volatility (variance) of out-of-the-money 91-day horizon firm put options as mea-
sured over the 10 trading days prior to the start of fiscal year t. σˆ2S&P500,t−1,OTM
is the average implied volatility (variance) of out-of-the-money 91-day horizon
S&P 500 put options as measured over the 10 trading days prior to the start
of fiscal year t. σˆ2i,t−1,ATM is the average implied volatility (variance) of at-
the-money 91-day horizon firm put options as measured over the 10 trading
days prior to the start of fiscal year t. σˆ2S&P500,t−1,ATM is the average implied
volatility (variance) of at-the-money 91-day horizon S&P 500 put options as
measured over the 10 trading days prior to the start of fiscal year t. βˆi,t-1,Vasicek
is the Vasicek shrinkage estimator of firm i’s beta on the market during fiscal
year t − 1 as estimated using weekly returns. βˆTSi,t−1 is the time-series estimate
of firm i’s fiscal year beta on the market during fiscal year t − 1 using weekly
returns. wi,t−1 is the Vasicek shrinkage weight on the time-series estimate of
firm i’s fiscal year beta on the market during fiscal year t − 1. XSVar(βˆTSi,t−1)
is the cross-sectional variance of the time-series estimates of firm betas on the
market during fiscal year t − 1. SE2(βˆTSi,t−1) is the square of the standard error
on the time-series estimate of firm i’s beta on the market portfolio during fis-
cal year t − 1 using using weekly returns. ri,t−1 denotes firm i’s weekly returns
during fiscal year t − 1 and rm,t−1 represents the weekly returns for the CRSP
value-weighted market index during fiscal year t − 1.
10. Idiosyncratic Firm Weekly Returns: I estimate the below model for each
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stock fiscal year and I define idiosyncratic firm weekly returns as ln(1 + ε):
ri,t = αi +β1,irm,t−1 +β2,irj,t−1 +β3,irm,t +β4,irj,t +β5,irm,t+1 +β6,irj,t+1 + εit
where ri,t is the weekly return for stock i in week t, rm,t is the weekly return
for the CRSP value-weighted market index in week t, and rj,t is the weekly
return for stock i’s value-weighted Fama-French industry index j during week
t. I include leads and lags to account for non-synchronous trading (Dimson,
1979).
11. Idiosyncratic Volatility: The standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly
returns for a given firm fiscal year.
12. IFP smirk 182: The idiosyncratic firm put smirk constructed using 182-day
maturity options.
13. Jump: Set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences one or more
idiosyncratic weekly returns rising 3.09 or more standard deviations above the
mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return.
14. Jump Frequency: The number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price jumps within
a given firm fiscal year.
15. Jump Idiosyncratic Firm Put Smirk: The ratio of the idiosyncratic implied
volatility (variance) of in-the-money put options to the idiosyncratic implied
volatility (variance) of at-the-money put options for a given firm fiscal year.
Specifically, I define JIFP Smirk for a given firm i in fiscal year t as follows:
JIFP Smirki,t = σˆ2i,t−1,ITM − [βˆ2i,t-1,Vasicek × σˆ2S&P500,t−1,ITM]
σˆ2i,t−1,ATM − [βˆ2i,t-1,Vasicek × σˆ2S&P500,t−1,ATM]
where the deltas of the in-the-money (ITM) put options and at-the-money
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(ATM) put options are -.8 and -.5, respectively. σˆ2i,t−1,ITM is the average implied
volatility (variance) of in-the-money 91-day horizon firm put options as mea-
sured over the 10 trading days prior to the start of fiscal year t. σˆ2S&P500,t−1,ITM
is the average implied volatility (variance) of in-the-money 91-day horizon S&P
500 put options as measured over the 10 trading days prior to the start of fiscal
year t. σˆ2i,t−1,ATM is the average implied volatility (variance) of at-the-money
91-day horizon firm put options as measured over the 10 trading days prior to
the start of fiscal year t. σˆ2S&P500,t−1,ATM is the average implied volatility (vari-
ance) of at-the-money 91-day horizon S&P 500 put options as measured over
the 10 trading days prior to the start of fiscal year t.
16. Jump Sigma: The largest standard deviation jump in idiosyncratic firm weekly
returns above their firm fiscal year mean.
17. Leverage: Total assets minus the book value of common equity scaled by total
assets —(AT-CEQ)/AT.
18. MTB: Market value of common equity scaled by the book value of common
equity—(PRCC F*CSHO)/CEQ.
19. Opaque: Three year moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals:
Opaquet = t−1∑
i=t−3 ∣DiscAcci∣
20. Post-123R: Dummy variable equal to 0 for fiscal years 2002-2004 and equal to
1 for fiscal years 2005-2007.
21. ROE: Income before extraordinary items scaled by the book value of common
equity—IBC/CEQ.
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22. Scaled Delta: Scaled Delta is the ratio of Executive Delta to Executive Cash-
Comp.
23. Scaled Vega: Scaled Vega is the ratio of Executive Vega to Executive Cash-
Comp.
24. Sigma: Sigma is the largest standard deviation decline in idiosyncratic firm
weekly returns below their firm fiscal year mean. Specifically, I define sigma for
a given firm fiscal year as follows:
Sigma = −min [ ln(1 + ε) −Mean (ln(1 + ε))Standard Deviation (ln(1 + ε))]
25. Size: Natural logarithm of the market value of common equity—ln(PRCC F*CSHO).
26. Total Accruals: Income before extraordinary items and discontinued opera-
tions minus the cash flow from operating activities—(IBC t-OANCF t).
27. Vega: Dollar change in the value of the executive’s total equity compensa-
tion portfolio (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in the
standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns.
59
CHAPTER 2
The Differential Ramifications of Risk-Taking Incentives on
Systematic and Idiosyncratic Volatility:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment
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2.1. Introduction
CEO compensation contracts have attained heightened scrutiny in the wake of
the Financial Crisis of 2008. Academics and regulators have highlighted the recent
explosion in executive pay, as well as the role of misaligned remuneration incentives
in the recent crisis, in calling for reform. For instance, Bebchuk (2009) posits that the
risk-taking incentives arising from option-based pay may have fueled the exorbitant
risk-taking activities that precipitated the crisis. One factor that contributed to the
proliferation of options, as components of executive pay, is their generous expensing
treatment. Until recently, firms were given a choice to either expense options at their
intrinsic value or at their fair value through some variant of a closed-form option
pricing model, such as the Black and Scholes (1973) model as modified to account
for dividends, or a binomial option pricing model. Consequently, most firms elected
to use the intrinsic valuation methodology and granted options at-the-money so as
to set the intrinsic value of grants at zero. This, in turn, allowed firms to artificially
inflate their earnings by avoiding the recognition of option-grant expenses.
Under the terms of FAS 123R, firms were mandated to adopt the fair value ex-
pensing of options. Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012) show that following the adoption
of FAS 123R in December of 2005, firms drastically decrease their use of option-based
pay and, consequently, also reduce the convexity of compensation contracts. How-
ever, they do not find any evidence of the expected decrease in proxies for managerial
risk-taking behavior associated with a decrease in the risk-taking incentives stemming
from option pay.1 They state that “it remains a challenge to understand the condi-
tions under which convexity in compensation contracts affects managerial behavior
and the role that options play relative to other forms of compensation as an efficient
1Anderson and Core (2013) present one potential solution to the puzzle in Hayes, Lemmon, and
Qiu (2012) by accounting for the full risk-taking incentives of executives stemming from option-,
stock-, and debt-like remuneration structures.
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mechanism for paying managers.”
In discerning the relationship between option remuneration and managerial risk-
taking behavior, it is paramount to consider the role of CEO risk-aversion. Namely,
not all risk is equally risky in the perspective of a risk-averse CEO who is overex-
posed to the risk of the firm. If a manager wants to increase the value of options
within their option compensation portfolio by increasing the volatility of the firm, an
increase in hedgeable risk is preferable to an increase in non-hedgeable risk. Arm-
strong and Vashishtha (2012) reason that as CEOs are precluded from shorting their
firm’s equity and are able to freely trade the market portfolio, it is easier for them
to hedge a given undesirable increase in systematic risk than a similar unwanted
increase in idiosyncratic risk. CEOs can also hedge their potentially suboptimal over-
exposure to systematic risk through the use of derivatives contracts. Ceteris paribus,
the certainty equivalent of an increase in the value of the risk-averse manager’s option
portfolio stemming from a fixed increase in systematic risk is greater than that from
an identical increase in idiosyncratic risk as the cash flow is subjectively deemed less
risky.
Kulatilaka and Marcus (1994) show that while the value of tradable options is
increasing in the volatility of the underlying stock, the value of restricted employee
options can actually fall as volatility increases. They argue that the early exercise of
employee stock options leads to an option pricing anomaly. As volatility increases, a
risk-averse CEO is more likely to sub-optimally exercise early so as to decrease non-
hedgeable over-exposure to firm risk which, in turn, reduces the option’s expected
value. For reasonable risk-aversion parameters, this mechanism can offset the other-
wise value-increasing effects of volatility on option prices. The intuition in Lambert,
Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991), Carpenter (2000), and Ross (2004) implies that unlike
increases in total risk stemming from idiosyncratic volatility, increases in total risk
linked to systematic volatility unambiguously increase the CEO’s valuation of their
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option portfolio.
In this paper, I exploit the exogenous negative shock to compensation convexity
stemming from FAS 123R in examining the differential ramifications of option pay
and risk-taking incentives on the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility of the firm. If
option convexity in the pre-FAS 123R period incentivized CEOs to primarily increase
the value of their option portfolios by increasing their firms’ systematic volatility, the
post-FAS 123R period should feature a differential decrease in systematic volatility
as compensation convexity and option use decrease. In isolating the aforementioned
effect, I use a difference-in-differences identification strategy featuring two control
groups of firms that are relatively unaffected by FAS 123R. My ideal control group
is composed of firms in which the CEO’s compensation portfolio is entirely devoid of
stock options over the sample period. These CEOs are not affected by FAS 123R, from
a risk-taking incentives standpoint, as their remuneration package does not feature
any current or prior outstanding stock option grants surrounding the adoption of FAS
123R.
Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) argue that when analyzing the implications
of FAS 123R on firms, it is crucial to account for the fact these new accounting rules
were known in advance of the passage and adoption of FAS 123R. If firms recognized
the forthcoming regulatory changes and voluntarily adopted the terms of FAS 123R
early, the true ramifications of FAS 123R as measured at the time of mandatory
adoption may be biased downward.2 With this in mind, my second control contains,
both, firms in the first control group as well as early full-adopters of FAS 123R. To
the extent that early-full adopting firms voluntarily enact the fair-value methodology
prior to the adoption of FAS 123R, they are expected to be relatively less affected by
FAS 123R, at its later time of mandated adoption, than their counterpart firms who
2I would like to thank Carter, Lynch, and Tuna (2007) for giving me access to a list of early
adopters of FAS 123R.
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delay adoption until the mandatory enforcement deadline.3
By combining the first control group of firms with early-full adopters of FAS 123R,
I increase the power of my tests. With both of the above control groups, I show that
firms subjected to a negative convexity shock (treatment firms) differentially decrease
their systematic volatility by a greater magnitude than those firms whose executive
compensation convexity profile is relatively unaffected by FAS 123R (control firms)
at its time of mandatory adoption. In contrast, I do not find a similar differential
trend in idiosyncratic volatility between the aforementioned treatment and control
groups. This evidence is largely consistent with the notion that compensation con-
vexity, stemming from option convexity, predominantly incentivizes under-diversified
risk-averse CEOs to increase the value of their option portfolios by increasing the
systematic volatility of the firms they manage as it is readily more hedgeable than
idiosyncratic volatility.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper presents
a novel approach to resolving the convexity puzzle within Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu
(2012) as I present new evidence indicating that convexity in the remuneration pack-
age incentivizes CEOs to primarily augment the systematic volatility, as opposed to
the idiosyncratic volatility, of the firms they manage. If managers use options as a
conduit through which they can gamble with shareholder wealth by exposing them
to suboptimal systematic volatility, options are not serving their intended contract-
ing function. Instead of decreasing the agency costs of risk by encouraging CEOs to
adopt positive NPV projects that may be characterized by idiosyncratic risk, option
pay may have instead contributed to the very frictions it was intended to reduce.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the differential ramifications of
compensation convexity on systematic and idiosyncratic volatility within a natural
experiment setting featuring an exogenous negative option convexity shock to CEO
3Specifically, I use the subset of early FAS 123R adopters who chose the modified prospective
adoption methodology.
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firm-specific equity portfolios.
In addition, this study also presents evidence in accordance with the framework
and predictions developed by Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012). Specifically, they
utilize an instrumental variables approach in attempting to control for the endogeneity
inherent in the risk-compensation incentives setting mechanism. A potential concern
with instrumental variables approaches is the requirement for untestable exclusion
restrictions to hold. Namely, Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) reference this
concern in noting that Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012) “assume that cash balances,
marginal tax rates, past stock returns, and past profitability are unrelated to the
proportion of firms’ overall risk that is systematic.” The evidence presented within
my paper, from a natural experiment setting, is largely in agreement with the intuition
from Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012) and hence helps to allay the aforementioned
concerns regarding invalid instruments driving the results in their paper.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 conducts a review of
the related literature and institutional background. Section 2.3 develops the testable
hypotheses and specifies the identification strategy. Section 2.4 describes the data
selection process as well as the measurement of important variables. Section 2.5
presents the empirical analysis and Section 2.6 concludes the paper.
2.2. Related Literature and Institutional Background
2.2.1. Option Pay, Risk-Taking Incentives, and CEO Behav-
ior
A number of papers explicitly examine the link between between option pay, risk-
taking incentives, and the risk-taking behavior of managers. For instance, Guay
(1999) finds that stock options, but not common stock, substantially increase the
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sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to firm risk. He also examines the cross-section of
firms and identifies a positive relationship between a firm’s investment opportunities
and compensation convexity. This finding is in accordance with the notion that firms
in which the agency costs of risk are greatest from potential managerial underinvest-
ment in risky positive-NPV projects have the highest impetus to increase managerial
risk-taking incentives. He also identifies a positive relation between a firm’s stock-
return volatility and the convexity provided by managerial option grants.
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) attempt to control for the endogeneity inherent
in the risk and compensation incentives setting mechanism by implementing a simul-
taneous equations framework designed to capture plausible reverse causality. They
find that a higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility results in the man-
ager’s implementation of riskier policy choices. They also identify a positive feedback
relation between riskier policy choices and compensation convexity. Low (2009) also
identifies a positive causal relation between compensation convexity and managerial
risk-taking behavior. Namely, she finds that in response to an exogenous positive
shock to takeover protection in Delaware in the 1990s, CEOs decrease the risk of
the firms they manage. This reduction primarily occurs in firms featuring low man-
agerial wealth sensitivity to stock return volatility. In response to the increase in
takeover protection, firms increase compensation convexity so as provide augmented
risk-taking incentives to CEOs.
Chava and Purnanandam (2010) find a positive relationship between the risk-
taking incentives of CEOs and CFOs and financial policy. They show that CEOs’
risk increasing incentives are linked to greater leverage as well as lower cash balances
while CFOs’ risk-increasing incentives are associated with riskier debt-maturity de-
cisions and lower earnings-smoothing. Bakke, Mahmudi, Fernando, and Salas (2013)
show that compensation convexity is negatively associated with the use of oil and
gas derivative contracts within the oil and gas industry. Specifically, they find that
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firms increase their use of derivatives contracts meant to guard against shocks in oil
and gas prices following the decrease in compensation convexity associated with FAS
123R. Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) identify an exogenous increase in left-
tail risk and show that boards reduce managerial exposure to stock price movements
as a consequence. They also find greater risk reducing activities after a decrease in
option-based pay.
While the aforementioned evidence portrays a positive association between option
convexity and managerial risk-taking activities, several papers highlight the need for
caution in depicting the full nature of this connection. For example, Lambert, Larcker,
and Verrecchia (1991) demonstrate that the managerial incentives stemming from re-
stricted option pay do not necessarily follow the same dynamics as those provided by
unrestricted options. They show that if the probability of an option vesting in the
money is substantially high, managerial stock options can actually increase aversion
to risk-taking behavior. Carpenter (2000) examines the impact of option compensa-
tion on the manager’s appetite for risk when the option position is not hedgeable. She
finds that the ramifications of option compensation on the manager’s risk-taking be-
havior is more complicated than simple option pricing intuition may imply. While the
convexity in option pay incentivizes the manager to seek payoffs that are “away from
the money” and thus may lead to an augmentation of firm volatility, DARA utility
shows that the manager may dynamically adjust volatility as asset values fluctuate.
As asset values increase, the CEO may attenuate the risk of their equity portfolio.
Hall and Murphy (2002) argue that the interaction of risk aversion with non-
diversification leads to a divergence between the company’s cost of granting options
and the CEO’s valuation of options granted. As risk averse CEOs are overexposed
to the risk of the firms they manage, their valuation of options within their equity
portfolio is less than that of the firm. Hall and Murphy (2002) explain that this
friction can justify the large premiums that managers demand when accepting op-
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tion pay in lieu of cash compensation. Ross (2004) contends that convexity within
an agent’s fee schedule does not automatically imply lower risk aversion. Specifically,
convexity within the pay contract is a necessary but insufficient condition for inducing
risk-taking behavior. Increasing the CEO’s wealth, by means of option grants, may
not necessarily lead to greater risk-taking behavior if the wealth effect of the options
perturbs the manager’s utility function into a more risk-averse portion of its domain.
2.3. Hypotheses Development and Research De-
sign
2.3.1. Hypotheses Development
Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012) conjecture that for a fixed level of compensation
convexity (vega), an increase in systematic risk, for all combinations of risk and risk-
aversion, unambiguously yields an increase in the manager’s certainty equivalent of
their firm-specific equity portfolio. This is a direct result of the CEO’s ability to hedge
any potentially deleterious increases in systematic risk by trading the market portfolio.
CEOs can also hedge their potentially suboptimal overexposure to systematic risk
through the use of derivatives contracts. I utilize this intuition in approaching the
convexity puzzle within Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012). My first hypothesis is
specified below:
Hypothesis 1. Compensation convexity, stemming from option pay, incentivizes
CEOs to increase the systematic risk of the firms they manage.
I exploit the exogenous negative shock to compensation convexity associated with
FAS 123R in testing the empirical predictions of the aforementioned hypothesis. If
option convexity in the pre-FAS 123R period incentivized CEOs to increase the value
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of their option portfolios by increasing their firms’ systematic risk, the post-FAS 123R
period should feature a decrease in systematic risk as compensation convexity, risk-
taking incentives, and option use exogenously decrease. Specifically, firms subjected
to a negative convexity shock (treatment firms) should differentially decrease their
systematic risk by a greater magnitude than those firms whose executive compensa-
tion convexity profiles are relatively unaffected by FAS 123R (control firms) at its
time of mandatory adoption.
Ceteris paribus, the certainty equivalent of an increase in the value of the risk-
averse manager’s option portfolio stemming from a fixed increase in systematic risk
is greater than that from an identical increase in idiosyncratic risk as the cash flow is
subjectively deemed less risky. If option convexity in the pre-FAS 123R period incen-
tivized CEOs to increase the value of their option portfolios by primarily increasing
the systematic as opposed to the idiosyncratic risk of the firm, there should not be an
equally observable differential trend in idiosyncratic risk between the aforementioned
treatment and control groups. This leads to my second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Compensation convexity, stemming from option pay, incentivizes
CEOs to increase risk by primarily increasing the systematic as opposed to the
idiosyncratic risk of the firms they manage.
2.3.2. Research Design
In examining the testable empirical implications of my hypotheses, I use a difference-
in-differences identification strategy featuring two control groups of firms that are
relatively unaffected by FAS 123R. My ideal control group is composed of firms in
which the CEO’s compensation portfolio is entirely devoid of stock options over the
sample period. These CEOs are not affected by FAS 123R, from a risk-taking in-
centives standpoint, as their remuneration package does not feature any current or
prior outstanding stock option grants surrounding the adoption of FAS 123R. Gorm-
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ley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) argue that when analyzing the implications of FAS
123R on firms, it is crucial to account for the fact these new accounting rules were
known in advance of the passage and adoption of FAS 123R. If firms recognized the
forthcoming regulatory changes and voluntarily adopted the terms of FAS 123R early,
the true ramifications of FAS 123R as measured at the time of mandatory adoption
may be biased downward. With this in mind, my second control group also includes
early full-adopters of FAS 123R. To the extent that early-full adopting firms volun-
tarily enact the fair-value methodology prior to the adoption of FAS 123R, they are
expected to be relatively less affected by FAS 123R, at its later time of mandated
adoption, than their counterpart firms who delay adoption until the mandatory en-
forcement deadline. I first test the empirical predictions of my hypotheses using my
ideal control group. I then combine the first control group of firms with full-early
adopters of FAS 123R, so as to increase the power of my tests, and re-examine the
empirical validity of my hypotheses.
I employ the following equations in analyzing the differential ramifications of an
exogenous negative shock to compensation convexity on the total, systematic, and
idiosyncratic risk of the firm:
ln(TRi,t+1) = λ0 + λ1Post + λ2Treatment + λ3Post×Treatment + m∑
j=1βjControlj,i,t + i,t+1
(2.1)
ln(SRi,t+1) = φ0 + φ1Post + φ2Treatment + φ3Post×Treatment + m∑
j=1 δjControlj,i,t + ηi,t+1
(2.2)
ln(IRi,t+1) = ψ0 + ψ1Post + ψ2Treatment + ψ3Post×Treatment + m∑
j=1ωjControlj,i,t + ξi,t+1
(2.3)
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where Post-123R (abbreviated as Post) is a dummy variable equal to 0 for fiscal years
2002-2004 and equal to 1 for fiscal years 2005-2007, and Treatment is a dummy vari-
able equal to 0 for firms assigned to the control group and equal to 1 for firms assigned
to the treatment group. TR, SR, and IR are acronyms for total risk, systematic risk,
and idiosyncratic risk, respectively. All control variables are defined in Appendix B.
If the testable implication of Hypothesis 1 holds, I should find that firms sub-
jected to a negative convexity shock (treatment firms) differentially decrease their
systematic risk by a greater magnitude than those firms whose executive compensa-
tion convexity profiles are relatively unaffected by FAS 123R (control firms) at its
time of mandatory adoption. This translates to a negative and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient on the difference-in differences interaction term within Equation 2.2
(φ3 < 0). Similarly, one potential empirical manifestation of Hypothesis 2 is for φ3 to
be negative and statistically significant within Equation 2.2 and for ψ3 to be nega-
tive but statistically insignificant within Equation 2.3. As total risk is composed of
systematic and idiosyncratic risk, the ramification of an exogenous shock to compen-
sation convexity on the total risk of the firm will be an interaction of the individual
effects of the shock on the systematic and idiosyncratic components of risk. To the
extent that the relationship between compensation convexity and the total risk of
the firm may be attenuated by the weaker relation between compensation convexity
and the idiosyncratic risk of the firm, the finding within Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu
(2012) demonstrating that an exogenous drop in convexity is not associated with the
expected drop in total volatility can be further rationalized. While the expected sign
on λ3 within Equation 2.1 is negative, it is difficult to make a prediction regarding
its statistical significance.
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2.4. Data Selection and Variable Measurement
For my primary empirical analysis, I begin by obtaining all relevant variables from
the ExecuComp database pertaining to the annual compensation of CEOs between
fiscal years 2002-2007. The CEO’s equity incentives to increase the stock price of the
firm, delta, is calculated as the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio
(in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Compensation
convexity, vega, is defined as the CEO’s equity incentives to increase the risk of the
firm. Specifically, vega is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio
(in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation
of the firm’s equity returns. The closed form expressions for the delta and vega of
a call option on an underlying security with dividends are provided by the Black
and Scholes (1973) option pricing model as modified to account for dividend payouts.
The methodology in Core and Guay (2002) is used to aggregate the delta and vega of
individual option grants so as to arrive at the total delta and total vega of the CEO’s
option portfolio. The total delta of the CEO’s portfolio of stocks is then added to
the total option portfolio delta in calculating the total delta of the CEO’s equity
portfolio. The total vega of CEO’s equity portfolio is approximated as the total vega
of the option portfolio as Guay (1999) finds that stock options, but not common
stock, substantially increase the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to firm risk.
After collecting the necessary Execucomp measures, I merge this data with the
required Compustat control variables. All volatility measures are based on stock
return data obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I follow
Execucomp in calculating volatility as the standard deviation of firm stock returns
over rolling 60-month windows. In order to estimate volatility accurately, I mandate
a minimum requirement of 20 monthly observations over the aforementioned rolling
windows for a given volatility estimate to be retained. The Fama-French three-factor
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asset pricing model is employed in decomposing total volatility into its systematic
and idiosyncratic components. All information regarding the monthly risk-free rate
as well as the Fama-French market, value-growth, and size factors is obtained from
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Next, I annualize all volatility measures
by multiplying the monthly volatility measures by the square root of 12.
I merge the data constructed from Execucomp and Compustat with the CRSP
volatility data. I retain a given firm-year if all required variables are available for
that observation. In addition, I keep data for a given firm if it has a minimum of
one year of data within both the pre- and post-FAS 123R periods. I also remove
utility firms (firms whose SIC code is between 4900 and 4999) and financial firms
(firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) from my sample. The Fama-French 49
industry definitions are obtained from Kenneth French’s online data library. Finally, I
winsorize market-to-book-ratio, cash compensation, delta, leverage, pp&e, total pay,
as well as vega at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All control variables are defined in
Appendix B.
2.5. Empirical Analysis
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used within my pri-
mary tests. The mean total annual pay for a CEO in my sample is roughly $5.09
million, with roughly $1.39 million stemming from cash-based compensation. The
average grant-date value of the option portfolio accounts for 31% of the manager’s
annual pay, which translates to approximately $1.6 million. The two primary incen-
tives derived from the CEO’s equity compensation portfolio are incentives to increase
the firm’s stock price, delta, and incentives to increase the firm’s volatility, vega.
Table 2.1 indicates that for a typical CEO, the value of the equity remuneration port-
folio increases by $761,940 for a 1% increase in their firm’s stock price. In contrast,
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the value of the total option remuneration portfolio increases by $178,450 for a one
percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s return. On average,
systematic volatility constitutes roughly 26% of the total volatility of the firm.
Panel B of Figure 2.1, illustrates the importance of the firm’s annual issuance
of new option grants to the CEO’s compensation portfolio in maintaining a desired
optimal level of risk-taking incentives. Ceteris paribus, the total vega of previously
granted options decreases as the aggregate time-to-maturity of the option portfolio
decreases (vega time-decay). In addition, Panel B of Figure 2.1 demonstrates graph-
ically that the risk-taking incentives derived from option grants are maximized when
the options are at-the-money. Until recently, firms were given a choice to either ex-
pense options at their intrinsic value or at their fair value through some variant of
a closed-form option pricing model, such as the Black and Scholes (1973) model as
modified to account for dividends, or a binomial option pricing model. Consequently,
most firms elected to use the intrinsic valuation methodology and granted options
at-the-money so as to set the intrinsic value of grants at zero. This, in turn, allowed
firms to artificially inflate their earnings by avoiding the recognition of option-grant
expenses. As options were perceived as a relatively less-costly form of pay, they con-
stituted an average of roughly 41% of the CEOs’ annual pay in 2002 (Figure 2.2). As
firms started to recognize the forthcoming mandatory fair-value regulatory changes
associated with FAS 123R, they began decreasing their utilization of option-based
pay within the remuneration package. Namely, option pay decreased to 31% of total
annual CEO compensation by fiscal year 2005 and to only 23% of total pay in 2007.
As the earning advantages of options declined, option pay decreased, and the risk-
taking incentives stemming from options fell. Figure 2.3 documents the temporal
trend in mean CEO equity portfolio vega over my sample period. As the total vega of
the CEO’s equity portfolio is an aggregation of the risk taking incentives derived from
unexercised vested options, unexercised unvested options, and current option grants,
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total average CEO option portfolio vega continued to increase through fiscal year
2003, reaching a maximum value of approximately $191,253. Firms recognized the
forthcoming regulatory changes and began adjusting their compensation policies so as
to comply with the terms of FAS 123R. As a result, vega began to decline in fiscal year
2004 and entered a period of steep attenuation as the post-FAS 123R period set in.
By fiscal year 2007, vega had declined to roughly $160,796. This decrease constitutes
a 16% negative shock to the compensation convexity stemming from options in the
period surrounding the adoption of FAS 123R. I exploit this exogenous negative shock
to compensation convexity in examining the differential ramifications of option pay
and risk-taking incentives on the systematic and idiosyncratic risk of the firm.
My ideal control group consists of firms in which the CEO’s compensation portfolio
is entirely devoid of stock options over my sample period. These CEOs are not affected
by FAS 123R, from a risk-taking incentives standpoint, as their remuneration package
does not feature any current or prior outstanding stock option grants surrounding the
adoption of FAS 123R. If firms recognized the forthcoming regulatory changes and
voluntarily adopted the terms of FAS 123R early, the true ramifications of FAS 123R
as measured at the time of mandatory adoption may be biased downward. With this
in mind, my second control group also includes early full-adopters of FAS 123R. To
the extent that early-full adopting firms voluntarily enact the fair-value methodology
prior to the adoption of FAS 123R, they are expected to be relatively less affected by
FAS 123R, at its later time of mandated adoption, than their counterpart firms who
delay adoption until the mandatory enforcement deadline. I first test the empirical
predictions of my hypotheses using my ideal control group. I then combine the first
control group of firms with full-early adopters of FAS 123R, so as to increase the
power of my tests, and re-examine the empirical validity of my hypotheses. This
merged control group, featuring both the ideal control sample as well as early-full
adopters of FAS 123R, is henceforth referred to as the full control group.
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Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics for my treatment and full control group
over the entire sample period. Similarly, Table 2.3 provides the descriptive statis-
tics for my treatment and ideal control group over the duration of my sample. For
my analysis to yield unbiased estimates, the respective treatment and control groups
should feature similar firm properties in the pre-FAS 123R period. Table 2.4 features
the results of difference-in-means paired t-tests and difference-in-medians Wilcoxon
rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests between my treatment and full control samples in
the pre-FAS 123R window. The treatment and full control groups are similar in size,
leverage, market-to-book ratio, investment growth, return on equity, cash holdings,
as well as in total plant, property, and equipment. The primary divergence in firm
properties appears to be in the percentage of firms paying dividends as well as in
research and development expenses, sales growth, and capital expenditures. By con-
struction, firms within the full control sample have lower option pay and lower vega
than their counterpart firms in the treatment sample. These firms also have lower
volatility.4 I control for all differences in the observable characteristics of my treat-
ment and control firms within my primary volatility tests. It is certainly comforting
that the treatment and control sample are similar along many of the firm properties
demonstrated to impact volatility.
Table 2.5 features the results of difference-in-means paired t-tests and difference-
in-medians Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests between my treatment and
ideal control samples in the pre-FAS 123R period. The ideal control group appears to
be more similar to the treatment sample. Namely, firms in the ideal control group are
similar to treatment firms in size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, investment growth,
4It is paramount to account for the endogeneity inherent in the volatility and compensation
incentives setting mechanism by exploiting exogenous variation in vega. Ceteris paribus, managers
with greater wealth-stock volatility sensitivities are more incentivized to increase the volatility of
the firms they manage. However, it is also the case that firms operating in economic settings
characterized by greater volatility may render the compensation contract more convex. This is done
so as to reward the CEO for bearing the greater risks associated with their position and to also
decrease the net risk aversion of the executive.
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sales growth, return on equity, cash holdings, capital expenditures, as well as in total
plant, property, and equipment. In terms of firm properties, they are only statistically
different from treatment firms in research and development expenses and dividend
payer status. Ideal control firms, by construction, have zero vega as their CEO’s
remuneration package does not feature any current or prior outstanding stock option
grants surrounding the adoption of FAS 123R. Figure 2.4 illustrates the temporal
trend in mean option grant value as a proportion of total CEO compensation in my
treatment and ideal control group, respectively. The pre-FAS 123R period spans
fiscal years 2002-2004 and the post-FAS 123R period spans fiscal years 2005-2007.
Similarly, Figure 2.5 presents the time trend in mean CEO equity portfolio vega in
the treatment and ideal control group, respectively. For my analysis to yield unbiased
estimates, the treatment and ideal control sample should follow parallel trends in the
primary volatility outcome variables of interest prior to the convexity shock. Over
fiscal years 2002-2004, Figures 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 show that there are, indeed, parallel
trends in total volatility, systematic volatility, and idiosyncratic volatility between my
treatment and ideal control group. The use of a control group is essential within my
research design as I am able to filter secular declines in volatility that are unrelated
to the convexity shock stemming from FAS 123R. This is one of the benefits of a
difference-in-differences identification strategy. I also use year fixed-effects in further
controlling for this aforementioned decrease in volatility.
I begin my primary analysis by demonstrating that, within my ideal control and
treatment sample, the shock to CEO remuneration packages surrounding the passage
of FAS 123R is primarily a shock to risk-taking incentives.5 Table 2.6 demonstrates
that FAS 123R does not consistently constitute a differential shock to the price-
increasing incentives of CEOs across my five empirical specifications. With delta as
5As the compensation incentives and volatility measures are skewed, I take the natural log-
arithmic transformation of the relevant variables in normalizing the transformed empirical data
distributions.
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the dependent variable, the difference-in-differences interaction term is statistically
insignificant in columns 1-4 of Table 2.6. In contrast, Table 2.7 shows that firms in
my ideal control group decrease their portion of total pay stemming from option pay
by roughly 14 percentage points more than their counterparts in the control group.
As expected, this translates to a substantial decline in the risk-taking incentives of
CEOs. I find that the dollar change in the value of the average treatment-sample
CEO’s equity portfolio (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in
the standard deviation of the firm’s return declines by $49,985 more than for similar
CEOs in my control group. This effect is statistically significant for all specifications
within Table 2.8. Firms appear to have largely stabilized delta incentives over the pre-
and post-FAS 123R by increasing the portion of CEO pay stemming from restricted
stock grants so as to offset decreases in delta associated with decreases in option pay.6
Having demonstrated empirically that FAS 123R is primarily a differential exogenous
shock to the compensation convexity of CEOs within my treatment and ideal control
sample, I next examine the testable empirical implications of my two hypotheses.
If the testable implication of Hypothesis 1 holds, I should find that firms subjected
to a negative convexity shock (treatment firms) differentially decrease their systematic
risk by a greater magnitude than those firms whose executive compensation convexity
profiles are unaffected by FAS 123R (control firms) at its time of mandatory adoption.
This translates to a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the difference-in
differences interaction term within Equation 2.2 (φ3 < 0). Table 2.9 presents evidence
that is largely consistent with my first hypothesis. With systematic volatility as the
dependent variable, the difference-in-differences interaction term (Post×Treatment) is
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. The economic magnitude of this
result is also significant as firms subjected to the negative convexity shock (treatment
firms) decrease their systematic risk by roughly 3.84 percentage points more than
6I further control for the relatively minor changes in delta surrounding FAS 123R by including
CEO delta as a control variable within all of my primary volatility empirical specifications.
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those firms whose executive compensation convexity profiles are unaffected by FAS
123R (control firms). This decrease represents 15.05% of the average volatility of
treatment firms within the pre-FAS 123R period.
As my sample features firms from a wide array of industries, it is important to
control for the unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity in volatility stemming from
industry membership. Accordingly, Table 2.10 implements industry fixed-effects in
addressing this concern. As before, the difference-in-differences interaction term is
negative and becomes statistically significant at the 1% level. It is also crucial to
account for year-specific heterogeneity in volatility in controlling for secular declines
in volatility that are unrelated to the compensation convexity shock. Accordingly,
Table 2.11 repeats the analysis with year fixed-effects and the results remain largely
unchanged. Next, I include both industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects within
Equation 2.2 and show, in Table 2.12, that the interaction term in Equation 2.2 re-
mains negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Finally, I account for
the role of unobservable time-invariant, firm-effects in volatility by incorporating firm
fixed-effects into my framework. Table 2.13 demonstrates that the interaction term
in Equation 2.2 remains negative and is statistically significant at the 5% level af-
ter accounting for firm and year fixed-effects. All of these results support my first
hypothesis.
One potential empirical manifestation of Hypothesis 2 is for φ3 to be negative and
statistically significant within Equation 2.2 and for ψ3 to be negative but statistically
insignificant within Equation 2.3. As I have already demonstrated that φ3 is neg-
ative and statistically significant across my empirical specifications, I now examine
the sign and statistical significance of ψ3 within Equation 2.3. Table 2.9 presents
evidence that is largely consistent with my second hypothesis. With idiosyncratic
volatility as the dependent variable, the difference-in-differences interaction term is
highly insignificant. While firms subjected to a negative convexity shock (treatment
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firms) differentially decrease their systematic risk by a greater magnitude than those
firms whose executive compensation convexity profile is unaffected by FAS 123R (con-
trol firms) at its time of mandatory adoption, I do not find a similar differential trend
in idiosyncratic risk between the aforementioned treatment and control groups. I
account for the role of industry, year, and firm fixed-effects within my framework
in Tables 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, and 2.13. Across these specifications, ψ3 remains highly
insignificant. The interaction term within Equation 2.1 is statistically insignificant
across all of my empirical specifications as the relationship between compensation
convexity and the total risk of the firm is attenuated by the weaker relation be-
tween compensation convexity and the idiosyncratic risk of the firm. These results
demonstrate, within a natural experiment setting, that the relation between risk-
taking incentives and the firm’s total volatility is primarily driven by the more robust
relation between risk-taking incentives and the systematic volatility of the firm.
In further testing the robustness of my results, I extend my sample period by
one year so as to include fiscal years 2002-2008. This is the sample period analyzed
in Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012). Table 2.14 demonstrates that all of my results
continue to hold in this extended sample. Namely, φ3 is negative and statistically
significant at the 5% level within Equation 2.2 and ψ3 is negative but statistically
insignificant within Equation 2.3. Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) argue that
when analyzing the implications of FAS 123R on firms, it is crucial to account for the
fact these new accounting rules were known in advance of the passage and adoption
of FAS 123R. If firms recognized the forthcoming regulatory changes and voluntarily
adopted the terms of FAS 123R early, the true ramifications of FAS 123R as mea-
sured at the time of mandatory adoption may be biased downward. With this in
mind, I re-examine the robustness of my results to the inclusion of early full-adopters
of FAS 123R within my control group (full control group). Table 2.15 presents re-
sults that are in accordance with both of my hypotheses as the interaction term in
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Equation 2.2 is negative and significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the interaction
term is statistically insignificant in Equation 2.3.
What are the hedging mechanisms through which CEOs decrease the systematic
risk of the firms they manage? Knopf, Nam, and Thornton Jr (2002) use deriva-
tives data from the Swaps Monitor private database to analyze the relation between
managerial equity incentives and the use of interest rate and currency derivatives
by CEOs. Specifically, they examine the association between equity incentives and
the notional amounts of interest rate and currency derivatives, including swaps, for-
wards, options, and futures. They present evidence suggesting that as vega increases,
firms tend to decrease their use of hedging instruments. As FAS 123R features an
exogenous negative shock to the convexity of the CEO’s compensation portfolio, the
intuition from Knopf, Nam, and Thornton Jr (2002) implies that CEOs should in-
crease their hedging activities in the post-FAS 123R period. This augmentation of
hedging behavior can be utilized to decrease the suboptimal overexposure of the firm
to systematic risk and can drive the differential decrease of systematic risk within
firms subjected to a negative compensation convexity shock (treatment firms) in the
post-FAS 123R period. Bakke, Mahmudi, Fernando, and Salas (2013) identify evi-
dence that is consistent with this logic by showing that compensation convexity is
negatively associated with the use of oil and gas derivative contracts within the oil
and gas industry. Specifically, they use a hand-collected sample of firms, with the
requisite hedging data, in demonstrating that oil and gas companies increase their
use of derivatives contracts, meant to guard against systematic shocks in oil and gas
prices, following the decrease in compensation convexity associated with FAS 123R.
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2.6. Summary and Conclusion
Within this paper, I exploit an exogenous negative shock to CEO compensation
convexity in examining the differential ramifications of option pay and risk-taking
incentives on the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility of the firm. In isolating
this mechanism, I use a difference-in-differences identification strategy featuring two
control groups of firms that are relatively unaffected by the aforementioned shock. By
examining this question in this setting, I identify a novel approach towards resolving
a puzzle within the compensation literature. In addition, I present new evidence that
is largely consistent with the notion that compensation convexity, stemming from
option convexity, predominantly incentivizes under-diversified risk-averse CEOs to
increase the value of their option portfolios by increasing the systematic volatility of
the firms they manage as it is readily more hedgeable than idiosyncratic volatility. If
managers use options as a conduit through which they can gamble with shareholder
wealth by overexposing them to suboptimal systematic volatility, options are not
serving their intended contracting function. Instead of decreasing agency costs of
risk, by encouraging CEOs to adopt innovative positive NPV projects that may be
primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk, option pay may have contributed to the
very frictions it was intended to reduce. To my knowledge, this is the first paper
to examine the heterogeneous implications of compensation convexity on systematic
and idiosyncratic firm volatility within a natural experiment setting featuring an
exogenous negative option convexity shock to CEO firm-specific equity portfolios.
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2.7. Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Black-Scholes-Merton Call Option Price & Vega
Panel A: Call Option Price—Stock Price & Volatility Sensitivity, X=$40
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables related to CEO compensation, CEO incentives, volatility, and
firm properties. The sample contains firms in Execucomp from fiscal years 2002-2007 with non-missing values for all
required variables. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Full sample of firm-years with all required variables
Variable N Mean Std 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
CEO Compensation:
Total Pay (in $000s) 5781 5088.42 5748.28 551.88 1515.49 3125.98 6225.44 16893.21
Cash Compensation (in $000s) 5781 1385.06 1231.46 350.00 641.15 1000.00 1667.50 3800.00
Option Proportion 5781 0.31 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.52 0.81
Tenure 5781 7.78 7.35 0.95 2.75 5.41 10.07 22.48
CEO Incentives:
Delta (in $000s) 5781 761.94 1533.87 26.32 107.63 273.95 698.16 3013.53
Vega (in $000s) 5781 178.45 287.34 1.92 27.30 74.64 198.39 732.10
Annualized Volatility:
Total Volatility 5781 0.43 0.21 0.20 0.29 0.37 0.52 0.83
Systematic Volatility 5781 0.22 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.19 0.27 0.50
Idiosyncratic Volatility 5781 0.36 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.32 0.44 0.69
Firm Properties:
Size 5781 7.40 1.54 5.09 6.33 7.26 8.32 10.18
Leverage 5781 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.31 0.52
MTB 5781 1.99 1.08 0.97 1.28 1.66 2.31 4.16
Investment Growth 5781 0.20 0.77 -0.56 -0.16 0.08 0.36 1.22
Sales Growth 5781 0.12 0.25 -0.16 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.47
ROE 5781 -0.03 10.54 -0.40 0.04 0.11 0.18 0.39
Cash 5781 0.16 0.18 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.24 0.55
Dividend Payer 5781 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
PP&E 5781 0.26 0.21 0.03 0.10 0.20 0.36 0.72
R&D 5781 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.15
Capex 5781 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.14
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics—Treatment vs. Full Control Sample
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables related to CEO compensation, CEO incentives, volatility, and
firm properties. The sample contains firms in Execucomp from fiscal years 2002-2007 with non-missing values for all
required variables. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Treatment Firms Control Firms
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median
CEO Compensation:
Total Pay (in $000s) 5613 5136.72 3170.87 168 3474.92 1848.72
Cash Compensation (in $000s) 5613 1392.52 1000.00 168 1135.83 850.67
Option Proportion 5613 0.32 0.30 168 0.14 0.00
Tenure 5613 7.67 5.41 168 11.50 7.58
CEO Incentives:
Delta (in $000s) 5613 736.72 273.61 168 1604.43 309.60
Vega (in $000s) 5613 181.40 76.82 168 80.02 0.00
Annualized Volatility:
Total Volatility 5613 0.43 0.38 168 0.39 0.34
Systematic Volatility 5613 0.22 0.19 168 0.19 0.17
Idiosyncratic Volatility 5613 0.36 0.32 168 0.33 0.29
Firm Properties:
Size 5613 7.39 7.27 168 7.61 7.20
Leverage 5613 0.20 0.19 168 0.24 0.19
MTB 5613 2.00 1.67 168 1.90 1.50
Investment Growth 5613 0.20 0.08 168 0.22 0.11
Sales Growth 5613 0.12 0.09 168 0.09 0.08
ROE 5613 -0.03 0.11 168 0.07 0.11
Cash 5613 0.17 0.10 168 0.15 0.10
Dividend Payer 5613 0.48 0.00 168 0.67 1.00
PP&E 5613 0.26 0.19 168 0.28 0.24
R&D 5613 0.03 0.01 168 0.01 0.00
Capex 5613 0.05 0.03 168 0.05 0.04
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics—Treatment vs. Ideal Control Sample
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables related to CEO compensation, CEO incentives, volatility, and
firm properties. The sample contains firms in Execucomp from fiscal years 2002-2007 with non-missing values for all
required variables. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Treatment Firms Control Firms
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median
CEO Compensation:
Total Pay (in $000s) 5689 5145.54 3180.77 92 1556.41 1104.44
Cash Compensation (in $000s) 5689 1394.40 1000.00 92 807.68 658.43
Option Proportion 5689 0.32 0.30 92 0.00 0.00
Tenure 5689 7.67 5.36 92 14.59 12.49
CEO Incentives:
Delta (in $000s) 5689 733.45 273.61 92 2523.56 533.76
Vega (in $000s) 5689 181.34 77.30 92 0.00 0.00
Annualized Volatility:
Total Volatility 5689 0.43 0.37 92 0.39 0.36
Systematic Volatility 5689 0.22 0.19 92 0.20 0.18
Idiosyncratic Volatility 5689 0.36 0.32 92 0.33 0.31
Firm Properties:
Size 5689 7.40 7.27 92 7.15 7.14
Leverage 5689 0.20 0.19 92 0.21 0.18
MTB 5689 2.00 1.66 92 1.88 1.55
Investment Growth 5689 0.20 0.08 92 0.16 0.08
Sales Growth 5689 0.12 0.09 92 0.11 0.10
ROE 5689 -0.03 0.11 92 0.04 0.10
Cash 5689 0.16 0.10 92 0.16 0.11
Dividend Payer 5689 0.49 0.00 92 0.65 1.00
PP&E 5689 0.26 0.20 92 0.29 0.23
R&D 5689 0.03 0.01 92 0.01 0.00
Capex 5689 0.05 0.03 92 0.04 0.04
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Table 2.4: Pre-FAS 123R Period—Treatment vs. Full Control Sample
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables related to CEO compensation, CEO incentives, volatility, and
firm properties within the pre-FAS 123R period. The pre-FAS 123R sample contains firms in Execucomp from fiscal
years 2002-2004 with non-missing values for all required variables. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical
significance at the 10%,5%,and 1% levels, respectively. The aforementioned significance levels pertain to difference-
in-means paired t-tests and difference-in-medians Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests between the treatment
and full control sample in the pre-FAS 123R period. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Treatment Firms Control Firms
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
CEO Compensation:
Total Pay (in $000s) 4712.94 2812.11 2712.36∗∗∗ 1320.80∗∗∗
Cash Compensation (in $000s) 1486.74 1100.00 1103.44∗∗∗ 841.91∗∗∗
Option Proportion 0.37 0.37 0.14∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Tenure 7.71 5.08 11.91∗∗∗ 8.83∗∗∗
CEO Incentives:
Delta (in $000s) 710.25 271.51 1770.64∗∗∗ 366.01∗
Vega (in $000s) 187.52 78.51 75.43∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Annualized Volatility:
Total Volatility 0.49 0.43 0.42∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
Systematic Volatility 0.26 0.21 0.21∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.41 0.36 0.36∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
Firm Properties:
Size 7.25 7.06 7.43 7.14
Leverage 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.19
MTB 1.99 1.63 1.97 1.47
Investment Growth 0.16 0.03 0.13 -0.00
Sales Growth 0.12 0.09 0.09∗ 0.07
ROE -0.21 0.10 0.02 0.09
Cash 0.17 0.10 0.16 0.11
Dividend Payer 0.46 0.00 0.64∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗
PP&E 0.27 0.20 0.27 0.24
R&D 0.04 0.01 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Capex 0.05 0.03 0.04∗∗ 0.03
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Table 2.5: Pre-FAS 123R Period—Treatment vs. Ideal Control Sample
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables related to CEO compensation, CEO incentives, volatility, and
firm properties within the pre-FAS 123R period. The pre-FAS 123R sample contains firms in Execucomp from fiscal
years 2002-2004 with non-missing values for all required variables. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical
significance at the 10%,5%,and 1% levels, respectively. The aforementioned significance levels pertain to difference-
in-means paired t-tests and difference-in-medians Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests between the treatment
and ideal control sample in the pre-FAS 123R period. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Treatment Firms Control Firms
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
CEO Compensation:
Total Pay (in $000s) 4716.95 2813.92 1128.33∗∗∗ 957.10∗∗∗
Cash Compensation (in $000s) 1488.57 1101.03 745.66∗∗∗ 547.04∗∗∗
Option Proportion 0.37 0.36 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Tenure 7.71 5.07 14.82∗∗∗ 12.20∗∗∗
CEO Incentives:
Delta (in $000s) 707.63 271.51 2635.59∗∗∗ 512.65∗∗
Vega (in $000s) 187.48 78.72 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Annualized Volatility:
Total Volatility 0.49 0.42 0.42∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗
Systematic Volatility 0.26 0.21 0.21∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.41 0.36 0.36∗∗∗ 0.33∗
Firm Properties:
Size 7.26 7.07 7.09 7.09
Leverage 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.15
MTB 1.99 1.63 1.95 1.57
Investment Growth 0.16 0.03 0.13 0.01
Sales Growth 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.11
ROE -0.20 0.10 0.02 0.10
Cash 0.17 0.10 0.18 0.13
Dividend Payer 0.46 0.00 0.59∗ 1.00∗
PP&E 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.24
R&D 0.03 0.01 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Capex 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04
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Table 2.6: Differential Change in CEO Delta Surrounding Convexity Shock
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the total delta of the CEO’s equity portfolio. Delta is
the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s
stock price. Post-123R is a dummy variable equal to zero for fiscal years 2002-2004 and equal to one for fiscal years
2005-2007. Treatment is a dummy variable equal to zero for firms assigned to the control group and equal to one for
firms assigned to the treatment group. Post×Treatment is the difference-in-differences interaction term. Intercept
term is included but not reported. All p-values in parentheses are clustered at the industry level. The notation∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are
defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(CEO Delta) ln(CEO Delta) ln(CEO Delta) ln(CEO Delta) ln(CEO Delta)
Post-123R 0.057 0.019 -0.025 -0.004 0.373
(0.812) (0.933) (0.925) (0.986) (0.153)
Treatment -0.577 -0.550 -0.581 -0.554 3.725∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.270) (0.226) (0.267) (0.000)
Post×Treatment -0.232 -0.196 -0.178 -0.143 -0.510∗
(0.332) (0.379) (0.465) (0.533) (0.052)
Size 0.578∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage -1.021∗∗∗ -0.965∗∗∗ -1.016∗∗∗ -0.954∗∗∗ -0.793∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MTB 0.476∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Investment Growth 0.023 0.031 0.018 0.027 0.002
(0.225) (0.112) (0.338) (0.160) (0.863)
Sales Growth 0.293∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.465)
ROE -0.001∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.000∗∗
(0.072) (0.029) (0.083) (0.034) (0.026)
Cash -0.087 0.039 -0.098 0.024 -0.173
(0.645) (0.877) (0.601) (0.926) (0.351)
Dividend Payer -0.141∗∗ -0.084 -0.144∗∗ -0.085 -0.150∗
(0.045) (0.200) (0.045) (0.212) (0.097)
Observations 5781 5781 5781 5781 5781
Adjusted R2 0.453 0.480 0.455 0.482 0.826
Industry-FE No Yes No Yes No
Year-FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm-FE No No No No Yes
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Table 2.7: Differential Change in CEO Option Pay Surrounding Convexity Shock
The dependent variable is the value of current options granted scaled by total pay. Post-123R is a dummy variable
equal to zero for fiscal years 2002-2004 and equal to one for fiscal years 2005-2007. Treatment is a dummy variable
equal to zero for firms assigned to the control group and equal to one for firms assigned to the treatment group.
Post×Treatment is the difference-in-differences interaction term. Intercept term is included but not reported. All
p-values in parentheses are clustered at the industry level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Option Pay Option Pay Option Pay Option Pay Option Pay
Post-123R 0.029∗ 0.011 0.062∗ 0.049 0.094∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.346) (0.096) (0.124) (0.001)
Treatment 0.355∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015)
Post×Treatment -0.141∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Leverage -0.070∗ -0.040 -0.075∗∗ -0.044 -0.095
(0.064) (0.238) (0.044) (0.192) (0.150)
MTB 0.038∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.454)
Investment Growth -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.391) (0.628) (0.584) (0.879) (0.927)
Sales Growth -0.027 -0.036∗∗ -0.020 -0.028∗ -0.048∗∗
(0.165) (0.033) (0.322) (0.094) (0.049)
ROE -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗∗∗
(0.845) (0.931) (0.698) (0.836) (0.000)
Cash 0.218∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ -0.047
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.008) (0.410)
Dividend Payer -0.087∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.018
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.236)
Observations 5781 5781 5781 5781 5781
Adjusted R2 0.148 0.185 0.162 0.199 0.413
Industry-FE No Yes No Yes No
Year-FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm-FE No No No No Yes
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Table 2.8: Differential Change in CEO Vega Surrounding Convexity Shock
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the total vega of the CEO’s equity portfolio. Vega
is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point
increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. Post-123R is a dummy variable equal to zero for fiscal
years 2002-2004 and equal to one for fiscal years 2005-2007. Treatment is a dummy variable equal to zero for firms
assigned to the control group and equal to one for firms assigned to the treatment group. Post×Treatment is the
difference-in-differences interaction term. Intercept term is included but not reported. All p-values in parentheses
are clustered at the industry level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(CEO Vega) ln(CEO Vega) ln(CEO Vega) ln(CEO Vega) ln(CEO Vega)
Post-123R 0.002 -0.089 -0.159 -0.214∗ -0.037
(0.981) (0.168) (0.218) (0.079) (0.633)
Treatment 4.195∗∗∗ 4.125∗∗∗ 4.189∗∗∗ 4.119∗∗∗ 2.326∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Post×Treatment -0.299∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗ -0.241∗∗ -0.152∗ -0.094∗
(0.005) (0.017) (0.026) (0.072) (0.075)
Size 0.659∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage -0.468∗ -0.458∗ -0.460∗ -0.453∗ -0.446∗∗
(0.063) (0.055) (0.065) (0.057) (0.013)
MTB 0.293∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.067
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.122)
Investment Growth -0.051∗∗ -0.033∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗ -0.005
(0.013) (0.066) (0.010) (0.048) (0.675)
Sales Growth -0.086 -0.041 -0.100 -0.055 -0.019
(0.218) (0.459) (0.171) (0.312) (0.697)
ROE -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗
(0.163) (0.112) (0.201) (0.143) (0.026)
Cash 0.356 0.129 0.343 0.108 -0.268
(0.118) (0.601) (0.133) (0.661) (0.343)
Dividend Payer -0.098 -0.027 -0.099 -0.028 -0.158∗
(0.240) (0.746) (0.240) (0.744) (0.086)
Observations 5781 5781 5781 5781 5781
Adjusted R2 0.490 0.528 0.493 0.530 0.805
Industry-FE No Yes No Yes No
Year-FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm-FE No No No No Yes
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Table 2.9: Differential Change in Volatility Surrounding Convexity Shock
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annualized total firm volatility, annualized systematic firm volatil-
ity, and annualized idiosyncratic firm volatility, respectively. ln(CEO Delta) is the natural logarithm of one plus the
total delta of the CEO’s equity portfolio. Delta is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (in
$000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Post-123R is a dummy variable equal to zero for fiscal
years 2002-2004 and equal to one for fiscal years 2005-2007. Treatment is a dummy variable equal to zero for firms
assigned to the control group and equal to one for firms assigned to the treatment group. Post×Treatment is the
difference-in-differences interaction term. Intercept term is included but not reported. All p-values in parentheses
are clustered at the industry level and year level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Total Volatility) ln(Systematic Volatility) ln(Idiosyncratic Volatility)
Post-123R -0.162∗ -0.096 -0.175∗
(0.077) (0.317) (0.060)
Treatment 0.119 0.186 0.102
(0.126) (0.167) (0.122)
Post×Treatment -0.086 -0.159∗∗ -0.063
(0.242) (0.013) (0.416)
ln(CEO Delta) -0.032∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.031∗∗
(0.015) (0.045) (0.012)
Size -0.085∗∗∗ -0.035 -0.102∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.141) (0.000)
Leverage 0.127∗∗ -0.063 0.179∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.595) (0.001)
MTB -0.046∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Investment Growth 0.002 0.014 -0.001
(0.852) (0.424) (0.905)
Sales Growth 0.033 -0.017 0.052
(0.503) (0.853) (0.144)
CEO Cash Compensation -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.278) (0.218) (0.320)
CEO Tenure 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.026) (0.008)
PP&E -0.235∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.030)
R&D 1.888∗∗∗ 2.647∗∗∗ 1.541∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capex 0.733∗∗∗ 0.294 0.860∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.303) (0.001)
ROE -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.005) (0.000) (0.110)
Observations 5781 5781 5781
Adjusted R2 0.382 0.228 0.394
Industry-FE No No No
Year-FE No No No
Firm-FE No No No
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Table 2.10: Differential Change in Volatility Surrounding Convexity Shock
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annualized total firm volatility, annualized systematic firm volatil-
ity, and annualized idiosyncratic firm volatility, respectively. ln(CEO Delta) is the natural logarithm of one plus the
total delta of the CEO’s equity portfolio. Delta is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (in
$000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Post-123R is a dummy variable equal to zero for fiscal
years 2002-2004 and equal to one for fiscal years 2005-2007. Treatment is a dummy variable equal to zero for firms
assigned to the control group and equal to one for firms assigned to the treatment group. Post×Treatment is the
difference-in-differences interaction term. Intercept term is included but not reported. All p-values in parentheses
are clustered at the industry level and year level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Total Volatility) ln(Systematic Volatility) ln(Idiosyncratic Volatility)
Post-123R -0.170∗ -0.088 -0.185∗∗
(0.054) (0.293) (0.048)
Treatment 0.160∗∗ 0.249∗ 0.139∗
(0.050) (0.060) (0.056)
Post×Treatment -0.074 -0.154∗∗∗ -0.052
(0.205) (0.000) (0.456)
ln(CEO Delta) -0.030∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.048) (0.005)
Size -0.092∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
Leverage 0.304∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
MTB -0.032∗∗ -0.050∗∗ -0.030∗∗
(0.041) (0.040) (0.034)
Investment Growth 0.003 0.013 0.001
(0.701) (0.163) (0.946)
Sales Growth 0.008 -0.041 0.029
(0.830) (0.568) (0.310)
CEO Cash Compensation -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.383) (0.343) (0.374)
CEO Tenure 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.007)
PP&E -0.170∗∗∗ -0.133 -0.163∗∗
(0.008) (0.154) (0.020)
R&D 1.187∗∗∗ 1.591∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Capex 0.391∗∗ 0.030 0.464∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.917) (0.007)
ROE -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗
(0.004) (0.000) (0.052)
Observations 5781 5781 5781
Adjusted R2 0.495 0.381 0.493
Industry-FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE No No No
Firm-FE No No No
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Table 2.11: Differential Change in Volatility Surrounding Convexity Shock
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annualized total firm volatility, annualized systematic firm volatil-
ity, and annualized idiosyncratic firm volatility, respectively. ln(CEO Delta) is the natural logarithm of one plus the
total delta of the CEO’s equity portfolio. Delta is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (in
$000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Post-123R is a dummy variable equal to zero for fiscal
years 2002-2004 and equal to one for fiscal years 2005-2007. Treatment is a dummy variable equal to zero for firms
assigned to the control group and equal to one for firms assigned to the treatment group. Post×Treatment is the
difference-in-differences interaction term. Intercept term is included but not reported. All p-values in parentheses
are clustered at the industry level and year level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Total Volatility) ln(Systematic Volatility) ln(Idiosyncratic Volatility)
Post-123R -0.039 0.032 -0.056
(0.624) (0.786) (0.469)
Treatment 0.123 0.191 0.105
(0.115) (0.157) (0.111)
Post×Treatment -0.079 -0.149∗∗∗ -0.058
(0.236) (0.007) (0.437)
ln(CEO Delta) -0.031∗∗ -0.038∗ -0.030∗∗
(0.021) (0.060) (0.016)
Size -0.083∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.100∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.211) (0.000)
Leverage 0.114∗ -0.072 0.165∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.555) (0.002)
MTB -0.044∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.006)
Investment Growth 0.006 0.016 0.004
(0.559) (0.347) (0.699)
Sales Growth 0.054 -0.003 0.076∗∗
(0.302) (0.972) (0.040)
CEO Cash Compensation -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.246) (0.169) (0.316)
CEO Tenure 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.035) (0.009)
PP&E -0.239∗∗∗ -0.301∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.029)
R&D 1.851∗∗∗ 2.616∗∗∗ 1.502∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capex 0.721∗∗∗ 0.301 0.839∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.276) (0.001)
ROE -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.003) (0.000) (0.101)
Observations 5781 5781 5781
Adjusted R2 0.396 0.238 0.408
Industry-FE No No No
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-FE No No No
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Table 2.12: Differential Change in Volatility Surrounding Convexity Shock
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annualized total firm volatility, annualized systematic firm volatil-
ity, and annualized idiosyncratic firm volatility, respectively. ln(CEO Delta) is the natural logarithm of one plus the
total delta of the CEO’s equity portfolio. Delta is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (in
$000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Post-123R is a dummy variable equal to zero for fiscal
years 2002-2004 and equal to one for fiscal years 2005-2007. Treatment is a dummy variable equal to zero for firms
assigned to the control group and equal to one for firms assigned to the treatment group. Post×Treatment is the
difference-in-differences interaction term. Intercept term is included but not reported. All p-values in parentheses
are clustered at the industry level and year level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Total Volatility) ln(Systematic Volatility) ln(Idiosyncratic Volatility)
Post-123R -0.019 0.059 -0.033
(0.711) (0.445) (0.583)
Treatment 0.166∗∗ 0.258∗ 0.144∗∗
(0.039) (0.051) (0.043)
Post×Treatment -0.065 -0.143∗∗∗ -0.044
(0.239) (0.000) (0.524)
ln(CEO Delta) -0.030∗∗ -0.028∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.060) (0.005)
Size -0.090∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000)
Leverage 0.290∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000)
MTB -0.030∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.027∗∗
(0.049) (0.044) (0.041)
Investment Growth 0.008 0.016∗ 0.006
(0.281) (0.076) (0.422)
Sales Growth 0.031 -0.026 0.054∗
(0.459) (0.722) (0.066)
CEO Cash Compensation -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.286) (0.209) (0.314)
CEO Tenure 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
PP&E -0.182∗∗∗ -0.146∗ -0.173∗∗
(0.003) (0.089) (0.012)
R&D 1.173∗∗∗ 1.584∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Capex 0.363∗∗ 0.023 0.427∗∗
(0.050) (0.931) (0.024)
ROE -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.040)
Observations 5781 5781 5781
Adjusted R2 0.510 0.391 0.509
Industry-FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-FE No No No
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Table 2.13: Differential Change in Volatility Surrounding Convexity Shock
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annualized total firm volatility, annualized systematic firm volatil-
ity, and annualized idiosyncratic firm volatility, respectively. ln(CEO Delta) is the natural logarithm of one plus the
total delta of the CEO’s equity portfolio. Delta is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (in
$000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Post-123R is a dummy variable equal to zero for fiscal
years 2002-2004 and equal to one for fiscal years 2005-2007. Treatment is a dummy variable equal to zero for firms
assigned to the control group and equal to one for firms assigned to the treatment group. Post×Treatment is the
difference-in-differences interaction term. Intercept term is included but not reported. All p-values in parentheses
are clustered at the industry level and year level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Total Volatility) ln(Systematic Volatility) ln(Idiosyncratic Volatility)
Post-123R 0.036 0.077 0.036
(0.652) (0.365) (0.679)
Treatment 0.383∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.014) (0.005)
Post×Treatment -0.079 -0.167∗∗ -0.061
(0.279) (0.022) (0.450)
ln(CEO Delta) -0.021∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.020∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.140) (0.006)
Size -0.017 0.038 -0.034
(0.557) (0.343) (0.177)
Leverage 0.142∗∗∗ 0.160∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.083) (0.008)
MTB 0.015 0.019 0.012
(0.167) (0.340) (0.151)
Investment Growth 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.334) (0.806) (0.253)
Sales Growth -0.022 -0.020 -0.022
(0.289) (0.258) (0.355)
CEO Cash Compensation -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.993) (0.917) (0.755)
CEO Tenure 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.002
(0.032) (0.021) (0.142)
PP&E -0.122 0.045 -0.203
(0.400) (0.811) (0.160)
R&D -0.014 -0.200 0.010
(0.939) (0.353) (0.951)
Capex 0.155 0.499∗ 0.051
(0.447) (0.099) (0.788)
ROE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.394) (0.375) (0.326)
Observations 5781 5781 5781
Adjusted R2 0.859 0.761 0.861
Industry-FE No No No
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.14: Differential Change in Volatility Surrounding Convexity Shock:
Alternate Sample Period (2002-2008)
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annualized total firm volatility, annualized systematic firm volatil-
ity, and annualized idiosyncratic firm volatility, respectively. ln(CEO Delta) is the natural logarithm of one plus the
total delta of the CEO’s equity portfolio. Delta is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (in
$000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Post-123R is a dummy variable equal to zero for fiscal
years 2002-2004 and equal to one for fiscal years 2005-2008. Treatment is a dummy variable equal to zero for firms
assigned to the control group and equal to one for firms assigned to the treatment group. Post×Treatment is the
difference-in-differences interaction term. Intercept term is included but not reported. All p-values in parentheses
are clustered at the industry level and year level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Total Volatility) ln(Systematic Volatility) ln(Idiosyncratic Volatility)
Post-123R 0.023 0.077 0.016
(0.776) (0.459) (0.859)
Treatment 0.622∗∗∗ 0.995∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Post×Treatment -0.100 -0.206∗∗ -0.071
(0.246) (0.045) (0.431)
ln(CEO Delta) -0.049∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.047∗∗
(0.007) (0.018) (0.010)
Size -0.025 0.034 -0.045∗
(0.376) (0.427) (0.067)
Leverage 0.244∗∗ 0.301∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.037) (0.010)
MTB 0.033∗∗ 0.030 0.031∗∗
(0.042) (0.190) (0.029)
Investment Growth -0.002 -0.000 -0.001
(0.654) (0.950) (0.870)
Sales Growth -0.015 -0.018 -0.012
(0.501) (0.306) (0.638)
CEO Cash Compensation -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.850) (0.744) (0.886)
CEO Tenure 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.020)
PP&E 0.026 0.199 -0.039
(0.875) (0.344) (0.817)
R&D -0.299∗ -0.497 -0.241
(0.096) (0.179) (0.182)
Capex 0.233 0.556∗∗ 0.106
(0.252) (0.015) (0.593)
ROE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.424) (0.377) (0.432)
Observations 6689 6689 6689
Adjusted R2 0.801 0.695 0.814
Industry-FE No No No
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.15: Differential Change in Volatility Surrounding Convexity Shock:
Control Group Including Full-Early Adopters
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annualized total firm volatility, annualized systematic firm volatil-
ity, and annualized idiosyncratic firm volatility, respectively. ln(CEO Delta) is the natural logarithm of one plus the
total delta of the CEO’s equity portfolio. Delta is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (in
$000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Post-123R is a dummy variable equal to zero for fiscal
years 2002-2004 and equal to one for fiscal years 2005-2007. Treatment is a dummy variable equal to zero for firms
assigned to the control group and equal to one for firms assigned to the treatment group. Post×Treatment is the
difference-in-differences interaction term. Intercept term is included but not reported. All p-values in parentheses
are clustered at the industry level and year level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Total Volatility) ln(Systematic Volatility) ln(Idiosyncratic Volatility)
Post-123R 0.038 0.069 0.043
(0.495) (0.305) (0.476)
Treatment 0.385∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Post×Treatment -0.082 -0.161∗∗∗ -0.069
(0.137) (0.003) (0.249)
ln(CEO Delta) -0.021∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.020∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.149) (0.006)
Size -0.018 0.038 -0.035
(0.548) (0.346) (0.171)
Leverage 0.145∗∗∗ 0.165∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.078) (0.007)
MTB 0.015 0.019 0.013
(0.155) (0.322) (0.138)
Investment Growth 0.003 0.002 0.004
(0.354) (0.818) (0.265)
Sales Growth -0.022 -0.020 -0.022
(0.285) (0.252) (0.350)
CEO Cash Compensation -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.999) (0.912) (0.762)
CEO Tenure 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002
(0.033) (0.022) (0.142)
PP&E -0.125 0.039 -0.205
(0.384) (0.835) (0.152)
R&D -0.013 -0.198 0.011
(0.943) (0.359) (0.948)
Capex 0.149 0.487 0.046
(0.466) (0.111) (0.809)
ROE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.399) (0.384) (0.330)
Observations 5781 5781 5781
Adjusted R2 0.859 0.761 0.861
Industry-FE No No No
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-FE Yes Yes Yes
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A. Estimation of Compensation Incentives
Delta is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (in $000s)
associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Similarly, vega is the dollar
change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (in $000s) associated with a one
percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. The
closed form expressions for the delta and vega of a call option on an underlying
security with dividends are provided by the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing
model as modified to account for dividend payouts:
Option Value = Se−dTN (Z) −Xe−rTN (Z − σ√T) (4)
∆ = ∂ (Option Value)
∂S
(5)
= e−dTN (Z)
ν = ∂ (Option Value)
∂σ
(6)
= e−dTN ′ (Z)S√T
Z = ln [ SX ] + T [r − d + σ22 ]
σ
√
T
(7)
where N is the cumulative density function for the normal distribution, N ′ is the
probability density function for the normal distribution, d is the natural logarithm
of the expected dividend yield, T is the time to maturity of the option in years, S
is the price of the underlying stock, X is the exercise price of the option, r is the
natural logarithm of the risk-free interest rate, and σ is the expected stock return
volatility. Accordingly, the dollar change in the value of an option associated with a
1% increase in the firm’s stock price is .01×∆×S. The dollar change in the value of
an option associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation
of the firm’s return is .01 × ν.
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The methodology in Core and Guay (2002) is used to aggregate the delta and
vega of individual option grants so as to arrive at the total delta and total vega of
the CEO’s option portfolio. The total delta of the CEO’s portfolio of stocks is then
added to the total option portfolio delta in calculating the total delta of the CEO’s
equity portfolio. The total vega of the CEO’s equity portfolio is approximated as the
total vega of the option portfolio as Guay (1999) finds that stock options, but not
common stock, substantially increase the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to firm
equity risk.
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B. Variable Definitions
1. CAPEX: Capital expenditures scaled by total assets—CAPX/AT.
2. Cash: Cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets—CHE/AT.
3. CEO Cash Compensation: Total current compensation (Salary+Bonus)—TOTAL CURR.
4. CEO Tenure: Number of years elapsed between the date on which the execu-
tive became CEO (BECAMECEO) and the end a given fiscal year (DATADATE).
5. Delta: Dollar change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (in $000s)
associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price.
6. Dividend Payer: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm paid dividends to its
common/ordinary equity shareholders (DVC>0) .
7. Idiosyncratic Volatility: Annualized standard deviation of the idiosyncratic
component of the firm’s 60-month stock return as calculated by the fama-french
three-factor asset pricing model.
8. Investment Growth: Growth in capital expenditures—(CAPXt-CAPXt−1)/CAPXt−1.
9. Leverage: Total debt in current liabilities plus total long-term debt scaled by
total assets —(DLC+DLTT)/AT.
10. MTB: Market-to-book ratio—((PRCC F*CSHO)+LT)/AT.
11. Option Proportion: Value of options granted scaled by total pay. Prior to
2006, this ratio is OPTION AWARDS BLK VALUE/TDC1. Beginning in 2006, this
ratio is OPTION AWARDS FV/TDC1.
12. Post-123R:Dummy variable equal to 0 for fiscal years 2002-2004 and equal to
1 for fiscal years 2005-2007.
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13. PP&E: Total plant, property, and equipment scaled by total assets—PPENT/AT.
14. R&D: Research and development expense scaled by total assets—max(0,XRD)/AT.
15. ROE: Net income scaled by the book value of common equity—NI/CEQ.
16. Sales Growth: Growth in sales—(SALEt-SALEt−1)/SALEt−1.
17. Size: Natural logarithm of total assets—ln(AT).
18. Systematic Volatility: Annualized standard deviation of the systematic com-
ponent of the firm’s 60-month stock return as calculated by the fama-french
three-factor asset pricing model.
19. Total Pay:Total Compensation (salary+bonus+other annual+restricted stock
grants+ltip payouts+all other+value of option grants)—TDC1.
20. Total Volatility: Annualized standard deviation of the firm’s 60-month stock
return.
21. Treatment: Dummy variable equal to 0 for firms assigned to the control group
and equal to 1 for firms assigned to the treatment group.
22. Vega: Dollar change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio (in $000s)
associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of
the firm’s equity returns.
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CHAPTER 3
Managerial Inside-Debt and Firm Jump Risk
111
3.1. Introduction
Within the framework of Jensen and Meckling (1976), the separation of ownership
and control inherent in the managerial control of a firm owned by shareholders leads
to a number of inefficiencies. As an executive’s actions and the firm’s access to
investment opportunities cannot be perfectly observed by shareholders, the firm can
design the incentive contract so as to align managerial objectives with those of the
firm. Jensen and Murphy (1990b) argue that this, in theory, can be accomplished
by linking executive wealth to that of shareholders, thus providing incentives for an
executive to engage in optimal behavior that maximizes shareholder value.
While the dependence of managerial compensation on the value of the firm can
induce effort and potentially attenuate monitoring costs, equity-based remuneration
can lead to excessive risk-taking behavior. Firms can attenuate the negative con-
sequences of equity compensation by compensating executives with debt-like remu-
neration mechanisms. Recent developments in the managerial inside-debt literature
suggest that pension benefits and deferred compensation can align the incentives of
executives with those of bond holders. For example, Sundaram and Yermack (2007)
as well as Edmans and Liu (2011) argue that since pensions and deferred compen-
sation are unsecured firm liabilities, inside-debt holdings expose managers to firm
default risk. This debt-like exposure to risk can incentivize managers to attenuate
suboptimal overexposure to risk.
In this paper, I explore the ramifications of managerial inside-debt holdings on
stock-price jump risk. I present evidence that suggests that not all debt-like compen-
sation mechanisms decrease managerial risk-taking equally. First, I find that CEO
pension pay significantly reduces the likelihood of positive stock-price jumps. Specif-
ically, I find that a bottom-to-top decile increase in the present value of CEO pension
pay leads to a roughly 25% decrease in a firm’s unconditional ex-post jump proba-
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bility. Second, I find that CEO deferred compensation does not reduce jump risk.
Finally, I show that an ex-ante measure of the option market’s perception of future
stock-price jumps, the option-implied volatility smirk, does not appear to capture
these aforementioned relations.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 surveys the related
literature and institutional background. Section 3.3 summarizes the data construc-
tion procedure. Section 3.4 presents my hypotheses and formulates my identification
strategy. Section 3.5 presents my empirical analysis and Section 3.6 concludes the
paper.
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3.2. Related Literature and Institutional Background
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argue that debt-like managerial compensation can
help to alleviate the agency costs of debt within a firm. For instance, CEOs with
greater pension holdings are naturally expected to prefer less risky firm policies.
This can manifest with increases in the average maturity of firm debt, a reduction of
payouts from the firm to shareholders, as well as through the undertaking of less risky
firm investments. They find that as CEOs age, their compensation holdings gradually
shift from equity towards debt-based compensation. In addition, CEOs with vested
pensions that are immediately payable are found to be more likely to voluntarily retire
for a given age. Finally, firms managed by CEOs with greater inside-debt holdings
are found to feature lower default risk.
Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) examine the implications of manage-
rial inside-debt holdings on the investment and financial policies of firms. Namely,
they find that CEOs with greater inside-debt compensation elect investment and
financial policies that are safer. For instance, they show that larger inside-debt com-
pensation levels incentivize CEOs to decrease the volatility of future firm stock re-
turns. This reduced volatility is achieved, in part, by greater asset liquidity and
diversification policies as well as by reduced R&D expenditures and leverage.
He (2013) investigates the ramifications of CEO inside-leverage on financial report-
ing quality. Specifically, he finds that greater managerial inside-leverage is associated
with lower abnormal accruals and higher earnings reporting quality. He also finds
that this translates to a negative relation between inside-leverage and stock price
crashes as managers with greater inside-leverage are less inclined to conceal nega-
tive information.1 These findings are in agreement with the notion that CEOs with
greater debt-like compensation are averse to actions that may increase the probabil-
1The central measure of this paper is a function of the ratio of CEO D/E to Firm D/E.
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ity of default or bankruptcy within a firm as debt-like compensation is an unsecured
liability.
3.3. Data Selection and Variable Measurement
In constructing the necessary variables for this paper, I follow the same process as
described in Amadeus (2015). However, I utilize CEO-specific compensation informa-
tion in creating my compensation related variables. First, I construct my measures of
managerial inside-leverage by using information from Execucomp. Namely, I define
CEO inside-leverage, CEO D/E, as the ratio of the total value of a CEO’s inside-debt
compensation to the total value of a CEO’s inside-equity compensation. Inside-debt
compensation is defined as the sum of a CEO’s total aggregate balance in deferred
compensation as well as the present value of a CEO’s accumulated pension benefits
(in $000s). Inside-Equity compensation is defined as the total value of a CEO’s cur-
rent and outstanding portfolios of stock- and option-based remuneration (in $000s).
I obtain information pertaining to CEO Inside-Equity, CEO Delta, and CEO Vega
from Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2013). I then merge this data with the crash-jump
sample from Amadeus (2015) in arriving at my final sample for this paper. I also
construct a measure of Firm D/E as well as alternate measures of managerial inside-
leverage mentioned in Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012). My results only
hold for inside-leverage measured as CEO D/E as well as its decomposition. I do
not find a symmetric link between inside-leverage and firm crashes. My final merged
sample features 3,476 stock fiscal-year observations spanning fiscal years 2007-2011.
I winsorize Size, Opaque, ROE, M/B, Leverage, JIFP Smirk, Firm D/E, CEO Cash
Compensation, CEO Delta, CEO Vega, and CEO D/E at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
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3.4. Hypothesis Development and Research De-
sign
3.4.1. Hypothesis Development
If managerial inside-leverage decreases managerial risk-taking, as measured by
the probability of positive stock price jumps, I would expect λ1, ψ1, γ1, and φ1 to be
both negative and significant in Equation 3.1-Equation 3.4, respectively. In order
to better understand the individual roles of CEO Deferred Compensation and CEO
Pension remuneration in influencing stock-price jump risk, I decompose my measure
of managerial inside-leverage into its constituent components. If managerial deferred
compensation and pension remuneration both decrease managerial risk taking behav-
ior, I would expect to find λ1, λ2, ψ1, ψ2, γ1, γ2, and φ1, φ2 to be negative and significant
in Equation 3.6-Equation 3.9, respectively.
3.4.2. Research Design
Within my primary analysis, I use equations of the following form in analyzing the
implications of managerial inside-leverage on firms’ ex-ante and ex-post idiosyncratic
jump risk:
JIFP Smirki,t = λ0 + λ1CEO D/Ei,t + m∑
j=1βjControlj,i,t + i,t (3.1)
Jumpi,t = ψ0 + ψ1CEO D/Ei,t−1 + m+1∑
j=1 µjControlj,i,t−1 + ηi,t (3.2)
Jump Frequencyi,t = γ0 + γ1CEO D/Ei,t−1 + m+1∑
j=1 ωjControlj,i,t−1 + θi,t (3.3)
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Jump Sigmai,t = φ0 + φ1CEO D/Ei,t−1 + m+1∑
j=1 δjControlj,i,t−1 + τi,t (3.4)
where i is the firm subscript, t is the fiscal year subscript, and j is the control subscript.
Next, I decompose my previous measure of managerial inside-leverage into its
constituent components. Namely:
CEO D/E = CEO Deferred Compensation +CEO PensionCEO Inside-Equity (3.5)
This decomposition allows me to better understand the individual roles of CEO De-
ferred Compensation and CEO Pensions in influencing stock-price jump risk.
JIFP Smirki,t = λ0 + λ1Deferredi,t + λ2Pensioni,t + m+1∑
j=1 βjControlj,i,t + i,t (3.6)
Jumpi,t = ψ0 + ψ1Deferredi,t−1 + ψ2Pensioni,t−1 + m+2∑
j=1 µjControlj,i,t−1 + ηi,t
(3.7)
Jump Freqi,t = γ0 + γ1Deferredi,t−1 + γ2Pensioni,t−1 + m+2∑
j=1 ωjControlj,i,t−1 + θi,t
(3.8)
Jump Sigmai,t = φ0 + φ1Deferredi,t−1 + φ2Pensioni,t−1 + m+2∑
j=1 δjControlj,i,t−1 + τi,t
(3.9)
where i is the firm subscript, t is the fiscal year subscript, and j is the control subscript.
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3.5. Empirical Analysis
Table 3.1 shows that the average CEO in my final sample has $3.7 million dollars
in deferred compensation as well as $4.8 million dollars in pensions. Similarly, the
average CEO also has a total equity compensation portfolio valued at $105.5 million
dollars with a delta of $685,000 and a vega of $193,000. Together, this translates
to an average CEO Inside Debt/Inside Equity ratio of 0.43. The average firm D/E
ratio is 0.54. Panel A of Figure 3.1 presents the temporal trends in CEO deferred
compensation as well as pension pay and Panel B shows the trend in CEO Inside-
Debt and Inside-Equity. Finally, Figure 3.2 features the fluctuation in CEO D/E and
Firm D/E between fiscal years 2006-2010. The average magnitude of a stock price
positive jump in my sample is 22.24%. Table 3.2 reveals that roughly 0.418% of the
stock fiscal weeks in my sample are characterized as jump weeks (755/180,620).
I begin my empirical analysis by examining the ramifications of managerial inside-
leverage on firm jump risk. As managerial inside-debt is largely unsecured, I would
expect managerial risk-taking to decrease with managerial inside-leverage. Columns
(1) and (2) of Table 3.3 confirms this hypothesis as the coefficient on CEO D/E is
both negative and significant. In columns (3) and (4), I introduce a measure of the
option market’s ex-ante expectation of a firm’s future positive jump risk probabil-
ity, the jump idiosyncratic firm put smirk (JIFP Smirk). Surprisingly, JIFP Smirk
does not appear be significant in predicting future firm-specific jumps and does not
substantially alter the magnitude or significance of the point estimates on CEO D/E
in columns (1) and (2). In order to better understand the individual roles of CEO
Deferred Compensation, CEO Pension, and CEO Inside-Equity in influencing stock-
price jump risk, I decompose CEO D/E into its constituent components. Table 3.4
presents the results of this decomposition. Namely, columns (1)-(4) of Table 3.4
demonstrate that not all debt-like CEO compensation structures decrease risk-taking
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equally. Namely, while the coefficient on the present value of CEO pension pay is
significant at the 1% level, CEO Deferred Compensation does not appear to have a
significant influence on firm jump risk.
In Table 3.5, my outcome variable is the number of firm-specific positive jumps
within a given stock-fiscal year. I find a negative relation between managerial inside-
leverage and the number of stock price positive jumps. Table 3.6 presents the results
when I decompose CEO D/E into its components. As expected, I find that CEO
Pension pay reduces the number of firm specific positive jumps within a fiscal year
but this relation does not extend to CEO Deferred Compensation. In Table 3.7, my
outcome variable is the magnitude of the largest positive jump within a given stock
fiscal year. I find a negative relation between CEO D/E and Jump Sigma. As in
previous tests, Table 3.8 suggests that CEO pension pay decreases jump magnitudes
while deferred compensation does not appear to have a significant influence.
In Table 3.9, I examine if the option-implied volatility smirk incorporates the
realized relation between managerial inside-leverage, CEO Pension pay, and firm-
specific jumps. Columns (1) and (2) reveal that the coefficient on CEO D/E is
insignificant. Table 3.10 further reveals that the option-implied volatility smirk does
not appear to capture the negative relation between CEO Pension pay and firm-
specific positive jumps. Next, I examine the economic significance of the relationship
between managerial inside-leverage and firm jump risk. Column (2) of Table 3.11
reveals that a bottom-to-top decile fluctuation in CEO D/E results in a roughly 4.99
percentage point decrease in a firm’s unconditional ex-post positive jump probability.
More specifically, Table 3.12 shows that a bottom-to-top decile fluctuation in the
present value of CEO Pension pay leads to a 5.33 percentage point reduction in a
firm’s unconditional ex-post positive jump probability. This represents a roughly
25% decrease in a firm’s unconditional ex-post idiosyncratic jump probability. Again,
deferred compensation does not appear to play a prominent role in reducing firm
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jump risk.
3.6. Summary and Conclusion
Within this paper, I present evidence suggesting that not all debt-like managerial
remuneration structures decrease managerial risk-taking equally. I find that CEO
pension pay appears to be more effective than deferred compensation in reducing
managerial risk-taking behavior. Namely, I find that a bottom-to-top decile increase
in the present value of CEO pension pay leads to a roughly 25% decrease in a firm’s
unconditional ex-post idiosyncratic jump probability. In contrast, I do not find a
significant relation between deferred compensation and firm jump risk. Finally, I find
that information in option-implied volatility smirks does not appear to reflect these
aforementioned dynamics.
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3.7. Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: CEO Inside Debt Compensation
Panel A: CEO Pension and Deferred Compensation Values
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for variables related to executive compensation incentives, idiosyncratic firm
crash risk, idiosyncratic positive jump risk, and firm properties. My primary sample consists of 3,476 firm fiscal
year observations spanning fiscal years 2007 through 2011. I winsorize the variables Size, Opaque, ROE, M/B,
Leverage, JIFP Smirk, Firm D/E, CEO CashComp, CEO Delta, and CEO Vega, and CEO D/E at the first and
99th percentiles. CEO CashComp is the CEO’s total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. CEO
Delta is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated with
a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. CEO Vega is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s total equity
compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the
firm’s equity returns. CEO D/E is the ratio of the total value of a CEO’s inside-debt compensation to the total
value of a CEO’s inside-equity compensation. Inside-debt compensation is defined as the sum of a CEO’s total
aggregate balance in deferred compensation as well as the present value of a CEO’s accumulated pension benefits (in
$000s). Inside-Equity compensation is defined as the total value of a CEO’s current and outstanding portfolios of
stock- and option-based remuneration (in $000s). JIFP Smirk is the jump risk related idiosyncratic firm put smirk.
Jump is set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences one or more idiosyncratic weekly returns rising 3.09
or more standard deviations above the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return. Jump Frequency is the number of
idiosyncratic firm stock-price jumps within a given firm fiscal year. Jump Sigma is the largest standard deviation
jump in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns above their firm fiscal year mean. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard
deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. All remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
Full Sample of Firm Fiscal Years with Non-Missing Variables
Variable Mean Std 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Executive Incentives:
CEO CashComp 1139.54 810.52 490.38 742.46 950.00 1193.27 2668.75
CEO Delta 685.17 1322.97 23.62 104.72 255.79 654.19 2801.94
CEO Vega 192.56 261.30 0.04 29.02 95.51 238.80 740.57
ln(1+CEO CashComp) 6.89 0.50 6.20 6.61 6.86 7.09 7.89
ln(1+CEO Delta) 5.56 1.40 3.20 4.66 5.55 6.48 7.94
ln(1+CEO Vega) 4.28 1.72 0.04 3.40 4.57 5.48 6.61
CEO D/E 0.43 0.68 0.00 0.05 0.18 0.47 1.72
CEO Deferred Compensation 3,708 9,311 0.00 151 839 3,176 15,949
CEO Pension 4,773 9,160 0.00 0.00 884 5,962 21,170
Inside Equity 105,532 1,098,667 1,871 7,714 18,285 45,097 233,458
ln(1+CEO Deferred Compensation) 5.98 3.04 0.00 5.03 6.73 8.06 9.68
ln(1+CEO Pension) 5.14 4.02 0.00 0.00 6.79 8.69 9.96
ln(1+CEO Inside Equity) 9.86 1.48 7.53 8.95 9.81 10.72 12.36
Idiosyncratic Firm Jump Risk:
JIFP Smirk 1.11 0.41 0.75 0.93 1.03 1.19 1.81
Jump 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Jump Frequency 0.22 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Jump Sigma 2.61 0.65 1.75 2.15 2.51 2.97 3.85
Firm Properties:
Opaque 1.53 3.36 0.04 0.14 0.33 1.25 6.89
ROE 0.10 0.32 -0.34 0.06 0.12 0.20 0.44
Size 8.16 1.47 5.89 7.10 8.01 9.12 10.83
M/B 2.64 3.07 0.62 1.33 2.03 3.23 7.18
Leverage 0.61 0.20 0.30 0.48 0.60 0.75 0.93
Firm D/E 0.54 0.81 0.02 0.12 0.26 0.56 2.09
Idiosyncratic Vol. 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.08
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Table 3.2: Weekly Returns During Idiosyncratic Firm Stock-Price Jump Weeks
This table presents summary statistics pertaining to firm, industry, and market weekly returns during idiosyncratic
firm stock-price jump weeks. A week is classified as a jump week if a firm experiences an idiosyncratic weekly stock
return jump rising 3.09 or more standard deviations above its mean idiosyncratic weekly return for a particular
fiscal year. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%,5%,and 1% levels, respectively. The
aforementioned significance levels pertain to difference-in-means paired t-tests and difference-in-medians Wilcoxon
rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests for mean and median returns during jump and non-jump weeks.
Panel A: Firm Weekly Returns During Jump vs. Non-Jump Weeks
Variable N(Weeks) Mean Median Variance
Jump Weeks 755 0.2224*** 0.1599*** 0.1090
Non-Jump Weeks 179,865 0.0006 0.0021 0.0045
Total 180,620
Panel B: Industry Weekly Returns During Jump vs. Non-Jump Weeks
Variable N(Weeks) Mean Median Variance
Jump Weeks 755 0.0107*** 0.0080 0.0017
Non-Jump Weeks 179,865 0.0007 0.0039 0.0016
Total 180,620
Panel C: Market Weekly Returns During Jump vs. Non-Jump Weeks
Variable N(Weeks) Mean Median Variance
Jump Weeks 755 0.0047*** 0.0059*** 0.0009
Non-Jump Weeks 179,865 0.0004 0.0030 0.0010
Total 180,620
Panel D: Jump Week Frequencies Within Firm Fiscal Year Sample
Number of Crashes N(Years) Percentage of Sample Cumulative Percentage
0 2,741 78.86 78.86
1 715 20.57 99.42
2 20 0.58 100
Total 3,476 100
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Table 3.3: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on the Occurrence of
Idiosyncratic Firm Jumps: Linear Probability Model Analysis
The dependent variable, Jump, is a binary indicator specifying the occurrence of an idiosyncratic firm jump within
a given firm fiscal year. Specifically, Jump is set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences one or more
idiosyncratic weekly returns rising 3.09 or more standard deviations above the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return.
JIFP Smirk, is the jump idiosyncratic firm put smirk. CEO CashComp is the CEO’s total cash remuneration within
a given firm fiscal year. CEO Delta is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio
(in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. CEO Vega is the dollar change in the value of the
CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard
deviation of the firm’s equity returns. CEO D/E is the ratio of the total value of a CEO’s inside-debt compensation
to the total value of a CEO’s inside-equity compensation. Inside-debt compensation is defined as the sum of a CEO’s
total aggregate balance in deferred compensation as well as the present value of a CEO’s accumulated pension benefits
(in $000s). Inside-Equity compensation is defined as the total value of a CEO’s current and outstanding portfolios of
stock- and option-based remuneration (in $000s). Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic
firm weekly returns. The dependent variable is measured at time t while all independent variables are measured at
time t − 1. Intercept term is included but not reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm and
year level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The
remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Jump Jump Jump Jump
JIFP Smirk 0.0096 0.0109
(0.69) (0.76)
CEO D/E -0.0243∗∗ -0.0250∗∗ -0.0242∗∗ -0.0248∗∗
(-2.52) (-2.54) (-2.47) (-2.50)
ln(1+CEO Vega) 0.0083∗∗ 0.0083∗∗ 0.0082∗∗ 0.0082∗∗
(2.08) (2.13) (2.11) (2.17)
ln(1+CEO Delta) -0.0091 -0.0092 -0.0089 -0.0090
(-1.09) (-1.08) (-1.04) (-1.03)
ln(1+CEO CashComp) 0.0070 0.0065 0.0068 0.0064
(1.04) (0.98) (1.00) (0.94)
ROE -0.0302 -0.0311 -0.0304 -0.0314
(-0.92) (-0.95) (-0.93) (-0.96)
Size -0.0186∗∗ -0.0181∗∗ -0.0185∗∗ -0.0180∗∗
(-2.49) (-2.49) (-2.49) (-2.50)
M/B 0.0050 0.0051 0.0050 0.0051
(1.12) (1.12) (1.12) (1.13)
Firm D/E 0.0070 0.0067 0.0069 0.0065
(0.41) (0.39) (0.40) (0.38)
Opaque 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗
(3.62) (3.50) (3.57) (3.49)
Idiosyncratic Vol. 0.3751 0.3849 0.3790 0.3862
(1.04) (1.23) (1.03) (1.22)
Observations 3476 3476 3476 3476
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Year-FE No Yes No Yes
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Table 3.4: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on the Occurrence of
Idiosyncratic Firm Jumps: Linear Probability Model Analysis
The dependent variable, Jump, is a binary indicator specifying the occurrence of an idiosyncratic firm jump within
a given firm fiscal year. Specifically, Jump is set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences one or more
idiosyncratic weekly returns rising 3.09 or more standard deviations above the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return.
JIFP Smirk, is the jump idiosyncratic firm put smirk. CEO CashComp is the CEO’s total cash remuneration within
a given firm fiscal year. CEO Delta is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio
(in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. CEO Vega is the dollar change in the value of the
CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard
deviation of the firm’s equity returns. CEO D/E is the ratio of the total value of a CEO’s inside-debt compensation
to the total value of a CEO’s inside-equity compensation. Inside-debt compensation is defined as the sum of a CEO’s
total aggregate balance in deferred compensation as well as the present value of a CEO’s accumulated pension benefits
(in $000s). Inside-Equity compensation is defined as the total value of a CEO’s current and outstanding portfolios of
stock- and option-based remuneration (in $000s). Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic
firm weekly returns. The dependent variable is measured at time t while all independent variables are measured at
time t − 1. Intercept term is included but not reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm and
year level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The
remaining variables are defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Jump Jump Jump Jump
JIFP Smirk 0.0116 0.0126
(0.84) (0.90)
ln(1+CEO Deferred Compensation) 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
(0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27)
ln(1+CEO Pension) -0.0037∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗
(-2.68) (-2.62) (-2.65) (-2.59)
ln(1+CEO Inside-Equity) -0.0372∗∗∗ -0.0389∗∗∗ -0.0380∗∗∗ -0.0396∗∗∗
(-3.22) (-3.21) (-3.24) (-3.24)
ln(1+CEO Vega) 0.0045 0.0044 0.0043 0.0042
(1.07) (1.08) (1.07) (1.08)
ln(1+CEO Delta) 0.0389∗∗ 0.0407∗∗ 0.0400∗∗ 0.0417∗∗
(2.19) (2.20) (2.18) (2.20)
ln(1+CEO CashComp) 0.0057 0.0051 0.0055 0.0049
(0.84) (0.74) (0.80) (0.70)
ROE -0.0251 -0.0257 -0.0253 -0.0261
(-0.80) (-0.81) (-0.80) (-0.82)
Size -0.0208∗∗ -0.0202∗∗ -0.0206∗∗ -0.0201∗∗
(-2.53) (-2.51) (-2.52) (-2.51)
M/B 0.0044 0.0045 0.0045 0.0046
(1.00) (1.00) (1.01) (1.01)
Firm D/E 0.0059 0.0056 0.0058 0.0054
(0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.32)
Opaque 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗
(3.60) (3.41) (3.55) (3.41)
Idiosyncratic Vol. 0.3531 0.3951 0.3588 0.3974
(1.09) (1.41) (1.08) (1.40)
Observations 3476 3476 3476 3476
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005
Year-FE No Yes No Yes
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Table 3.5: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on the Number of
Idiosyncratic Firm Jumps: Linear Model Analysis
The dependent variable, Jump Freq, is the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price jumps within a given firm fiscal
year. A firm experiences an idiosyncratic jump within a fiscal year if its idiosyncratic weekly returns jump by 3.09
or more standard deviations above their firm fiscal year mean. JIFP smirk is the jump idiosyncratic firm put smirk.
CEO CashComp is the CEO’s total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. CEO Delta is the dollar change
in the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s
stock price. CEO Vega is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s)
associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. CEO D/E is the
ratio of the total value of a CEO’s inside-debt compensation to the total value of a CEO’s inside-equity compensation.
Inside-debt compensation is defined as the sum of a CEO’s total aggregate balance in deferred compensation as well
as the present value of a CEO’s accumulated pension benefits (in $000s). Inside-Equity compensation is defined as
the total value of a CEO’s current and outstanding portfolios of stock- and option-based remuneration (in $000s).
Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. The dependent variable is
measured at time t while all independent variables are measured at time t − 1. Intercept term is included but not
reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm and year level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix
B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Jump Frequency Jump Frequency Jump Frequency Jump Frequency
JIFP Smirk 0.0027 0.0039
(0.19) (0.27)
CEO D/E -0.0223∗ -0.0228∗ -0.0223∗ -0.0228∗
(-1.90) (-1.91) (-1.89) (-1.90)
ln(1+CEO Vega) 0.0074∗ 0.0076∗ 0.0074∗ 0.0075∗
(1.84) (1.90) (1.85) (1.91)
ln(1+CEO Delta) -0.0076 -0.0079 -0.0075 -0.0078
(-0.86) (-0.88) (-0.83) (-0.86)
ln(1+CEO CashComp) 0.0085∗ 0.0082∗ 0.0084∗ 0.0081∗
(1.96) (1.84) (1.88) (1.77)
ROE -0.0260 -0.0268 -0.0260 -0.0269
(-0.76) (-0.79) (-0.77) (-0.79)
Size -0.0199∗∗ -0.0192∗∗ -0.0198∗∗ -0.0192∗∗
(-2.40) (-2.39) (-2.39) (-2.39)
M/B 0.0064 0.0065 0.0064 0.0065
(1.28) (1.28) (1.29) (1.29)
Firm D/E 0.0127 0.0123 0.0126 0.0123
(0.68) (0.66) (0.68) (0.66)
Opaque 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗
(2.66) (2.55) (2.63) (2.55)
Idiosyncratic Vol. 0.2733 0.3009 0.2744 0.3014
(0.77) (0.95) (0.77) (0.95)
Observations 3476 3476 3476 3476
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
Year-FE No Yes No Yes
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Table 3.6: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on the Number of
Idiosyncratic Firm Jumps: Linear Model Analysis
The dependent variable, Jump Freq, is the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price jumps within a given firm fiscal
year. A firm experiences an idiosyncratic jump within a fiscal year if its idiosyncratic weekly returns jump by 3.09
or more standard deviations above their firm fiscal year mean. JIFP smirk is the jump idiosyncratic firm put smirk.
CEO CashComp is the CEO’s total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. CEO Delta is the dollar change
in the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s
stock price. CEO Vega is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s)
associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. CEO D/E is the
ratio of the total value of a CEO’s inside-debt compensation to the total value of a CEO’s inside-equity compensation.
Inside-debt compensation is defined as the sum of a CEO’s total aggregate balance in deferred compensation as well
as the present value of a CEO’s accumulated pension benefits (in $000s). Inside-Equity compensation is defined as
the total value of a CEO’s current and outstanding portfolios of stock- and option-based remuneration (in $000s).
Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. The dependent variable is
measured at time t while all independent variables are measured at time t − 1. Intercept term is included but not
reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm and year level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix
B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Jump Freq Jump Freq Jump Freq Jump Freq
JIFP Smirk 0.0048 0.0058
(0.35) (0.41)
ln(1+CEO Deferred Compensation) 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019
(0.63) (0.63) (0.63) (0.63)
ln(1+CEO Pension) -0.0032∗∗ -0.0032∗∗ -0.0032∗∗ -0.0032∗∗
(-2.14) (-2.09) (-2.13) (-2.08)
ln(1+CEO Inside-Equity) -0.0496∗∗∗ -0.0516∗∗∗ -0.0499∗∗∗ -0.0519∗∗∗
(-3.14) (-3.16) (-3.22) (-3.23)
ln(1+CEO Vega) 0.0020 0.0021 0.0020 0.0020
(0.42) (0.44) (0.42) (0.44)
ln(1+CEO Delta) 0.0541∗∗∗ 0.0560∗∗∗ 0.0545∗∗∗ 0.0564∗∗∗
(2.92) (2.92) (2.95) (2.95)
ln(1+CEO CashComp) 0.0066∗ 0.0060 0.0065∗ 0.0060
(1.87) (1.58) (1.75) (1.49)
ROE -0.0215 -0.0220 -0.0216 -0.0222
(-0.65) (-0.67) (-0.66) (-0.67)
Size -0.0228∗∗ -0.0221∗∗ -0.0227∗∗ -0.0221∗∗
(-2.55) (-2.53) (-2.54) (-2.52)
M/B 0.0059 0.0059 0.0059 0.0059
(1.17) (1.17) (1.18) (1.17)
Firm D/E 0.0118 0.0114 0.0117 0.0113
(0.64) (0.63) (0.64) (0.63)
Opaque 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗
(2.73) (2.57) (2.70) (2.57)
Idiosyncratic Vol. 0.2754 0.3425 0.2778 0.3435
(0.89) (1.24) (0.88) (1.23)
Observations 3476 3476 3476 3476
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005
Year-FE No Yes No Yes
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Table 3.7: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on the Magnitude of
Idiosyncratic Firm Jumps
The dependent variable, Jump Sigma, is the largest standard deviation jump in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns
above their firm fiscal year mean. JIFP smirk is the jump idiosyncratic firm put smirk. CEO CashComp is the
CEO’s total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. CEO Delta is the dollar change in the value of
the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price.
CEO Vega is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated
with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. CEO D/E is the ratio
of the total value of a CEO’s inside-debt compensation to the total value of a CEO’s inside-equity compensation.
Inside-debt compensation is defined as the sum of a CEO’s total aggregate balance in deferred compensation as well
as the present value of a CEO’s accumulated pension benefits (in $000s). Inside-Equity compensation is defined as
the total value of a CEO’s current and outstanding portfolios of stock- and option-based remuneration (in $000s).
Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. The dependent variable is
measured at time t while all independent variables are measured at time t − 1. Intercept term is included but not
reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm and year level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix
B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Jump Sigma Jump Sigma Jump Sigma Jump Sigma
JIFP Smirk 0.0350 0.0382
(1.12) (1.24)
CEO D/E -0.0264∗∗ -0.0262∗ -0.0259∗ -0.0257∗
(-2.00) (-1.93) (-1.92) (-1.86)
ln(1+CEO Vega) 0.0131∗∗ 0.0135∗∗ 0.0130∗∗ 0.0134∗∗
(2.16) (2.12) (2.17) (2.13)
ln(1+CEO Delta) -0.0022 -0.0032 -0.0015 -0.0025
(-0.20) (-0.32) (-0.14) (-0.25)
ln(1+CEO CashComp) 0.0250 0.0244 0.0244 0.0239
(1.34) (1.33) (1.27) (1.26)
ROE -0.0151 -0.0161 -0.0158 -0.0171
(-0.42) (-0.44) (-0.44) (-0.47)
Size -0.0367∗∗ -0.0358∗∗ -0.0364∗∗ -0.0354∗∗
(-2.48) (-2.48) (-2.38) (-2.38)
M/B 0.0072∗ 0.0073∗ 0.0073∗ 0.0074∗
(1.71) (1.70) (1.73) (1.73)
Firm D/E 0.0164 0.0164 0.0159 0.0159
(0.60) (0.60) (0.58) (0.58)
Opaque 0.0044 0.0037 0.0045 0.0037
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Idiosyncratic Vol. 0.9062∗∗ 1.0077∗∗∗ 0.9205∗∗ 1.0122∗∗∗
(2.53) (3.20) (2.50) (3.10)
Observations 3476 3476 3476 3476
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006
Year-FE No Yes No Yes
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Table 3.8: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on the Magnitude of
Idiosyncratic Firm Jumps
The dependent variable, Jump Sigma, is the largest standard deviation jump in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns
above their firm fiscal year mean. JIFP smirk is the jump idiosyncratic firm put smirk. CEO CashComp is the
CEO’s total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. CEO Delta is the dollar change in the value of
the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price.
CEO Vega is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated
with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. CEO D/E is the ratio
of the total value of a CEO’s inside-debt compensation to the total value of a CEO’s inside-equity compensation.
Inside-debt compensation is defined as the sum of a CEO’s total aggregate balance in deferred compensation as well
as the present value of a CEO’s accumulated pension benefits (in $000s). Inside-Equity compensation is defined as
the total value of a CEO’s current and outstanding portfolios of stock- and option-based remuneration (in $000s).
Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. The dependent variable is
measured at time t while all independent variables are measured at time t − 1. Intercept term is included but not
reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm and year level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix
B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Jump Sigma Jump Sigma Jump Sigma Jump Sigma
JIFP Smirk 0.0374 0.0404
(1.20) (1.32)
ln(1+CEO Deferred Compensation) -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019
(-0.38) (-0.37) (-0.38) (-0.38)
ln(1+CEO Pension) -0.0057∗ -0.0057∗ -0.0058∗ -0.0058∗
(-1.82) (-1.79) (-1.79) (-1.77)
ln(1+CEO Inside-Equity) -0.0480∗∗ -0.0499∗∗ -0.0505∗∗ -0.0521∗∗
(-2.10) (-2.06) (-2.26) (-2.20)
ln(1+CEO Vega) 0.0087 0.0090 0.0083 0.0086
(1.31) (1.30) (1.31) (1.29)
ln(1+CEO Delta) 0.0591∗∗ 0.0599∗∗ 0.0626∗∗ 0.0631∗∗
(2.31) (2.13) (2.50) (2.29)
ln(1+CEO CashComp) 0.0243 0.0237 0.0237 0.0231
(1.50) (1.48) (1.40) (1.39)
ROE -0.0093 -0.0102 -0.0101 -0.0113
(-0.28) (-0.30) (-0.30) (-0.33)
Size -0.0371∗∗ -0.0361∗∗ -0.0367∗∗ -0.0357∗∗
(-2.25) (-2.25) (-2.15) (-2.15)
M/B 0.0066 0.0066 0.0067 0.0067
(1.53) (1.53) (1.55) (1.55)
Firm D/E 0.0162 0.0164 0.0159 0.0160
(0.58) (0.59) (0.56) (0.57)
Opaque 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0035 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0035
(20.03) (.) (25.64) (.)
Idiosyncratic Vol. 0.8698∗∗ 0.9966∗∗∗ 0.8881∗∗ 1.0039∗∗∗
(2.27) (2.79) (2.28) (2.72)
Observations 3476 3476 3476 3476
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006
Year-FE No Yes No Yes
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Table 3.9: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on Jump Idiosyncratic Firm
Put Smirks
The dependent variable, JIFP Smirk, is the jump idiosyncratic firm put smirk. The jump idiosyncratic firm put smirk
is the ratio of the idiosyncratic implied volatility (variance) of in-the-money put options to the idiosyncratic implied
volatility (variance) of at-the-money put options for a given firm fiscal year. CEO CashComp is the CEO’s total cash
remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. CEO Delta is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s total equity
compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. CEO Vega is the dollar
change in the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-
point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. CEO D/E is the ratio of the total value of a
CEO’s inside-debt compensation to the total value of a CEO’s inside-equity compensation. Inside-debt compensation
is defined as the sum of a CEO’s total aggregate balance in deferred compensation as well as the present value of a
CEO’s accumulated pension benefits (in $000s). Inside-Equity compensation is defined as the total value of a CEO’s
current and outstanding portfolios of stock- and option-based remuneration (in $000s). Idiosyncratic Volatility is
the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. All variables are measured at time t. Intercept term
is included but not reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm and year level. The notation∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are
defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2)
JIFP Smirk JIFP Smirk
CEO D/E -0.0146 -0.0122
(-0.98) (-0.76)
ln(1+CEO Vega) 0.0023 0.0031
(0.27) (0.34)
ln(1+CEO Delta) -0.0202∗∗∗ -0.0200∗∗∗
(-2.82) (-2.74)
ln(1+CEO CashComp) 0.0158 0.0142
(1.52) (1.23)
ROE 0.0177 0.0238
(0.77) (1.13)
Size -0.0111 -0.0101
(-0.41) (-0.36)
M/B -0.0031 -0.0031
(-1.03) (-1.16)
Firm D/E 0.0125 0.0137
(1.05) (1.16)
Opaque -0.0024 -0.0005
(-1.24) (-0.34)
Idiosyncratic Vol. -0.4076 -0.1201
(-0.68) (-0.20)
Observations 3476 3476
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.017
Year-FE No Yes
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Table 3.10: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on Jump Idiosyncratic Firm
Put Smirks
The dependent variable, JIFP Smirk, is the jump idiosyncratic firm put smirk. The jump idiosyncratic firm put smirk
is the ratio of the idiosyncratic implied volatility (variance) of in-the-money put options to the idiosyncratic implied
volatility (variance) of at-the-money put options for a given firm fiscal year. CEO CashComp is the CEO’s total cash
remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. CEO Delta is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s total equity
compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. CEO Vega is the dollar
change in the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-
point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. CEO D/E is the ratio of the total value of a
CEO’s inside-debt compensation to the total value of a CEO’s inside-equity compensation. Inside-debt compensation
is defined as the sum of a CEO’s total aggregate balance in deferred compensation as well as the present value of a
CEO’s accumulated pension benefits (in $000s). Inside-Equity compensation is defined as the total value of a CEO’s
current and outstanding portfolios of stock- and option-based remuneration (in $000s). Idiosyncratic Volatility is
the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. All variables are measured at time t. Intercept term
is included but not reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm and year level. The notation∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are
defined in Appendix B.
(1) (2)
JIFP Smirk JIFP Smirk
ln(1+CEO Deferred Compensation) 0.0005 0.0007
(0.27) (0.41)
ln(1+CEO Pension) 0.0011 0.0013
(0.37) (0.43)
ln(1+CEO Inside-Equity) 0.0674∗∗∗ 0.0533∗∗
(2.73) (2.47)
ln(1+CEO Vega) 0.0096 0.0088
(1.25) (1.12)
ln(1+CEO Delta) -0.0943∗∗∗ -0.0785∗∗∗
(-3.58) (-3.47)
ln(1+CEO CashComp) 0.0163 0.0143
(1.36) (1.07)
ROE 0.0210 0.0263
(0.85) (1.13)
Size -0.0118 -0.0112
(-0.45) (-0.41)
M/B -0.0029 -0.0030
(-1.01) (-1.13)
Firm D/E 0.0091 0.0107
(0.86) (1.01)
Opaque -0.0023 -0.0005
(-1.28) (-0.34)
Idiosyncratic Vol. -0.4901 -0.1806
(-0.86) (-0.30)
Observations 3476 3476
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.017
Year-FE No Yes
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Table 3.11: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on Idiosyncratic Firm
Jumps: Scaled Decile Rank Linear Model Analysis
The dependent variables are JIFP Smirk, Jump, Jump Frequency, and Jump Sigma, respectively. All independent
variables are transformed by first calculating their decile rank each fiscal year, subtracting one, and then dividing
by nine. The coefficient on the respective scaled decile rank variable is the change in the corresponding dependent
variable stemming from a bottom-to-top decile transition in the independent variable. JIFP smirk is the jump
idiosyncratic firm put smirk. Jump is set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences one or more idiosyncratic
weekly returns rising 3.09 or more standard deviations above the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return. Jump
Frequency is the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price jumps within a given firm fiscal year. Jump Sigma is
the largest standard deviation jump in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns above their firm fiscal year mean. CEO
CashComp is the CEO’s total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. CEO Delta is the dollar change in
the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s
stock price. CEO Vega is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s)
associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. CEO D/E is the
ratio of the total value of a CEO’s inside-debt compensation to the total value of a CEO’s inside-equity compensation.
Inside-debt compensation is defined as the sum of a CEO’s total aggregate balance in deferred compensation as well
as the present value of a CEO’s accumulated pension benefits (in $000s). Inside-Equity compensation is defined as
the total value of a CEO’s current and outstanding portfolios of stock- and option-based remuneration (in $000s).
Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. Intercept term is included
but not reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm and year level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗
indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in
Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
JIFP Smirk Jump Jump Frequency Jump Sigma
Rank(JIFP Smirk) 0.0170∗∗ 0.0106 0.0175
(2.06) (0.91) (0.62)
Rank(CEO D/E) 0.0027 -0.0499∗∗∗ -0.0486∗∗∗ -0.0868∗∗∗
(0.07) (-5.05) (-3.54) (-2.90)
Rank(CEO Vega) -0.0470 0.0691∗∗ 0.0638∗ 0.1127∗∗∗
(-0.85) (2.10) (1.86) (4.73)
Rank(CEO Delta) -0.0381 -0.0573 -0.0520 -0.0822
(-1.38) (-1.23) (-1.08) (-1.48)
Rank(Cash Comp) 0.0185 -0.0032 -0.0001 0.0309
(0.69) (-0.24) (-0.01) (0.99)
Rank(ROE) -0.0149 -0.0079 0.0013 -0.0047
(-1.11) (-0.30) (0.05) (-0.21)
Rank(Size) -0.0482 -0.0837∗∗ -0.0875∗∗ -0.1869∗∗∗
(-0.39) (-2.54) (-2.28) (-3.16)
Rank(M/B) -0.0164 0.0412 0.0439 0.0944∗∗
(-1.01) (1.09) (1.11) (2.14)
Rank(Firm D/E) 0.0762∗∗∗ 0.0063 0.0138 0.0395
(3.71) (0.14) (0.29) (0.81)
Rank(Opaque) 0.0687 0.0132 0.0071 0.0058
(1.64) (0.74) (0.40) (0.21)
Rank(Idiosyncratic Vol.) -0.0736 0.0202 0.0204 0.0039
(-1.57) (1.26) (1.03) (0.15)
Observations 3476 3476 3476 3476
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.005
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Table 3.12: Effect of Executive Compensation Convexity on Idiosyncratic Firm
Jumps: Scaled Decile Rank Linear Model Analysis
The dependent variables are JIFP Smirk, Jump, Jump Frequency, and Jump Sigma, respectively. All independent
variables are transformed by first calculating their decile rank each fiscal year, subtracting one, and then dividing
by nine. The coefficient on the respective scaled decile rank variable is the change in the corresponding dependent
variable stemming from a bottom-to-top decile transition in the independent variable. JIFP smirk is the jump
idiosyncratic firm put smirk. Jump is set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences one or more idiosyncratic
weekly returns rising 3.09 or more standard deviations above the mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return. Jump
Frequency is the number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price jumps within a given firm fiscal year. Jump Sigma is
the largest standard deviation jump in idiosyncratic firm weekly returns above their firm fiscal year mean. CEO
CashComp is the CEO’s total cash remuneration within a given firm fiscal year. CEO Delta is the dollar change in
the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s
stock price. CEO Vega is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation portfolio (in $000s)
associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns. CEO D/E is the
ratio of the total value of a CEO’s inside-debt compensation to the total value of a CEO’s inside-equity compensation.
Inside-debt compensation is defined as the sum of a CEO’s total aggregate balance in deferred compensation as well
as the present value of a CEO’s accumulated pension benefits (in $000s). Inside-Equity compensation is defined as
the total value of a CEO’s current and outstanding portfolios of stock- and option-based remuneration (in $000s).
Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly returns. Intercept term is included
but not reported. All t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the firm and year level. The notation ∗,∗∗,∗ ∗ ∗
indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in
Appendix B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
JIFP Smirk Jump Jump Frequency Jump Sigma
Rank(JIFP Smirk) 0.0169∗∗ 0.0103 0.0177
(2.22) (0.93) (0.63)
Rank(CEO Deferred Compensation) 0.0169 0.0183 0.0275 0.0067
(1.38) (0.71) (1.05) (0.14)
Rank(CEO Pension Value) 0.0077 -0.0533∗∗∗ -0.0500∗∗∗ -0.0821∗∗
(0.18) (-3.24) (-2.91) (-2.04)
Rank(CEO Inside-Equity) 0.0806 0.0543 0.0555 0.0617
(0.54) (0.35) (0.34) (0.24)
Rank(CEO Vega) -0.0355 0.0745 0.0690 0.1170∗
(-0.91) (1.60) (1.45) (1.95)
Rank(CEO Delta) -0.1308 -0.0937 -0.0925 -0.1040
(-0.91) (-0.52) (-0.50) (-0.35)
Rank(Cash Comp) 0.0154 -0.0040 -0.0017 0.0298
(0.59) (-0.29) (-0.14) (0.94)
Rank(ROE) -0.0152 -0.0063 0.0025 -0.0024
(-1.02) (-0.24) (0.10) (-0.12)
Rank(Size) -0.0521 -0.0882∗∗ -0.0938∗∗ -0.1918∗∗∗
(-0.42) (-2.54) (-2.34) (-3.02)
Rank(M/B) -0.0173 0.0382 0.0408 0.0913∗∗
(-1.28) (0.99) (1.01) (2.00)
Rank(Firm D/E) 0.0749∗∗∗ 0.0065 0.0136 0.0388
(3.67) (0.14) (0.29) (0.78)
Rank(Opaque) 0.0694∗ 0.0118 0.0058 0.0040
(1.65) (0.66) (0.33) (0.14)
Rank(Idiosyncratic Vol.) -0.0757 0.0175 0.0181 0.0013
(-1.57) (1.23) (1.07) (0.04)
Observations 3476 3476 3476 3476
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.005
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A. Estimation of Compensation Incentives
Delta is the dollar change in the value of the executive’s equity portfolio (in $000s)
associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. Similarly, vega is the dollar
change in the value of the executive’s equity portfolio (in $000s) associated with a
one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns.
The closed form expressions for the delta and vega of a call option on an underlying
security with dividends are provided by the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing
model as modified to account for dividend payouts:
Option Value = Se−dTN (Z) −Xe−rTN (Z − σ√T) (10)
∆ = ∂ (Option Value)
∂S
(11)
= e−dTN (Z)
ν = ∂ (Option Value)
∂σ
(12)
= e−dTN ′ (Z)S√T
Z = ln ( SX ) + T [r − d + σ22 ]
σ
√
T
(13)
where N is the cumulative density function for the normal distribution, N ′ is the
probability density function for the normal distribution, d is the natural logarithm
of the expected dividend yield, T is the time to maturity of the option in years, S
is the price of the underlying stock, X is the exercise price of the option, r is the
natural logarithm of the risk-free interest rate, and σ is the expected stock return
volatility. Accordingly, the dollar change in the value of an option associated with a
1% increase in the firm’s stock price is .01×∆×S. The dollar change in the value of
an option associated with a one percentage-point increase in the standard deviation
of the firm’s equity returns is .01 × ν.
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The methodology in Core and Guay (2002) is used to aggregate the delta and
vega of individual option grants so as to arrive at the total delta and total vega
of the executive’s option portfolio. The total delta of the executive’s portfolio of
stocks is then added to the total option portfolio delta in calculating the total delta
of the executive’s equity portfolio. The total vega of the executive’s equity portfolio
is approximated as the total vega of the option portfolio as Guay (1999) finds that
stock options, but not common stock, substantially increase the sensitivity of the
executive’s wealth to firm equity risk.
B. Variable Definitions
1. CEO Cash Compensation: Total current compensation (Salary+Bonus) of
the CEO—TOTAL CURR.
2. CEO Delta: Dollar change in the value of the CEO’s total equity compensation
portfolio (in $000s) associated with a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price.
3. CEO D/E: Ratio of the total value of a CEO’s inside-debt compensation to the
total value of a CEO’s inside-equity compensation. Inside-debt compensation is
defined as the sum of a CEO’s total aggregate balance in deferred compensation
as well as the present value of a CEO’s accumulated pension benefits (in $000s).
Inside-Equity compensation is defined as the total value of a CEO’s current and
outstanding portfolios of stock- and option-based remuneration (in $000s).
4. Discretionary Accruals: Discretionary accruals are calculated by estimating
the modified Jones model. For all firms within each Fama-French industry in a
given fiscal year, I estimate the following cross-sectional regression:
TAi,t
Assetsi,t−1 = α0 [ 1Assetsi,t−1 ] + β1 [ ∆Salesi,tAssetsi,t−1 ] + β2 [ PPEi,tAssetsi,t−1 ] + εi,t
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Discretionary accruals, for each firm fiscal year, are then calculated as follows:
DiscAcci,t = TAi,tAssetsi,t−1 − α̂0 [ 1Assetsi,t−1 ] − β̂1 [∆Salesi,t −∆Receivablesi,tAssetsi,t−1 ]
− β̂2 [ PPEi,tAssetsi,t−1 ]
where TAi,t is the total accruals, Assetsi,t is the total assets, ∆Salesi,t is the
change in sales, ∆Receivablesi,t is the change in receivables, and PPEi,t is the
property, plant, and equipment of firm i in fiscal year t, respectively.
5. Firm D/E: Defined as (dltt+dlc)/(csho*prccf).
6. Idiosyncratic Firm Weekly Returns: I estimate the below model for each
stock fiscal year and I define idiosyncratic firm weekly returns as ln(1 + ε):
ri,t = αi +β1,irm,t−1 +β2,irj,t−1 +β3,irm,t +β4,irj,t +β5,irm,t+1 +β6,irj,t+1 + εit
where ri,t is the weekly return for stock i in week t, rm,t is the weekly return
for the CRSP value-weighted market index in week t, and rj,t is the weekly
return for stock i’s value-weighted Fama-French industry index j during week
t. I include leads and lags to account for non-synchronous trading (Dimson,
1979).
7. Idiosyncratic Volatility: The standard deviation of idiosyncratic firm weekly
returns for a given firm fiscal year.
8. Jump: Set to one if, within its fiscal year, a firm experiences one or more
idiosyncratic weekly returns rising 3.09 or more standard deviations above the
mean idiosyncratic firm weekly return.
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9. Jump Frequency: The number of idiosyncratic firm stock-price jumps within
a given firm fiscal year.
10. Jump Idiosyncratic Firm Put Smirk: The ratio of the idiosyncratic implied
volatility (variance) of in-the-money put options to the idiosyncratic implied
volatility (variance) of at-the-money put options for a given firm fiscal year.
Specifically, I define JIFP Smirk for a given firm i in fiscal year t as follows:
JIFP Smirki,t = σˆ2i,t−1,ITM − [βˆ2i,t-1,Vasicek × σˆ2S&P500,t−1,ITM]
σˆ2i,t−1,ATM − [βˆ2i,t-1,Vasicek × σˆ2S&P500,t−1,ATM]
where the deltas of the in-the-money (ITM) put options and at-the-money
(ATM) put options are -.8 and -.5, respectively. σˆ2i,t−1,ITM is the average implied
volatility (variance) of in-the-money 91-day horizon firm put options as mea-
sured over the 10 trading days prior to the start of fiscal year t. σˆ2S&P500,t−1,ITM
is the average implied volatility (variance) of in-the-money 91-day horizon S&P
500 put options as measured over the 10 trading days prior to the start of fiscal
year t. σˆ2i,t−1,ATM is the average implied volatility (variance) of at-the-money
91-day horizon firm put options as measured over the 10 trading days prior to
the start of fiscal year t. σˆ2S&P500,t−1,ATM is the average implied volatility (vari-
ance) of at-the-money 91-day horizon S&P 500 put options as measured over
the 10 trading days prior to the start of fiscal year t.
11. Jump Sigma: The largest standard deviation jump in idiosyncratic firm weekly
returns above their firm fiscal year mean.
12. Leverage: Total assets minus the book value of common equity scaled by total
assets —(AT-CEQ)/AT.
13. MTB: Market value of common equity scaled by the book value of common
equity—(PRCC F*CSHO)/CEQ.
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14. Opaque: Three year moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals:
Opaquet = t−1∑
i=t−3 ∣DiscAcci∣
15. ROE: Income before extraordinary items scaled by the book value of common
equity—IBC/CEQ.
16. Size: Natural logarithm of the market value of common equity—ln(PRCC F*CSHO).
17. Total Accruals: Income before extraordinary items and discontinued opera-
tions minus the cash flow from operating activities—(IBC t-OANCF t).
18. CEO Vega: Dollar change in the value of the CEO’s total equity compensa-
tion portfolio (in $000s) associated with a one percentage-point increase in the
standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns.
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